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THE SPREAD OF ICT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH  
IS EUROPE REALLY LAGGING BEHIND IN THE NEW ECONOMY? 
(edited by Stefano Scarpetta) 
 
 
Eric Bartelsman, Andrea Bassanini, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, 
Stefano Scarpetta and Thorsten Schank 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Over the past decade, the economic performance of some OECD countries, most notably the United 
States, has renewed the interest of analysts and policy makers in what drives economic growth and  on 
how policy can eventually support it. Indeed, a number of "stylised" facts about economic growth have 
increasingly been challenged by events in the 1990s. For example, macroeconomists once largely agreed 
about the hypothesis of convergence in output per capita and productivity levels, at least among OECD 
countries that share common technologies, have intense inter-country trade and substantial foreign direct 
investment.  But OECD countries have shown significant growth divergence over the 1990s, with some 
affluent countries pulling ahead of the others. Along the same lines, economists have struggled for many 
years to find a rationale for the so-called productivity paradox (generally attributed to Robert Solow).  
Namely, why, when we are confronted by rapid changes in the quality and variety of high tech products in 
our day-to-day lives, do the macro data show an inexorable slowing down in total factor productivity (a 
proxy for technological progress)? Yet, in the 1990s, a number of countries, including the United 
States -- the one that was already at the world productivity frontier in many industries -- showed clear 
signs of a pick up in multifactor productivity growth rates. In addition, the experience of the 1980s in a 
number of European countries gave rise to the idea that expanding the employment base could only be 
achieved at the expense of labour productivity growth, since unemployment and inactivity were largely 
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concentrated amongst the low skilled. Again, the 1990s have challenged this view by showing that strong 
productivity growth can be accompanied by sustained employment growth: e.g. the United Stated and 
Ireland experienced very low unemployment rates with high and growing labour productivity growth 
rates, in the second half of the decade.   
Recent studies seem to agree that the observed changes in growth patterns in some countries are largely 
the result of the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution. In particular, it is argued 
that countries that have developed an ICT-producing industry, and/or where other industries have been 
quick in adopting highly productive ICT equipment, have been able to shift to higher output and 
productivity growth paths. In this respect, the United States and some smaller countries (e.g. Australia, 
Ireland) have benefited the most from this ICT revolution, while most large European economies are still 
lagging behind. In some circles this has been explained by the fact that “old institutions” have somehow 
slowed down the spread of ICT in Europe: e.g. rigidities in product, labour and financial markets have all 
reduced incentives to rapidly shift to ICT and to adjust production processes accordingly.  
The economic slowdown of the past two years has added additional elements to the discussion about the 
ICT revolution. It has certainly laid to rest one myth -- the end of the business cycle due to the spread of 
ICT. Two characteristics of ICT are generally thought to have an impact on business cycles.  First, the 
short life of most ICT equipment might flatten investment cycles.  Second, faster and broader 
communication amongst producers, on the one hand, and between producers and consumers, on the other 
hand, might improve the matching between demand and supply. Neither factor, has been able, at least so 
far, to prevent the OECD economies from experiencing cyclical fluctuations, although the last recession 
has been one of the mildest of the post-war history. However, the fundamental issue is whether, behind 
cyclical patterns, there has been any structural shift at least in some countries and, if so, whether this shift 
has been encouraged (or discouraged) by policy and institutional settings and reforms therein. 
This study utilises harmonised macro and sectoral data for OECD, a unique cross-country dataset 
developed for the OECD Growth Project with firm turnover and related measures at the sectoral-level, 
and establishment level micro data for the U.S. and German manufacturing sectors. These various data 
allow us to examine recent growth trends and analyse the link between ICT investment and productivity 
at the macro, sectoral and micro levels. In particular, we use aggregate data to assess whether or not there 
is evidence of growing disparities and what is driving them. This, in turn, enables us to better focus our 
research by identifying specific areas of the economy (sectors and markets) and specific institutional and 
policy settings that require further investigation. We use the firm-turnover measures and related 
decompositions of industry-level productivity dynamics to explore the role of flexibility and adaptability 
in growth and productivity.  Finally, we use establishment-level data to examine how individual 
businesses are are dealing with ICT with a focus on the role of market experimentation as evidenced by 
wage, productivity, and workforce differences across businesses.   
This information allows us to address a number of questions. What factors explain differences in output 
and productivity performance across OECD countries? What roles do the ICT-producing industries and 
ICT-driven capital deepening play in explaining the different growth patterns of countries? Is there a 
relationship between innovation intensity (e.g. R&D) and the spread of ICT? Does the adoption of ICT 
require organisational changes and/or changes in the composition of inputs? What is the contribution of 
new firms to overall productivity growth in general and in ICT-related sectors? Do ICT-industries show 
stronger firm and employment turnover rates? In this respect, is there any relationship between the spread 
of ICT and institutional features of the product and labour markets? For example, do stringent regulations 
 3 
on start-ups (as well as those affecting incumbents) affect the diffusion of ICT? Do differences in labour 
market policy and institutions explain different patterns of adoption of new technologies?  
We begin our analysis (Chapter 1) by reviewing recent aggregate growth trends and decompose them 
into the main driving forces using a standard growth accounting technique. Albeit simple in theory, this 
task is difficult in practice. First, there are differences in the way countries treat statistical problems 
related to the measurement of output in some service sectors, and quality changes in information 
technology products. Second, business cycles have been largely unsynchronised across OECD countries 
over the past decade, and this makes it difficult to compare growth patterns internationally. Our study 
relies largely on cyclically adjusted series and, whenever possible, on harmonised price deflators for ICT 
equipment.  
Macro data clearly point to widening disparities in growth performance across the OECD countries, even 
using cyclically-adjusted series. These disparities are related to differences in labour utilisation rather than 
to widening differences in labour productivity growth rates: i.e. higher growth rates in output per capita 
observed in a number of countries have been accompanied by improvements in the utilisation of labour, 
while sluggish employment in others (mainly in continental Europe) have not been fully compensated by 
higher labour productivity growth, thereby leading to a further slowdown in output growth.  
There are also some new factors behind the observed disparities in growth performance across the OECD 
countries. In particular, multifactor productivity (MFP), a proxy for technological change, accelerated in a 
number of OECD countries, most notably in the United States and Canada, but also in some small 
economies (e.g. Australia, Ireland). The acceleration of MFP growth seems to have started initially as a 
pure ‘disembodied’ phenomenon (i.e. the productivity acceleration of the ICT-producing industry), 
consistent with the idea of a slow diffusion of a new general-purpose technology.   As the ICT revolution 
progressed, intensive ICT-using industries increasingly contributed to overall productivity growth 
(although data limitations about the users of ICT by industry make this inference difficult).  The slow 
diffusion hypothesis is also consistent with the fact that MFP growth accelerated somewhat later in other 
OECD countries that did not have a sizeable ICT-producing industry.  
Why have some countries, including some small European ones, been able to develop an ICT-producing 
industry and, even more importantly, quickly adopt the IC technology? To address this question, in 
Chapter 2 we go beyond aggregate data and look at the sectoral evolution of the OECD economies.  We 
focus on the role of firm dynamics (the entry, expansion and exit of firms in each market) for productivity 
growth and adoption of technologies. Our results indicate that aggregate productivity patterns are largely 
the result of within-industry and even within-firm performance in most countries. This is not to say that 
some industries (both producers and users of ICT) have had stronger than average productivity growth 
over the past decade, and have made a major contribution to overall productivity growth in manufacturing 
and some service sectors. In turn, this strong productivity growth of ICT-related industries has also been 
driven by the entry of high performing new firms, while in other, more mature, industries the contribution 
of new firms has been more varied across countries.  
Our sectoral analysis also reveals important cross-country differences. The U.S. economy seems to be 
better able to acquire comparative advantage in rapidly growing ICT market segments than most of its 
trading partners. The U.S.  also has experienced a more widespread productivity acceleration of ICT-user 
industries, while the only notable acceleration in Europe has occurred in the finance sector. At the micro 
level, there seems to be a different degree of "market experimentation" in the United States compared 
with Europe, even if aggregate firm turnover rates are similar. In particular, the distinguishing features of 
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firms’ behaviour in the US markets are: i) a smaller (especially relative to industry average) size of 
entering firms; ii) a lower (albeit with greater variability) level of labour productivity of entrants relative 
to the average incumbent; and iii) a much stronger (employment) expansion of successful entrants in the 
initial years. Put in another way, our findings suggest that in the U.S. new firms tend to be smaller 
(relative to average incumbent) and less productive when compared with their European counterparts, but, 
if successful, they also tend to grow much more rapidly.  
The analysis in Chapter 3 is based on confidential micro establishment level micro data from the U.S. 
and Germany. We find evidence suggesting U.S. manufacturing establishments experiment with different 
ways of conducting business to a greater extent than their German counterparts.  There is greater 
experimentation amongst young businesses and there is greater experimentation among businesses 
actively changing their technology.   This experimentation is evidenced in systematic differences in the 
dispersion in productivity and in the related dispersion in key choices like skill mix and the role of 
Internet access.  The evidence also indicates the mean impact of adopting new technology greater in U.S. 
than in Germany.   Putting the pieces together suggests that U.S. businesses choose a higher mean, higher 
variance strategy in adopting new technology.    
The sectoral and micro evidence we find reinforces our belief that cross-country differences in recent 
growth patterns may, at least partially, be related to differences in underlying market and institutional 
framework conditions. In Chapter 4 we draw on economic theory to conceptually establish which 
institutional and policy factors are most likely to bear some responsibility in influencing innovation and 
adoption of new technologies by incumbent firms as well as the degree of market experimentation of both 
new entrepreneurs and existing firms. We see that product market competition affects the share of firms 
willing to undertake risky innovative investments. In a related manner, labour market regulations may be 
such that it becomes costlier up front to partake in the innovative activity. This can occur either because it 
is difficult or expensive to adjust the labour force to match the new technology, or because it is expensive 
to increase or decrease the labour force to adjust output following the uncertain outcome of the innovative 
gamble. Further, factor market regulations may restrict the degree to which firms are able to experiment 
in finding the best combination of technology, organisational structure, and relationship with customers 
and suppliers. 
Although there is a consensus that increased product market competition and market-friendly institutional 
settings are likely to have positive effects on innovation and the adoption of new technologies, there is no 
agreement on their empirical relevance. Chapter 5 checks some of the predictions of the theoretical 
analysis by looking at the comparative experience of the OECD countries in terms of sectoral multifactor 
productivity and the intensity of innovative activity (as proxied by R&D intensity). To date, the empirical 
evidence on the linkages between product market competition and productivity and innovation is limited 
due to a lack of adequate indicators of the intensity of competition, especially in a cross-country context. 
Commonly used indicators of competition (such as mark-ups or concentration indexes) are typically 
endogenous to productivity and innovation and it is often difficult to find suitable instruments. In 
addition, these indicators are likely to be non-monotonic with respect to common notions of competition 
and, in any event, do not have a direct link to policy or regulations, making it difficult to draw clear 
policy conclusions from their use. In light of these problems, we take a different approach.  Namely, since 
the degree of competition in the product market and the adaptability of labour markets are not directly 
measurable, we use some of their possible policy determinants as proxies, e.g. regulatory provisions. This 
is made possible by a novel set of quantitative indicators of cross-country differences in the stringency of 
the product and labour market regulatory environments in OECD economies.  
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Our results suggest that stringent regulatory settings in product and labour markets may help explain 
cross-country differences in innovation activity and technology adoption, thus providing an interpretation 
for the growth patterns discussed in the first three chapters of our study. It should be noted, however, that 
the impact of regulations and institutions on productivity performance and innovation seems to depend on 
certain market and technology conditions, as well as on specific firm characteristics. In particular, the 
burden of strict product market regulations on productivity seems to be greater the further a given 
country/industry is from the technology frontier. That is, strict regulation hinders the adoption of existing 
technologies, possibly because it reduces competitive pressures or technology spillovers, and restricts the 
entry of new high-tech firms. In addition, strict product market regulations have a significant negative 
impact on the process of innovation itself. Thus, given the strong impact of R&D on productivity, there is 
also an indirect channel whereby strict product market regulations may reduce the scope for productivity 
enhancement.  
The effect of high hiring and firing costs (proxied by the strictness of employment protection legislation, 
EPL) on productivity and innovation is less clear cut, and largely depends on the institutional system in 
which firms operate and the type of technology used in the sector. Firms facing high hiring and firing 
costs will tend to rely more on the internal labour market (e.g., training) than on the external one if they 
have to adjust the workforce to exploit a new technology. However, if they cannot rely on an institutional 
device to tackle possible free-riding problems (e.g., in un-coordinated regimes), then investing in internal 
labour market is risky, because other firms may poach on the pool of trained workers. Thus, when 
institutional settings do not allow wages or internal training to offset high hiring and firing costs, then the 
latter may lead to sub-optimal adjustments of the workforce to technology changes and lower productivity 
performance. Consistent with this view, we find that strict EPL has a negative impact on innovation in 
countries lacking co-ordination, while we find no significant impact of labour market flexibility in co-
ordinated countries (or even a negative impact in some industries).  
Where do these findings leave us with respect to our initial questions as to the existence of a structural 
shift in the growth patterns in some countries and the possible role of policy and institutions in 
influencing this shift? We can argue that the observed growing disparities in growth patterns across the 
OECD countries are due to a combination of "traditional" and "new" economy factors. Therefore, a 
combination of traditional and new therapies may be required for those countries, including most large 
European economies that are lagging behind in terms of output and productivity growth. The traditional 
part of the story largely refers to the inability of some countries to employ certain groups in the labour 
force, namely the low skilled. This has been the subject of a vast literature and policy prescriptions to 
overcome this pathology have been formulated by many academic researchers and international 
institutions. The good news is that the recent experience of certain countries suggests that it is possible to 
widen the employment base without necessarily facing deterioration in productivity performance. It may 
be argued that this is because of the spread of ICT that has enhanced labour productivity potentials even 
amongst the low skilled segments of the workforce. The spread of ICT has been, however, very different 
across countries and this has also contributed to widening growth disparities. Moreover, in certain 
industrial relations regimes, innovation and adoption of new technologies seem to be negatively affected 
by the stringency of certain regulations in the labour market, creating a possible synergy between labour 
market reforms, the spread of ICT and ultimately improvements in employment and output.  
In the paper we also provide evidence that strict regulations in the product market, by reducing 
competitive pressures, have a negative impact on innovation and adoption of new technologies, including 
ICT. In particular, anti-competitive regulations seem to hamper productivity growth, and the effect is 
stronger in those industries where countries have accumulated significant technology gaps (possibly 
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including ICT industries). In turn, these gaps are also explained by the effects of strict product and labour 
market regulations on the process of innovation that, among the high-tech industries, seem to be more 
negative in industries with multiple technological trajectories. To the extent to which important domains 
of the ICT industry are dominated by the frequent changes in the leading technology (e.g. in the software 
industry), these results may help to explain why some European countries, while enjoying leading 
positions in industries with cumulative technologies (such as aircrafts or motor vehicles) have been slow 
in moving into the ICT industry.  
The micro evidence reported in the paper offers additional elements in our discussion of a 
growth-enhancing policy setting. Our results seem to suggest that certain institutional and regulatory 
settings may reduce the degree of market experimentation by firms. This, in turn, could lower the speed 
with which a country shifts to a new technology, thereby offering an interpretation to the observed 
differences in innovation and adoption across the Atlantic. For example, low administrative costs of 
start-ups and not unduly strict regulations on labour adjustments in the United States, may stimulate 
potential entrepreneurs to start on a small scale, test the market and, if successful with their business plan, 
expand rapidly to reach the minimum efficient scale. In contrast, higher entry and adjustment costs in 
Europe may stimulate a pre-market selection of business plans with less market experimentation. In 
addition, the more market-based financial system in the United States compared with Europe may lead to 
a lower risk aversion to project financing, with greater financing possibilities for entrepreneurs with small 
or innovative projects, often characterised by limited cash flows and lack of collateral. On the basis of 
available data, it is difficult for us to conclude that greater market experimentation is always good for 
economic growth. On the one hand, greater experimentation may strengthen innovation in new areas and 
quicken adoption of new technologies. On the other hand, however, it may lead to excessive dynamics, 
with ‘stepping on toes’ and business stealing also producing negative externalities. Nevertheless, in a 
period (like the present) of rapid diffusion of a new general-purpose technology (ICT), greater 
experimentation may allow new ideas and forms of production to emerge more rapidly. Moreover, if ICT 
equipment also fosters innovation activity in other areas, then having a lead in its development may 
generate important synergies, with additional positive effects for the economy as a whole. These are 
amongst the research issues that may be worth developing in future studies.    
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I.  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF ICT IN SHAPING RECENT GROWTH PATTERNS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND OTHER OECD COUNTRIES? -  SOME AGGREGATE EVIDENCE 
This chapter presents some evidence on aggregate economic patterns in the OECD countries and on the 
role of the information and communication technology (ICT). Recent papers from the U.S. suggest that 
ICT has played an important role in driving the better performance of the economy, especially in the 
second half of the 1990s, and some suggest that it will continue to boost potential output over the medium 
term. More sceptical reports from European countries either deny the link between ICT and growth or 
show that they have not yet materialised. This chapter reviews cross-country evidence for several 
indicators of aggregate economic growth: real GDP (the usual summary measure of economic activity); 
GDP per capita (an indicator of the average economic welfare of the population); labour productivity; and 
multifactor productivity (a pointer to, among other things, technological progress). Next, indicators of the 
production and use of ICT show how its importance varies over time and across OECD countries. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with an indication of how ICT impacts on the observed aggregate growth patterns. 
1.1 Some stylised facts about GDP growth and its main drivers 
To set the stage for the remainder of this chapter, and indeed this report, we need to confront our opinions 
and hunches on the 'new economy' with the aggregate evidence on economic performance in recent years 
relative to historical patterns. Before starting our discussion on the observed growth patterns across the 
OECD countries, it is important to recall how difficult it is to do such comparisons. Indeed, the coverage 
and depth of analysis in all this report is constrained by the availability, accuracy and international 
comparability of economic statistics at the different levels of the analysis (macro, sectoral and micro).  
Despite continuous efforts to improve the quality and international comparability of time series of 
outputs, inputs and productivity, a number of measurement issues still arise at the aggregate and 
especially at the disaggregated levels. Two general issues that affect international comparisons of output 
measures are: i) the independence of output from input measures; and ii) the use of chain and fixed-
weighted indices. The first issue is important especially for those industries that mainly comprise non-
market producers (such as health or education), where output volume series are often based on the 
extrapolation of input measures, generating a downward bias within each country. 2 Moreover, annual 
chain-weighted indices are used in a small number of OECD countries instead of fixed base years for the 
construction of time series of outputs, inputs and productivity. Annual chain-weighted indices minimise 
the substitution bias implicit in fixed-weight price and volume indices that occurs in periods of rapid 
change of relative prices and quantities or over long time periods. Finally, the method to construct price 
indices of computers and peripheral equipment varies between OECD countries (see Box 1.1). 
                                                
2. The extent of the underestimation is difficult to determine, although BLS suggests that the order of magnitude is 
unlikely to be very large (Dean, 1999). 
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This paper uses data provided by the national authorities and included in the Analytical Data Base (ADB) 
of the OECD which takes into account changes to the new SNA. Adjustments were necessary to improve 
international comparability, especially with respect to the way in which changes in the quality of ICT is 
taken into account (see Box 1.1).3 Notwithstanding the efforts made, statements about relative growth 
performance, in particular at the sectoral level, have to be read with these caveats in mind, and results 
should be interpreted with the necessary care. 
Box 1.1. Price indices for ICT goods  
 One element that is particularly important for our analysis is  the treatment of price indices of information 
technology products, in particular computers. The significant quality improvements associated with technological 
advances in ICT have to be taken into account in the construction of ICT price indices. The use of hedonic deflators 
is generally considered as the best way to address this problem, and number of OECD countries use them to deflate 
output in the computer industry. 4 In the case of the United St ates, hedonic deflation methods are applied to most 
components of ICT investment. Other countries (e.g. Canada, Japan, France) have recently introduced some hedonic 
adjustment for the measurement of real computer investment and sometimes base their deflators on the US ones. 
Other countries make no adjustment for quality changes in ICT investment.   
Any international comparison of ICT cannot overlook this problem but, at the same time, the harmonisation of 
deflators is not an easy task, not least because there are differences in industrial specialisation; i.e. only few 
countries produce computers or semi-conductors, many only produce peripheral equipment. Bearing this caveat in 
mind, our analysis uses “harmonised” price indices for ICT products to control for some of the international 
differences in deflation methods that might affect the comparability of the results.  The “harmonised” series assumes 
that price ratios between ICT and non-ICT products have the same time patterns across countries, with the United 
States as the benchmark. For more details on this approach see Schreyer (2000). The Figure below shows the actual 
and harmonised price deflators for computers used in this study for the 8 countries for which details on different 
types of capital are available.  
                                                
3  Details are discussed in Scarpetta et al. (2000) 
4. Hedonic deflators are not the only measurement problem for the ICT manufacturing sector. The correct measurement 
of input prices for these industries is also quite complicated, and demands detailed input-output tables as well as hedonic 
deflators for certain inputs. 
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Current and harmonised price indexes for computers 
Price indexes for computers                                      Estimated “harmonised” price indexes  
USA
ITA
CAN
FIN
DEU
AUS
FRA
JPN
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
ITA
DEU
FIN
CAN
JPN
FRA
AUS
USA
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99  
Source: Colecchia, 2001 
A final issue that is important in an international comparison of growth performance in the short to 
medium term is that cross-country differences in output growth rates and levels may reflect differences in 
cyclical positions as well as underlying differences in performance (see e.g. Gordon, 2000, 2002). This 
problem was particularly relevant in the 1990s when business cycles were largely unsynchronised across 
OECD countries. In order to account for differences in the cyclical position of countries, we largely rely 
on trend series as opposed to actual series. Trend series have been estimated using an extended version of 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) where the well-known end-of-sample problem is 
minimised by prolonging the time series out of sample using OECD medium term projections. Given the 
assumptions included in the OECD projections, this can be considered as a prudent approach, insofar as it 
underestimates sharp deviations from the historical pattern in the neighbourhood of the end of the sample. 
This is particularly important at present, since the significant slowdown in the U.S. economy in the past 
two years has raised concerns as to the sustainability of the growth patterns of the late 1990s in the U.S. 
over the medium term. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, our first pass at the data is to look at the development of GDP per capita 
over time to see whether there is any evidence of shifts in the growth path of OECD countries owing to 
increased penetration of ICT throughout the economy.  Figure 1 suggests that, for the OECD area as a 
whole, trend GDP per capita growth rates slowed down in the 1990s compared with the previous decade. 
However, there has been a fairly widespread pick up in growth in the second half of the decade (with the 
exception of Korea, Japan and Turkey). This aggregate pattern, however, hides persistent differences 
across countries. Amongst the G-7, Canada and to a lesser extent the United States were able to reverse 
the slowdown in growth performance observed since the early 1970s, while the other countries 
experienced declining growth (particularly Japan and Italy). Outside the G-7, however, several smaller 
OECD countries also were able to reverse the slowdown in GDP per capita growth. It is noticeable that 
disparities in growth performance were particularly marked within Europe, with most of the large 
countries experiencing a significant slowdown in GDP per capita growth and some (mainly small) 
economies showing acceleration in growth. 
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Labour utilisation and productivity lay behind widening growth disparities  
From an accounting point of view, aggregate GDP per capita growth can be decomposed into four 
elements:  
§ Changes in the ratio of persons of working-age (15–64 years) to the total population; 
§ Changes in the ratio of employed persons to the working-age population, i.e. the employment rate; 
§ Changes in the number of working hours per person employed; 
§ Changes in GDP per hour worked. 
Figure 2 presents a breakdown of growth of GDP per capita in these components for most OECD 
countries over the period 1990-2000. 
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Figure 2.  Growth in trend GDP per capita and its components, 1990-2000 
            G D P  p e r  c a p i t a  g r o w t h
                       C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  G D P  p e r  c a p i t a  g r o w t h  f r o m  t r e n d  c h a n g e s  i n :
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As the period considered is quite short, the impact of changes in demographic structure is limited. For 
most countries, the share of the working-age population in the total population changed only marginally 
over the 1990s. However, the slight decline in this share in a number of old OECD countries reversed the 
post-war trend and mechanically reduced the growth of GDP per capita. Countries with significant 
changes are those with a rapidly evolving age structure due to strong population growth (Korea) and 
changes in migration flows (e.g. Ireland). 
Participation rates for the OECD countries as a whole have been rather stable over the recent past, with 
rising prime -age female participation rates largely compensated by falling participation rates among older 
workers and youths. In a few countries, the rise in part-time work (most notably in the Netherlands) has 
been associated with increasing participation rates, especially, amongst women (see OECD, 1999a). In 
the other countries, participation rates made more modest contributions to growth or even fell in some of 
those with high levels (notably in most of the Nordic countries). 
Although some theoretical cons ideration link labour force participation with ICT, the new economy story 
is mostly related to what is happening to the last component of GDP per capital, namely GDP per hour 
worked. Labour productivity growth accounts for at least half of GDP per capita growth in most OECD 
countries and considerably more than that in many of them. Notwithstanding differences in labour 
productivity growth rates across countries, it is noticeable that the overall dispersion did not change in the 
1990s as compared with the 1980s, despite the significant widening of GDP per capita growth rates 
discussed above.  
A key factor to reconcile growing disparities in GDP per capita growth rates in a context of broadly stable 
differences in labour productivity growth is a divergence in the shares of the working-age population in 
employment. The 1990s witnessed striking differences in the evolution of employment rates. Significant 
increases in labour utilisation (employment plus hours) in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, the United 
States and Australia (above one half of a percentage point) contrast sharply with slumps in Japan, 
Germany, Finland and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden.5 Notably, the United States is 
the only clear case where both hours worked and employment rates increased in the past decade by a 
significant amount. 
Enhancement in human capital contributed to boost labour productivity 
The simple measure of output per hour worked is only a crude approximation of productivity, insofar as 
workers show great differences in education, experience, sector of activity and other attributes that greatly 
affect their marginal productivity. To refine our analysis we use a measure of labour input in efficiency 
units obtained by weighting different types of labour by their marginal contribution to the production 
activity in which they are employed.6 Since these productivity measures are generally not observable, 
information on relative wages by characteristics was used to derive the required weights to aggregate 
different types of labour. The difference between the weighted and un-weighted series yields an index for 
the compositional change of labour input, or its quality. 
                                                
5 . These patterns resulted from generally negative changes in hours worked in most countries (Sweden and the United 
States being exceptions) and wide differences in the growth of the employment rate. 
6 . See Scarpetta et al., (2000) for more details. 
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To take into account the effect of changes in the composition of the labour input six different types of 
labour have been considered, based on gender and three different educational levels: below 
upper-secondary education; upper-secondary education and tertiary education. Relative wages are used to 
proxy for relative productivity. Two additional assumptions have also been made to construct a measure 
of labour input: i) workers with different levels of education are assumed to work the same (average) 
number of hours; and ii) relative wage rates are assumed to be constant over the sample period. To the 
extent that these are a reasonable assumption, the measured labour input controls for changes in the 
“quality” of the workforce over time. Compared with other proxies available in the literature (largely for 
the United States) this decomposition is rather crude, but it does shed light on the role of compositional 
changes in labour input consistently for a range of OECD countries, thereby permitting cross-country 
comparisons.  
Table 1 decomposes changes in total labour input into a component that reflects un-weighted changes in 
total hours and a second component reflecting the changing educational composition of labour, as well as 
changes in the relative wages earned by different workers. Given data availability, the decomposition 
covers only a selected number of OECD countries over the 1990s. The labour composition effect is 
positive in most cases, implying that quality-adjusted hourly labour input grew faster than total hours.7 In 
most European countries, sluggish employment growth and falling hours worked have been accompanied 
by a significant up-skilling of the workforce. This raises the suspicion that productivity gains have been 
achieved in part by dismissing or not employing low-productivity workers.8 By contrast, in other 
countries with greater labour utilisation (e.g. Ireland, the Netherlands) the skill upgrading has played a 
relatively modest role in total labour productivity growth. Improving labour market conditions and 
structural reforms have widened the employment base in these countries, especia lly in the 1990s, allowing 
low skilled workers to get a foothold into employment, but reducing the overall process of skill 
upgrading. 9 
                                                
7. The result for Germany reflects the discrete fall in the average education level of the workforce in the aftermath of the 
unification with the Eastern Länder. 
8 . Indeed, Scarpetta et al. (2000) show that for a number of Continental European countries there has been a general 
tendency towards skill-biased employment growth: i.e. the increase in share of workers with high education levels has been 
higher amongst in the employed population than in the overall working age population. 
9. As shown in a recent paper (OECD, 1999) in these countries (as well as in Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland) the 
unemployment rate of the low educated fell as much as the overall unemployment rate, while in most of the other countries the 
low educated experienced relatively smaller reductions or greater increases in unemployment than the average. 
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Table 1.  Trends in labour input, total hours and labour composition, 1990-2000 
Total  labour 
input
Total  
hours
Labour 
composition
(adjusted for 
compositional 
change)
Persons 
engaged
Average 
hours per 
person
United States 2.0 1.6 1.3 0.3 0.3
Germany -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0
France 0.6 0.1 0.5 -0.4 0.5
Italy 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.6
United Kingdom 1.2 0.4 0.6 -0.2 0.8
Canada 1.5 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.3
Australia 1.7 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0
Denmark 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2
Finland -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 0.5
Ireland 2.3 2.3 3.3 -1.0 0.0
Netherlands 1.0 1.1 2.1 -0.9 -0.2
New Zealand 1.5 1.6 1.6 0.0 -0.1
Norway 0.7 0.5 0.8 -0.3 0.2
Portugal 1.8 0.5 1.0 -0.5 1.3
Sweden 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 0.6 0.3
of which:
(average annual percentage change)
 
To summarise, our examination of recent trends in output and labour productivity indicates that the 
OECD have experienced quite different growth experiences over the past decade. GDP growth disparities 
have tended to widen, and stable  hourly labour productivity in some European countries has been 
associated with low or falling employment levels. Amongst the major economies, the United States was 
an exception in the 1990s combining significant acceleration in  labour productivity growth rates with 
rising labour utilisation even among low-skilled workers. In many Continental European economies there 
is some evidence of a skill-biased employment performance with low-skilled workers been trapped into 
unemployment or inactivity.  
Changes in MFP growth also play a role in shaping aggregate performance across countries 
Labour productivity growth provides only partial insights into overall economic efficiency. First of all, 
changes in labour productivity growth rates may occur because of changes in the capital/labour ratio, 
which in turn depends upon the rate of growth in fixed capital formation and/or changes in employment. 
Output growth also depends on the productivity of physical capital, which measures how this input is 
used in providing goods and services. 
A standard way to assess changes in the overall efficiency in the economy is to look at the growth rate of 
output that is not explained by changes in the quantity and quality of production factors, i.e. multi-factor 
productivity growth (MFP, also referred to as total factor productivity. Figure 3 reports MFP growth rates 
in the business sector in a large sample of countries computed using total hours worked and gross capital 
stock as factor inputs (i.e. without any adjustment for changes in the quality and composition of labour 
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and capital inputs).10 This is the broadest measure of productivity growth that incorporates the effects of 
progress in human capital as well as embodied (in physical capital) and disembodied technological 
progress.11  
Figure 3.  Changes in MFP growth rates, (1990s1 vs.1980s 2) 
       ( 1990-2000)1- ( 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 0 ) 2
       ( 1995-2000)3- ( 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 0 ) 2
D i f f e r e n c e  i n  a v e r a g e  M F P  ( b r o a d  m e a s u r e )  g r o w t h  r a t e  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 0  a n d  1 9 9 0 - 2 0 0 0
1 .  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 6  f o r  I r e l a n d  a n d  S w e d e n ,  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 7  f o r  A u s t r i a ,  B e l g i u m  a n d  N e w  Z e a l a n d ,  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 8  f o r  N e t h e r l a n d s ,
    1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 9  f o r  A u s t r a l i a ,  D e n m a r k ,  F r a n c e ,  I t a l y ,  J a p a n  a n d  1 9 9 1 - 2 0 0 0  f o r  G e r m a n y .
2 .  1 9 8 2 - 1 9 9 0  f o r  F i n l a n d ,  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 9 0  f o r  B e l g i u m , D e n m a r k  a n d  I r e l a n d ,  1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0  f o r  A u s t r i a  a n d  N e w  Z e a l a n d .
3 .  1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 7  f o r  A u s t r i a ,  B e l g i u m  a n d  N e w  Z e a l a n d ,  1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 8  f o r  N e t h e r l a n d s ,  1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 9  f o r  A u s t r a l i a ,  D e n m a r k ,
     F rance ,  I t a l y ,  Japan .
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10 . The focus on the business sector is due to the inherent difficulties in measuring output and capital stock for the 
government sector. Moreover, trend series avoid picking up idiosyncratic movements in output and inputs. 
11. For countries that use hedonic (or similar) price indices for certain investment goods (e.g. ICT), this measure of MFP 
growth rate does not incorporate technological progress embodied in them (as the capital stock is augmented by the 
improvements in quality of ICT goods). Bassanini et al. (2000) try to identify this component of broad MFP growth by 
considering the differences in growth rates of hedonic and non-hedonic price indexes of ICT. For the United States, the embodied 
part of MFP growth would be about 0.2 percentage point in the 1980-90 period and about 0.3 percentage point in the 1990-96 
period. 
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Figure 4 suggests that Ireland, Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway and New Zealand all experienced an 
acceleration in the average growth rates of MFP of at least 0.5 percentage points over the past decade (in 
most cases from relatively low levels in the 1980s). The United States recorded a somewhat smaller 
recovery in MFP growth that, however, reversed a longstanding downward trend. Conversely, MFP 
growth rates decreased significantly in a number of countries, including all the other G7 countries. In the 
most recent years (1995-2000), MFP seems to have accelerated more strongly in Canada, United States, 
Australia and Finland.  
It should be stressed, however, that these MFP growth patterns are associated with quite different 
economic developments. For example, in Australia, Ireland, Canada, Norway, New Zealand and the 
United States improvements in the growth rate of MFP have gone hand in hand with high and often rising 
labour utilisation and rapid GDP per capita growth. In contrast, in Sweden and Finland, increases in MFP 
growth rates have been accompanied by a significant slow down in GDP per capita growth rates and 
significant falls in employment rates.12  
I.2 The role of ICT 
Most of the recent debate about the ‘new economy’ has centred around the continuous technological 
advances in information and communication technology, largely relying on evidence for the United 
States. Here we would like to assess evidence on the role of ICT in influencing aggregate growth for a 
broader set of countries. Conceptually, ICT can raise output or output growth via several routes: i) an 
increase in productivity growth in the ICT-producing sectors themselves,13 and/or an increase in size of 
the fast-growing ICT-producing sectors in the economy; ii) capital deepening driven by high levels of 
investment in ICT equipment; and iii)  increases in efficiency in ICT-using sectors that successfully adopt 
this new technology.  
The ICT-producing industry is generally small, but has grown rapidly over the past decade 
The ICT sector accounts for a relatively small share of total value added in the OECD business sector 
(Figure 4): from less than 5 per cent in Australia to more than 8 per cent in Finland, United Kingdom, 
United States, Sweden and Korea. More interestingly, the composition of the broad ICT-producing 
industry varies considerably across the board: differences in the size of telecommunication industry are 
                                                
12 . In these latter cases, severe crises in the early 1990s (in Finland largely due to the collapse of the Soviet market) most 
likely led to cleansing the least productive activities with major employment losses but also with an increase in the recorded 
average MFP growth. Hence, their pattern of MFP growth does not reflect only an acceleration of technical change but also a 
one-shot reduction of inefficiencies. 
13. The ICT -producing sector includes the following industries according to the International Standard Industry 
Classification (ISIC) Revision 3: Manufacturing (ISIC Rev3 3000) Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
machinery; (ISIC Rev3 3130) Manufacture of insulated wire and cable; (ISIC Rev3 3210) Manufacture of electronic valves 
and tubes and other electronic components; (ISIC Rev3 3220) Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and lin e telegraphy; (ISIC Rev3 3230) Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods; (ISIC Rev3 3312) Manufacture of instruments and appliances for 
measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment; (ISIC Rev3 3313) 
Manufacture of industrial process control equipment. In Services (ISIC Rev3 5150) Wholesale of machinery, equipment and 
supplies; (ISIC Rev3 7123) Renting of office machinery and equipment (including computers); (ISIC Rev3  6420) 
Telecommunications; (ISIC Rev3  7200) Computer and related activities. See OECD (2000b). 
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rather modest, while countries differ significantly in the size of ICT manufacturing and in ICT-related 
services.     
Figure 4. The share of the ICT sector in total GDP, 1998 
1 .  I n c l u d i n g  a l l  o f  w h o l e s a l e  o f  m a c h i n e r y ,  e q u i p m e n t  a n d  s u p p l i e s  ( I S I C  5 1 5 0 ) .
2 .  E x c l u d i n g  a l l  o f  w h o l e s a l e s  o f  m a c h i n e r y ,  e q u i p m e n t  a n d  s u p p l i e s  ( I S I C  5 1 5 0 ) .
3 .  Ca l cu l a t ed  f o r  t he  24  coun t r i es  f o r  wh i ch  da ta  a re  ava i l ab l e .
S o u r c e :  O E C D  ( 2 0 0 0 ) ,  M e a s u r i n g  t h e  I C T  S e c t o r .
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Notwithstanding the small share in total value added, the ICT-producing industry contributed 
significantly to a surge in productivity in a number of countries, especially in the latter part of the 1990s. 
Figure 5 shows the contribution of the broad electrical equipment industry -- which comprises most of the 
ICT-producing industries -- to total manufacturing labour productivity growth in the previous decade and 
in the 1990s. The contribution of this industry to aggregate labour productivity has increased in the 1990s 
in most countries. More generally, the services part of the ICT sector tended to have more rapid 
productivity growth than the service sector as a whole.14 Other studies for the United States and a few 
European countries suggest that there has been a further substantial increase in contributions from 
ICT-producing industries in the second half of the 1990s.15  
                                                
14. There is also additional evidence on the role of the ICT-producing industry in country studies. For example, Forsman 
(2000) suggests that the mobile telephone producer Nokia accounted for more than one-fourth of GDP growth of 4% in Finland 
in 1999. Moreover, the Bank of Korea find that about 40% of recent GDP growth in Korea came from the ICT sector, five times 
its 1999 share in GDP (Yoo, 2000).  
15 . OECD data only allow to assess the role of ICT-producing industries in Denmark, Finland and Germany (see Pilat 
and Lee (2001). In Finland and Germany, the contribution of the ICT producing sector increased dramatically in the second half 
of the 1990s compared to the first half the 1990s. For the United States, see Jorgenson and Stiroh, (2000); Oliner and Sichel 
(2000). 
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Figure 5. Contribution of the electrical machinery industry to total labour productivity in 
manufacturing  
(% of total labour productivity growth) 
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Source: Calculations on the basis of the OECD STAN database. 
There has also been a strong process of capital deepening boosted by falling prices of ICT  
The next channel through which ICT operates on output and productivity is through capital deepening. 
Technological progress has manifested itself, in part, through falling prices of ICT equipment.  Falling 
prices have boosted the real investment, through a mixture of income and substitution effects resulting 
from the changing relative price structure of inputs to production; thus increasing the amount of ICT 
capital used in production.  
The availability of rapidly improving ICT capital goods has certainly had an impact on investment 
patterns across OECD countries.  Unfortunately, no official data sources provide time series of ICT 
investment in real and nominal terms for the OECD countries. The following makes use of work done at 
the OECD to collect and analyse cross-country ICT investment on the basis of data from statistical offices 
national accounts (Colechia and Schreyer, 2001).16 
In the G-7 countries, the share of IT capital goods in total investment expenditure rose steadily over the 
1990s, and ranged from 3 to more than 8 per cent of total non-residential gross fixed capital formation in 
2000.  The share of communication equipment also increased, though less rapidly (with the exception of 
Finland where it rose dramatically), and accounted for around 4 to 8 per cent of total non-residential 
                                                
16 . Other sources of ICT investment data are Daveri (2001), Schreyer (2000) and Van Ark (2001).  
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investment.17 Software investment also rose rapidly: from being a marginal component of total investment 
in the 1980s to one main driving force (especially in the United States).  
Moreover, at constant prices, volume growth rates of IT capital investment progressed at an annual rate 
from 20 to more than 30 per cent over the 1995-2000 period, while communication equipment and 
software investment progressed at an annual rate generally above 10 per cent over the same period.   This 
fast growth is due to an annual decline in IT price indices of about 20 per cent annually (much less for 
communication equipment and software), reflecting rapid quality improvements and technical progress 
embodied in these capital goods. 
Table 2 - ICT investment, 1980 - 2000 
Percentage share of  ICT investment in total  non-resident ia l  investment
Current prices, 1980-2000
Australia Canada Finland France Germany Italy Japan
United 
Kingdom
Uni ted
 States
IT  equ ipment 1980 2.2 3.9 2.0 2.5 4.6 4.1 3.3 2.9 5.1
1990 5.5 4.5 3.6 3.5 5.5 4.2 3.8 6.0 7.0
1995 8.4 5.7 4.0 3.9 4.6 3.5 4.6 8.6 8.7
2000 7.2 7.9 2.9 4.4 6.1 4.2 5.2 8.4 8.3
Communicat ion equ ipment 1980 4.0 3.0 3.2 2.9 3.9 4.0 3.4 1.6 7.1
1990 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.2 4.8 5.7 4.0 2.0 7.5
1995 4.7 4.0 9.3 3.5 4.2 6.7 5.3 3.6 7.3
2000 5.6 4.2 15.3 3.9 4.3 7.2 6.9 3.6 8.0
Sof tware 1980 1.1 2.2 2.6 1.3 3.6 1.7 0.4 0.3 3.0
1990 4.6 4.9 5.2 2.6 3.7 3.8 3.1 2.1 8.0
1995 6.4 7.1 9.2 3.5 4.5 4.3 4.0 3.5 10.1
2000 9.7 9.4 9.8 6.1 5.7 4.9 3.8 3.0 13.6
Source :  Colecchia and Schreyer (2001).   
This strong ICT-led process of capital deepening has contributed to boost output growth in most OECD 
countries for which data are available. The contribution of ICT equipment and software to output growth 
of the business sector has been between less than 0.4 (France, Italy, Japan) and almost 0.9 percentage 
points a year over the second half of the 1990s. In terms of shares in overall output growth this translates 
in an average contribution that ranges between 12 and 35 per cent across countries in the sample  (see 
Figure 6). The contribution on the second half of the 1990s was particularly high in absolute terms in the 
United States, more than doubling with respect to the 1980-85 period. However, strong contributions also 
emerged in Australia, Finland and Japan. 
It is also worth noting the increasing contribution of software capital to output growth. Over the second 
half of the 1990s, the accumulation of software capital accounted for a third of the overall contribution of 
ICT capital to output growth. What is remarkable is that this result holds across all OECD countries in the 
sample, with the exception of Japan.18 In particular, the percentage contribution of software capital to 
                                                
17 . Methodologies to measure the price change in ICT capital goods vary a great deal across the OECD countries.  The 
figures reported are based on a harmonised deflator constructed on the assumption that the differences between price changes for 
ICT capital goods and non -ICT goods are the same across countries.  See Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) for more details. 
18 . This is partly due to the fact that software investment in Japan is underestimated. 
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output growth almost doubled from the second-half of the 1980s to the second half of the 1990s in the 
United States, and increased significantly also in Germany, and France.19 
Figure 6.  The contribution of ICT capital to output growth 
Business sector, based on harmonised ICT price index 
P e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t  g r o w t h  i n  o u t p u t  d u e  t o  I T  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  e q u i p m e n t
P e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t  g r o w t h  i n  o u t p u t  d u e  t o  s o f t w a r e
( … % ) P e r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  o u t p u t  g r o w t h
S o u r c e :  A u t h o r s '  c a l c u l a t i o n s  f r o m  C o l e c c h i a  a n d  S c h r e y e r  ( 2 0 0 2 )
( 1 3 . 0  % )
( 1 6 . 3  % )
( 1 9 . 8  % )
( 3 4 . 5  % )
( 2 3 . 3  % )
( 3 4 . 5  % )
( 7 . 5  % )
( 1 3 . 5  % )
( 1 8 . 4  % )
( 6 . 4  % )
( 1 8 . 6  % )
( 1 2 . 5  % )
( 1 0 . 2  % )
( 1 4 . 6  % )
( 1 8 . 7  % )
( 7 . 4  % )
( 1 2 . 7  % )
( 1 3 . 5  % )
( 1 1 . 4  % )
( 1 6 . 8  % )
( 1 3 . 6  % )
( 1 2 . 1  % )
( 1 4 . 2  % )
( 1 4 . 7  % )
( 1 2 . 3  % )
( - 3 4 . 3  % )
( 1 1 . 0  % )
0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4 0 . 5 0 . 6 0 . 7 0 . 8 0 . 9 1 . 0
1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 9
F i n l a n d         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0
A u s t r a l i a         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0
C a n a d a         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 9
I t a l y         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0
F r a n c e         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0
W e s t e r n  G e r m a n y         1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 9
J a p a n         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0
U n i t e d  S t a t e s         1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 0
 
                                                
19 . It should be stressed that measurement on soft ware capital differs greatly across countries and in some countries it is 
likely that existing figures grossly underestimate it. In addition, the price indexes of software equipment do not fully account for 
quality improvements in this asset. In summary, the contribution of software capital to output growth should be considered as a 
lower bound estimate of the real contribution. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) perform some simulations with three alternative 
scenarios for software price indexes (baseline, modera te price decline and rapid price decline). They find that the contribution of 
software to capital accumulation in the US in 1995-98 would increase from 0.17% in the baseline scenario to 0.37% and 0.48% 
in the moderate and rapid decline in price scenarios. 
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All in all, these results indicate that the United States was not alone in experiencing an ICT-led growth in 
the second-half of the 1990s: in particular, Australia, Canada and Finland all experienced some 
acceleration in growth because of a strong ICT capital deepening. However, the impact of ICT in the 
other countries in the sample, was less marked. If anything, the distinguishing feature of the United States 
is that a stronger role to the overall impact of ICT to output growth was played by software capital 
accumulation. This might be linked to the rapid diffusion of Internet applications, an issue to which we 
will return later in this chapter. 
ICT investment also contributed to embodied technological progress 
Changes in the composition of the capital stock resulting from the shift towards ICT equipment also allow 
us to shed light on the role of embodied part of technological progress. The estimates of MFP growth 
presented above do not take into account quality changes in factor inputs and thus capture both embodied 
and disembodied technological and organisational improvements that increase output for given amount of 
inputs. Data on the composition of the capital stock into seven different assets, and availability of quality 
adjusted and non-adjusted price indexes for ICT equipment allow to assess how shifts towards ICT have 
contributed to the observed pick up in MFP growth observed in some countries. The shift towards ICT 
assets, whose relative prices have been falling, implies that with the same amount of foregone 
consumption it is possible to acquire a greater amount of productive capital services. We can tentatively 
term “embodied” technological change the expansion of the productive capacity resulting from this 
process.20 It should be stressed that in doing so we assume that changes in the quality and composition of 
capital assets fully reflect improvements in the productivity capacity of new vintages and not other 
influences, e.g. changes in consumer preferences.  
In the same vein as the correction for changes in the composition and quality of physical capital, the 
evolution of the total labour input can be decomposed into changes in the quality-constant hours worked 
and quality changes due to shifts towards more skilled workers. Indeed, improvements in human capital 
can be seen as reflecting a widening of the knowledge base that could be added to the embodied part of 
technological change. However, as discussed above, the observed changes in the skill composition of the 
workforce do not only represent a progress in the knowledge base of the working age population but also 
a skill-biased evolution of employment that has left out relatively low-skilled worked.  
From these considerations, we complement the measure of MFP growth presented above with two 
alternative measures. The first shifts back changes in labour quality from MFP to the labour input. The 
second measures  fully disembodied technological change and is computed by subtracting growth in factor 
inputs that are fully adjusted for changes in quality and composition from output growth (this is what 
Jorgenson, 1966, would consider as the only identifiable component of technological progress.   
Table 3 suggests that one-third of the acceleration in MFP in the United States from the first to the second 
half of the 1990s was due to embodied technical progress, while the contribution of this factor was 
generally smaller (with the exception of Finland) in the other countries. However, for the U.S. the 
contribution of embodied technical progress was also strong in the second half of the 1980s. To better 
                                                
20 . In particular, embodied technological change includes both changes in the composition of physical capital and 
changes in the quality of the different assets. From the discussion above, a proxy for total (embodied and disembodied) 
technological change can be computed as the residual from a growth accounting exercise in which we use the standard measure 
of capital stock (deflated at real acquisition prices). This can be justified from a theoretical point of view on the basis of the work 
of Solow (1960) and Fisher (1965). For a more detailed discussion on this issue see Bassanini et al. (2000). 
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assess the role of the different components, Figure 7, plots the different measures of MFP growth for the 
U.S. The first point to notice is that the end of the productivity slowdown should be dated back to the 
early 1980s and not to the nineties as often stressed on the basis of unadjusted series. This holds whatever 
measure of MFP growth is considered. Moreover, the contribution of ICT to embodied technological 
progress has increased over time to peak in the second half of the 1990s, as a result of a faster pace of ICT 
adoption.  
Table 3. Estimates of MFP growth rates 1980-2000 
Average  annua l  g rowth
Austral ia C a n a d a F in land France Germany Italy J a p a n
Uni ted 
K ingdom
Uni ted
 S t a t e s
Broad  measu re 1980 -1985 1 0.68 0.49 2.46 2.00 1.15 1.53 1.92 .. 0 .82
( techn ica l  change +  human cap i ta l ) 1985 -1990 2 0.46 0.77 2.36 1.71 1.46 1.57 2.38 1.01 1.03
1990 -1995 3 1.18 1.00 2.76 0.92 0.65 1.22 1.22 0.63 0.95
1995 -2000 4 1.50 1.45 3.11 1.02 0.84 0.72 0.62 0.93 1.28
Ad jus ted  fo r  human cap i ta l 1980 -1985 1 .. 0 .32 2.20 1.82 .. .. .. .. 0 .67
(embod ied  +  d isembod ied  techn ica l  change) 1985 -1990 2 .. 0 .61 2.01 1.36 .. .. .. 0 .66 0.87
1990 -1995 3 1.12 0.79 2.37 0.44 0.67 0.76 .. 0 .02 0.79
1995 -2000 4 1.36 1.24 2.79 0.60 0.87 0.27 .. 0 .29 1.12
Ful ly  adjusted 1980 -1985 1 .. 0 .12 2.01 1.66 .. .. .. .. 0 .47
(d isembodied technica l  change) 1985 -1990 2 .. 0 .40 1.82 1.18 .. .. .. 0 .46 0.65
1990 -1995 3 0.79 0.58 2.12 0.26 0.47 0.58 .. -0 .19 0.50
1995 -2000 4 1.01 0.97 2.52 0.41 0.66 0.08 .. 0 .04 0.72
M e m o r a n d u m  i t e m : 1980 -1985 1 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.14 .. 0 .20
        embodied techn ica l  change 1985 -1990 2 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22
1990 -1995 3 0.33 0.22 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.29
1995 -2000 4 0.35 0.28 0.38 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.40
1.  1982-1985 for  F in land.
2 .  1987-1990  fo r  the  Un i ted  K ingdom.
3.  1991-1995 for  Germany.
4 .  1995-1997 for  the Uni ted K ingdom,1995-1999 for  Aust ra l ia ,  France,  I ta ly  and Japan.
Source:  Bassanin i  and Scarpet ta  (2002) .  
 23 
Figure 7.  Different measures of trend MFP growth rates for the United States, 1970-2000 
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Table 3 above also suggests an acceleration in MFP growth in a number of countries even in fully 
disembodied technical progress. This is encouraging because it suggests that even countries without a 
sizeable ICT-producing industry have benefited from the spread of ICT, by shifting towards this more 
productive technology. Indeed, if the acceleration in fully-adjusted MFP growth due to ICT were merely a 
reflection of rapid technological progress in the production of computers, semi-conductors and related 
products and services, there would be no visible effects of ICT on MFP in countries that do not have a 
sizeable ICT-producing industry. For ICT to have visible effects on MFP in countries that do not produce 
ICT goods, it requires to have spillover effects -- or network externalities -- linked to its use in other 
sectors of the economy.  
Figures 8 and 9 shows some additional light on this issue. They indicate some prima facie evidence of a 
possible relationship between the acceleration of MFP growth and the overall intensity of ICT, the latter 
proxied by either total ICT expenditure or by a more specific indicator of the intensity of PC use by the 
population. Indeed, countries with greater expenditure in ICT and greater PC intensity were also those 
characterised by acceleration of MFP growth over the past decade.   
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Figure 8.  Change in MFP growth and ICT expenditure, 1990-99 
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Figure 9. Change in MFP growth and change in PC intensity, 1990-99 
Correlation coefficient: 0.63 
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1.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have shed some light on recent growth trends in the OECD countries and, in particular, 
in our comparison of the United States with Europe. We identify a number of stylised facts that will guide 
our empirical investigation in the following chapters, including: 
§ Per capita GDP growth was uneven across the OECD in the 1990s. While some economies 
experienced an acceleration of growth (e.g. Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands, the United States and 
Canada) others, including the large ones in continental Europe, persisted along the slow growth path 
observed since the 1970s.  
§ Compared to per capita GDP, labour productivity growth rates across countries were fairly persistent 
across countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The explanation for these seemingly conflicting patterns is 
the diversity in the trends in labour utilisation: in general, an acceleration in GDP growth rates have 
been accompanied by improvements in the utilisation of labour. In the countries where labour 
productivity picked up as well, employment usually fell or stagnated.  In this context, the United 
States stands out with respect to large Continental European countries not much in terms of labour 
productivity, but as having an acceleration in labour productivity growth being accompanied by 
growth in hours and employment.      
§ There are also some new factors behind the observed disparities in growth performance across the 
OECD countries. In particular, multifactor productivity (MFP), taken as a proxy for technological 
change, accelerated in a number of countries, most notably in the United States and Canada, but also 
in some small economies (e.g. Ireland, Australia). In the United States, the acceleration of MFP 
growth seem to have started initially as a pure ‘disembodied’ phenomenon, consistent with the idea of 
a slow diffusion of a new general purpose technology. Later on, an increasing contribution to overall 
productivity growth seems to result from greater use of highly productive ICT equipment by other 
industries. The slow diffusion hypothesis is also consistent with the fact that MFP growth accelerated 
somewhat later in other OECD countries that did not have a sizeable ICT-producing industry.  
§ The intensity of investment in ICT (either relative to GDP or to total investment) has increased in 
most countries, but still varies across the board. The United States does not stand out in this respect, 
as number of (small) European countries have experienced a surge in the most recent years. What 
distinguished the United States from most large European economies is the larger (and more 
productive) ICT-producing industry.  
§ Providing further support to the role of ICT in shaping recent growth trends, we also show a positive 
link between ICT expenditure and the acceleration of MFP growth across countries.  
 26 
2.  SCRAPING THE SURFACE: WHAT LIES BEHIND AGGREGATE GROWTH PATTERNS?  
INDUSTRY- AND FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the impact of ICT on growth can follow three paths: the rapid 
growth of the broadly defined ICT industry, the ICT-induced process of capital deepening, and the 
improvements in efficiency in ICT-using sectors. In this chapter we aim at shedding further light on why 
countries have had such different performance along these paths, although we will not be able to 
disentangle the latter two paths. We use industry-level data, which are available for several OECD 
countries, as well as firm-level data for a selected sample of countries. First, we assess how shifts of 
resources across industries have contributed to the observed productivity performance. Then we look 
more closely at the ICT-producing industries and assess whether, despite their different size across 
countries, they consistently boosted aggregate productivity. We then descend to firm-level data and assess 
how firm dynamics (entry, exit and post-entry growth) has contributed to manufacturing and 
industry-specific performance with a particular focus on ICT industries.  
2.1 The composition of aggregate productivity growth: the ICT sector and beyond.  
Aggregate productivity growth patterns depend on within-industry productivity performance as well as 
shifts of resources across industries. Historically, structural shifts were an important factor, as resources 
moved from a low-productive agricultural sector to a more productive manufacturing sector. More 
recently, the evidence from aggregate data seems to suggest that a large contribution to overall 
productivity growth patterns comes from productivity changes within  industries rather than as a result of 
significant shifts of employment across industries (van Ark, 1996). For the purpose of an international 
comparison, Figure 1 presents a decomposition of labour productivity growth in the business sector in 
three factors using the most disaggregated sectors available in STAN (2-digit ISIC for services and a 3-4 
digit ISIC for manufacturing):21 
§ An “intra-sectoral effect”, that measures productivity growth within industries; 
§ A “net-shift effect”, that measures the impact on productivity of the shift in employment between 
industries; 
§ And a residual third effect, the “interaction effect”. This effect is positive when sectors with growing 
productivity have a growing employment share or when industries with falling relative productivity 
                                                
21. The shift-share analysis presented has limitations other than the lack of detail for services (Timmer and Szirmai, 
1999). First, it focuses on labour productivity, and not on multi-factor productivity. Second, it assumes that marginal productivity 
of factor inputs moving in or out an industry is the same as average productivity. Finally, if output growth is positively related to 
productivity growth (the Verdoorn effect), the impact of structural change may be underestimated, since part of the shift to rapid -
growth sectors will be counted in the within-effect. 
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decline in size. It is negative when industries with growing relative productivity decline in size or 
when industries with falling productivity grow in size. 
Figure 1. Breakdown of compound growth rate of labour productivity into intra-sectoral 
productivity growth and inter-sectoral employment shifts, total business sector (1990-98) 
                         A n n u a l  c o m p o u n d  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t i v i t y
      C o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  a n n u a l  c o m p o u n d  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  f r o m  c h a n g e s  i n :
- 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
J a p a n
N e t h e r l a n d s
D e n m a r k
F r a n c e
C a n a d a
U n i t e d  S t a t e s
B e l g i u m
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m
A u s t r a l i a
W e s t e r n  G e r m a n y
I t a l y
N o r w a y
S w e d e n
F i n l a n d
P e r  c e n t
I n t r a s e c t o r a l  e f f e c t  ( p r o d u c t i v i t y  g r o w t h  w i t h i n  t h e  s e c t o r s )
N e t - s h i f t  e f f e c t  ( c h a n g e s  i n  s e c t o r a l  e m p l o y m e n t  s h a r e s )
I n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t  ( j o i n t  e f f e c t  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  e m p l o y m e n t  s h a r e s  a n d  s e c t o r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y )
 
Bearing in mind the limits of a decomposition based on rather broad industries, the results of these 
calculations show that the intra-industry effect is the most important contributor to productivity growth in 
the non-farm business sector. The net-shift effect did not make an important contribution  during this 
period.22 The interaction effect tends to be negative for most countries.  
The evidence that productivity growth is a matter of performance improvement within industries is 
perhaps not surprising for the countries examined in Figure 1, as around 70 per cent of value added in 
these countries is already in services. However, other OECD economies, including Ireland and Japan as 
well as some low-income countries have much smaller service sectors, suggesting that there may be 
further scope for structural change. In addition, there is likely to be scope for further structural change and 
                                                
22 . The net-shift effect was more significant over the 1970-79 and 1979-90 periods. 
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improved resource allocation within the industries considered in Figure 1. Indeed, in reading the figure, it 
should be stressed that the disaggregation of the service sector is limited, and it is possible that 
considerable structural changes are occurring within some broadly defined industries (e.g. business 
services).23 
Even though aggregate productivity growth has been largely driven by within-industry performance, the 
differences across countries in the size of the ICT producing sector, and the intensity of ICT-use in other 
sectors, make it important to analyse the sectors separately. These are treated in turn in the next two 
sections.     
How rapidly countries shift to expanding sectors?  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the United States and a few smaller economies have a larger ICT-producing 
industry than most of the European countries. Why is this the case? One way to address this issue is by 
looking at the ability of countries to shift to rapidly expanding sectors. Comparative advantage 
indicators --  such as the Balassa index (BI) -- can assess this ‘ability’, as suggested by Bartelsman and 
Hinloopen (2002). The BI index is defined as the share of a particular product in a country's export-basket 
relative to that product's world-wide share of world-trade. A BI index larger than unity denotes that a 
country has a relative comparative advantage in the production of that product. In Figure 2 we look over 
time at the percentage of a country's value of exports that are generated by ICT products for which the 
country has a relative comparative advantage. We calculate these figures using bilateral trade flow data 
for detailed products (Feenstra, 2000), and our assignment of these products to the ICT category 
following the OECD definition of ICT products (see Chapter 1). 
                                                
23. To shed some light of the sensitivity of the decomposition of between and within effects to changes in the industry 
details, the shift-share analysis was replicated for the United States with three different industry breakdowns: 1) 1-digit data; 
2) details for manufacturing but broad aggregates for services and mining (i.e. close to the decomposition used in the text); and 
3) the maximum detail of 58 industries (4 mining industries, construction, 20 manufacturing industries and 33 service industries). 
The results do not show a high sensitivity of results to the degree of industry detail used, confirming the strong role of within-
industry changes in productivity in explaining aggregate patterns. Data used are from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Industry Economics Division. http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gpo.htm. 
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Figure 2. Comparative advantage in ICT products 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands United Kingdom United States
1970 1980 1990 1997
 
From Figure 2, we see that in the United States in 1997, nearly a quarter of the value of exports was in 
ICT products for which the U.S. enjoys a relative comparative advantage. Furthermore, this percentage 
has been increasing steadily from earlier periods. Having a relative comparative advantage in the export 
of a product often indicates that a country has a cost advantage in producing the good, or that the quality 
of the good is appreciated in international markets. If the distribution of the BI for a certain product is 
near uniform worldwide, then it has become a commodity that everyone has the ability to produce: likely 
profit margins will be small. In contrast, if the distribution of BIs for a product is highly skewed, then 
margins are likely to be large. For the ICT products for which the U.S. has a comparative advantage, few 
other countries have a BI above unity. The only additional country that has been able to increase its 
comparative advantage in ICT products in the most recent years in Finland, but arguably this has occurred 
in a smaller segment (mobile phones) of the ICT market.  
The role of ICT-using industries 
ICT equipment is readily available in the world market and, in theory, all firms can acquire them at fairly 
similar prices, wherever they are located. Here we focus on productivity performance of ICT-using 
industries, which could be taken as a proxy for the ability to adopt a highly productive new technology. In 
addition the focus is on services industries, because the distinction between ICT-producers and ICT-users 
is more difficult within manufacturing. In particular, we consider wholesale and retail trade, finance, 
insurance and business services (see Figure 3). As stressed by the Council of Economic Advisors (2001), 
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in the U.S. more than two-thirds of all information technology products are purchased by these two broad 
sectors. 
Figure 3 suggests that in most countries for which data are available, ICT using industries increased their 
contribution to overall labour productivity growth, though the effect has been particularly marked for the 
United States. If we then look at the two sectors separately, we can observe that in the U.S. both sectors 
contributed substantially to the acceleration in labour productivity over the second half of the 1990s, 
while for the other countries the contribution mainly came from finance, insurance and real estate sector. 
Finland also experienced substantial productivity gains in wholesale and retail trade and in finance and 
insurance, but the overall contribution of ICT-using services to productivity improved only slightly, due 
to a strong negative contribution from business services. The strong improvement in Finland’s ICT-using 
services does, however, emerge from an examination of MFP growth rates. This shows that ICT-using 
services accounted for just over one-third of the pick-up in MFP growth from 1995-99. This contribution 
is considerably larger than in the 1970s or 1980s, and is due to strong productivity growth in wholesale 
and retail trade, and financial intermediation.  
Figure 3. Labour productivity growth in ICT-using services, 1989-95 and 1995-991 
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Note: 1991-95 and 1995-97 for Germany; 1995-98 for Japan. Employment-based labour productivity growth is used 
for the U.S. since hours worked is not available for ICT-using industries. 
Source: Pilat and Lee, (2001). 
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Figure 4. Labour productivity contributions by selected service industries (% point)1 
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Panel B: Finance, insurance, real estate and business services 
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Ca
na
da
De
nm
ar
k
Fin
lan
d
Fr
an
ce
Ge
rm
an
y
Ita
ly
Ja
pa
n
Ko
re
a
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
1989-95
1995-99
NA
 
Note: 1991-95 and 1995-97 for Germany; 1995-98 for Japan. 
Source: Pilat and Lee, 2001 
All in all, the evidence reported in this section suggests that, amongst the large OECD economies, the 
United States has been better able to switch to the rapidly expanding ICT products and enjoy a stronger 
boost to overall productivity growth. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the United States as well 
as some smaller economies (e.g. Finland) have experienced a stronger increase in productivity of 
ICT-using sectors, most likely because of a stronger process of ICT-driven capital deepening. Is there 
something inherent in the characteristics of manufacturing and ICT-user service industries in the U.S. that 
make them more able to develop and adopt these new technologies? We try to shed some further light on 
this issue by reporting some firm-level evidence in the next section.  
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2.2 Firm dynamics and productivity growth: evidence from firm-leve l data 
As suggested by growing micro evidence, industry performance (especially in a highly dynamic context) 
may hide a wide heterogeneity of individual firms’ behaviour, and it is precisely the different features of 
this firm heterogeneity that may explain cross-country difference in industry-wide performance. In 
particular, various formal models have emphasised the importance of a "Schumpeterian" process of 
'creative destruction' for innovation and adoption of new technologies.  
One class of these models focuses on the learning process (either active or passive) due to 
experimentation under uncertainty. In the passive learning model (Jovanovic, 1982) a firm enters a 
market without knowing its given potential profitability ex ante . Only after entry does the firm start to 
learn about the distribution of its own profitability, based on (noisy) information from realised profits. By 
continually updating such learning, the firm decides to expand, contract or exit. One of the main 
implications of this model is that smaller and younger firms should have higher and more variable growth 
rates. In the active learning model (Ericson and Pakes, 1995) a firm actively explores its economic 
environment and invests to enhance its profitability under competitive pressure from both within and 
outside the industry. Its potential and actual profitability changes over time in response to the stochastic 
outcomes of the firm’s own investment, and those of other actors in the same market. The firm grows if 
successful, and shrinks or exits if not. In any event, because of the inherent uncertainty in 
experimentation, even an entrant who is very successful, ex post, will typically begin small. The 
accumulation of experience and assets, in turn, strengthens survivors and lowers the likelihood of failure. 
One variant of the creative-destruction process is described by vintage models of technological change. 
These models stress that new technology is often embodied in new capital, which, however, requires a 
costly retooling process in existing plants. Related to this idea are models that emphasise the potential 
role of entry and exit: at the extreme, if new technology can only be adopted by new establishments, 
growth occurs only via entry of new units of production that displace outpaced establishments. The 
existence of sunk costs implies that high-tech new firms coexist with older and less productive firms 
generating the observed heterogeneity.  
Despite the clear attractiveness of firm-level analyses of technological innovation and adoption, their 
implementation has often been constrained by the lack of cross-country comparability of the underlying 
data. While many studies exist for the United States, evidence for most other countries is often scattered 
and based on different definitions of key concepts or units of measurement (see Caves, 1998 and Ahn, 
2001 for surveys). In this section we use a specially-constructed firm-level data for ten OECD countries 
(United States, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and 
Portugal) . In particular, we look at certain features of firm dynamics (entry, exit and survival) and how 
they influence industry-wide productivity growth in total manufacturing and in ICT-related industries.25 
                                                
25 . For more details see Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2002) and Barnes, Haskel and Maliranta (2002). 
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Box 2.1  The OECD firm-level study 
Firm-level data have been assembled by national experts as part of a two-year project, co-ordinated by the OECD, in 
which one of the key aims has been to minimise inconsistencies along different dimensions (e.g. sectoral 
breakdown, time horizon, definition of entry and exit, etc.). Notwithstanding the efforts made to harmonise the data, 
there remain some differences that have to be taken into account in the international comparison 
Sources of data 
Available data at the firm level are usually compiled for fiscal and other purposes and, unlike macroeconomic data, 
there are few internationally agreed definitions and sources, although harmonisation has improved over the years 
(see Bartelsman et al. 2002 for more details on the OECD firm-level project). The analysis of firm entry and exit for 
this study is based on business registers (Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Netherlands, United Kingdom and 
United States) or social security databases (Germany and Italy). Data for Portugal are drawn from an 
employee-based register containing information on both establishments and firms. These databases allow firms to be 
tracked over time because addition or removal of firms from the registers (at least in principle) reflects their actual 
entry and exit. The decomposition of aggregate productivity growth requires a wider set of variables and has been 
based on production survey data, in combination with business registers.  
Definition of key concepts  
The entry rate is defined as the number of new firms divided by the total number of incumbent and entrant firms in a 
given year; the exit rate is defined as the number of firms exiting the market in a given year divided by the 
population of origin, i.e. the incumbents in the previous year. 
Labour productivity growth is defined as the difference between the rate of growth of output and that of employment 
and, whenever possible, controls for material inputs. Available data do not allow the control for changes in hours 
worked, nor do they distinguish between part - and full-time employment. Multifactor productivity (MFP) growth is 
the change in gross output less the share weighted changes in materials, capital and labour inputs. Changes are 
calculated at the firm level, but income shares refer to the industry average in order to minimise measurement errors. 
The capital stock is based on the perpetual inventory method and material inputs are also considered. Real values for 
output are calculated by applying 2-4 digit industry deflators. 
Comparability issues  
Two prominent aspects of the data have to be borne in mind while comparing firm-level data across countries:1 
Unit of observation: The data used in this study refer to ‘firms’ rather than ‘establishments’. More specifically, most 
of the data used conform to the following definition (Eurostat, 1995) “an organisational unit producing goods or 
services which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of its 
current resources”. Nevertheless, business registers may define firms at different points in ownership structures; for 
example, some registers consider firms that are effectively controlled by a “parent” firm as separate units, whilst 
others record only the parent company.2 
Size threshold: While some registers include even single-person businesses, others omit firms smaller than a certain 
size, usually in terms of the number of employees but sometimes in terms of other measures such as sales (as is the 
case in the data for France and Italy). Data used in this study exclude single-person businesses. However, because 
smaller firms tend to have more volatile firm dynamics, remaining differences in the threshold across different 
country datasets should be taken into account in the international comparison .3 
________________________ 
1. For more detail on the comparability of the firm-level data, see Bartelsman et al., (2002). 
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2. In a sensitivity analysis, the decomposition of productivity growth has  been repeated for the United States, on 
the basis of establishment data instead of firm data. The results are largely unchanged, at least with respect to 
the sign and broad magnitude of the different components. 
3. However, a sensitivity analysis on Finnish data, where cut-off points were set at 5 and 20 employees, reveals 
broadly similar results for the productivity decomposition and aggregate entry and exit rates. 
The role of firm dynamics in industry productivity growth 
We use two alternative approaches to decompose labour productivity growth: the approach proposed by 
Griliches and Regev (1995, GR henceforth); and that proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998, 
FHK henceforth) (see Box 2). The analysis is based on 5-year rolling windows for all periods and 
industries for which data are available. 
Box 2.2  The decomposition of productivity growth 
One approach used to decompose productivity growth is from Griliches and Regev (1995): in this decomposition, 
each term is weighted by the average (over the time interval considered) market shares as follows:  
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where D means changes over the k-years’ interval between the first year (t - k) and the last year (t); qit is the share of 
firm i in the given industry at time t (it could be expressed in terms of output or employment); pi is the productivity 
of firm i and P is the aggregate (i.e. weighted average) productivity level of the industry.1 A bar over a variable 
indicates the averaging of the variable over the first year (t - k) and the last year (t). In equation [1], the first term is 
the within component; the second is the between component, while the third and fourth are the entry and exit 
component, respectively. 
Another decomposition has been proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998). It uses  base-year market 
shares as weights for each term of the decomposition, and includes an additional term (the so-called “covariance” or 
“cross” term) that combines changes in market shares and changes in productivity (it is positive if enterprises with 
growing productivity also experience an increase in market share) as follows: 
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One potential problem with this second method is that, in the presence of measurement error in assessing market 
shares and relative productivity levels in the base year, the correlation between changes in productivity and changes 
in market share could be spurious, affecting the within- and between-firm effects. The averaging of market shares in 
the GR method reduces this error. However, the interpretation of the different terms of the decomposition is less 
clear-cut in the GR method. If market shares indeed change significantly over the five-year interval, the ‘within’ 
effect in fact also includes a reallocation effect. 
__________________________ 
1. The shares are based on employment in the decomposition of labour pro ductivity and on output in the 
decomposition of total factor productivity. 
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Figure 5 presents the decomposition of labour productivity growth in manufacturing sectors for two five-
year intervals, 1987-92 and 1992-97. Both the GR, and especially the FHK decomposition method, 
suggest that labour productivity growth within each firm accounted for the bulk of total growth (from 50 
to 85 per cent of the total). Consistent with our sectoral analysis above, the impact on productivity via the 
reallocation of output across existing enterprises (the “between” effect) is typically small especially if one 
does not consider the “cross-effect” in the FHK decomposition. The cross effect is mostly negative, 
implying that firms experiencing an increase in productivity were also losing market shares, i.e. their 
productivity growth was associated with restructuring and downsizing rather than expansion. Finally, the 
net contribution to overall labour productivity growth of the entry and exit of firms (net entry) is positive 
in most countries (with the exception of western Germany over the 1990s), typically accounting for 
between 20 per cent and 40 per cent of total productivity growth.  
There are significant differences in the contribution of entries to productivity growth. Leaving aside 
France and Italy, where data are to some extent problematic,26 data for the other European countries show 
that new firms typically make a positive contribution to overall productivity growth (see Table  3), 
although the effect is generally of small magnitude. By contrast, entry in the United States for most 
industries makes a negative contribution to industry productivity growth. Less surprising, the exit 
contribution to productivity growth is typically positive across the data for all countries (Table 1), 
indicating that exiting firms usually have below-average levels of productivity. However, the contribution 
of exiting firms in the United States is larger than in all other countries. Differences in the role of entry 
and exit to overall productivity in the United States compared with European countries are probably 
related and point to a somewhat different nature of firm dynamics in the United States. Indeed, by 
analysing cohorts of entrants, Foster et al. (1998) shows that many weak recent entrants exit the market 
rapidly in the United States. This tends to boost the estimated contribution of exit to productivity for the 
U.S. but, at the same time, the presence of such firms also weakens the contribution of entry in the U.S. 
decomposition.  
                                                
26 . The French data refer to firms with at least 20 employees or with a turnover greater than 0.58m euros.. They are not 
likely to be representative of the total population.  It is also likely that larger firms are over-sampled, lowering the net entry effect 
and raising the within effect. The Italian data refer to firms with a turnover of at least 5m euros.  Sample size is maintained by 
deleting firms falling below the threshold and adding new firms in. Thus, the Italian data are likely to overstate true entry and exit 
rates. Furthermore, the sampling rules are likely to over-record exiting firms with falling productivity. 
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Figure 5. Decomposition of labour productivity growth in manufacturing 
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Table 1. Analysis of productivity components across industries of manufacturing 
 P r o p o r t i o n s  o f  p o s i t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  g r o w t h
 a c r o s s  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s 1
T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  
o b s e r v a t i o n s
( i ndus t r y  *  yea r )
En t r y  
con t r i bu t i on  %
E x i t  
con t r i bu t i on  %
B e t w e e n  
c o m p o n e n t  %
F in l and 420 5 7 9 3 6 2
France 126 4 7 8 1 4 0
Italy 348 8 4 8 9 8 5
N e t h e r l a n d s 344 7 6 7 7 5 1
Por tuga l 211 6 3 9 1 4 9
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 392 6 2 9 2 4 5
U n i t e d  S t a t e s 5 8 1 0 9 8 3 1
N o t e s :  T h e s e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  b a s e d  o n  a l l  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  w i t h  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  a n d  b u s i n e s s  
            s e r v i c e s .  T h e  t i m e  p e r i o d s  c o n s i d e r e d  v a r y  c o n s i d e r a b l y  a c r o s s  c o u n t r i e s .   
1 .  N u m b e r  o f  c a s e s  i n  w i c h  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o m p o n e n t s  m a d e  a  p o s i t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  l a b o u r
    p roduc t i v i t y  g row th  ( i n  %  o f  t o t a l  numbe r  o f  cases )
S o u r c e :  O E C D  
The contribution made by entry and exit to productivity growth varies considerably across industries. 
Most notably, in ICT-related manufacturing industries, the entry component makes a stronger than 
average contribution to labour productivity growth. 27 This is particularly the case in the United States, 
where the contribution from entrants to total labour productivity is strongly positive, in contrast to the 
negative effect observed in most of the other manufacturing industries (see Figure 6 for an example of the 
office and computing machinery industry). This suggests an important role for new firms in an area 
characterised by a strong wave of technological change. The opposite seems to be the case in more mature 
industries, where a more significant contribution comes from either within-firm growth or the exit of 
presumably obsolete firms.  
                                                
27. The industry group is “electrical and optical equipment”. In the United States, most 3-4 digit industries within this 
group had a positive contribution to productivity stemming from entry. In the other countries, there are cases where, within this 
group, the contribution from entry is very high, including the “office, accounting and computing machinery” industry in Finland, 
the United Kingdom and Portugal and “precision instruments” in France, Italy and the Netherlands. 
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Figure 6. Contribution of new entry to labour productivity growth in manufacturing and 
selected ICT industries 
1 .  To ta l  p roduc t iv i ty  g rowth  in  pa ren thes i s .
2 .  E l ec t r i ca l  mach ine ry  and  appa ra tus  n . e . c .  f o r  F rance ,  Ne the r l ands  and  Por tuga l .
Source : OECD.
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Firm dynamics in manufacturing and the ICT industry 
The micro literature has recently identified a set of stylised facts about firm dynamics (see Geroski, 1995; 
Caves 1998) and here we would like to review them on the basis of the OECD firm-level data. Figure 7 
seems to confirm a significant churning of firms in all countries (Panel A). Over the first-half of the 
1990s, firm turnover rates (entry plus exit rates) was in the range between 15 and more than 20 per cent in 
the business sector: i.e. a fifth of firms are either recent entrants, or will close down within a year. As 
previously pointed out, the process of entry and exit of firms involves a proportionally low number of 
workers: i.e. only about 10 per cent of employment is involved in firm turnover, and in Germany and 
Canada, employment-based turnover rates are around 5 per cent (Panel B in Figure 7). The difference 
between firm turnover rates and employment-based turnover rates arises from the fact that entrants (and 
exiting firms) are generally smaller than incumbents. For most countries, new firms are only 40 to 60 per 
cent the average size of incumbents, and in the United States, Germany and Canada their average size is 
less than 30 per cent of that of incumbents. The relatively small size of entrants in these countries reflects 
either the large size of incumbents (e.g. the United States) or the small average size of entrants compared 
with that in most other countries (Germany and Canada). This would suggest that, in these countries, 
entrant firms are further away from the average size in a given industry (what could be interpreted as the 
minimum efficient size). 
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Figure 7. Turnover rates in OECD countries, 1989-94 
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The main conclusion from Figure 7 in the context of our international comparison is that there seem to be 
no significant differences between Europe and North America in terms of firm dynamism. If the latter is 
taken as a proxy for the ability of industries to innovate and adopt leading technologies -- as the different 
models in the tradition of the creative destruction hypothesis seem to imply - we can tentatively conclude 
that such ability may not differ on the two sides of the Atlantic. However, aggregate turnover rates may 
hide different sectoral behaviours. Figure 8 sheds some light in this respect by presenting the estimated 
entry rates for each country once differences in the sectoral composition are taken into account by means 
of fixed effect regressions.28 In other words, these estimates measure the influence of country-specific 
factors on firm turnover, over and above those possibly stemming from the sectoral composition of the 
economy and the different time period covered by the data. The figure suggests that, with the exception of 
western Germany and Italy, all countries have higher entry rates than the United States. In Portugal, 
Finland and the manufacturing sector of the United Kingdom, entry rates are between 1.5 and more than 
2.5 percentage points higher than in the United States, while in the other countries differences are within 
one percentage point. Moreover, if the different size structure of firms across countries is taken into 
account (i.e. not included in the country fixed effects), then the differences are even smaller, and not 
statistically significant, in the case of Finland and the Netherlands. All in all, it can be concluded that 
cross-country differences in entry rates are not very large for the countries observed. 
Figure 8. Estimated entry rates with control for industry composition1 
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Fixed effect regressions also allow examination of differences in entry rates across industries, once 
country and size effects are controlled for (Figure 9). Values in the figure are relative to the overall 
business sector (un-weighted) average. Notably, high technology manufacturing industries and some 
                                                
28. The values reported in the figure are the estimated country -specific effects of a panel regression of entry rates on a set 
of dummy variables accounting for industry, country and time effects. See Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2002) for more 
details.  
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business-service industries, and in particular those related to ICT, have higher entry rates than average.29 
This evidence ties up with earlier discussion about the role of entry in productivity growth in high-tech 
industries, and lends some support to the vintage models of technological change whereby rapid 
technological changes are associated with greater firm churning where new innovative units replace 
outpaced ones. 
All in all, there is no evidence in our sample of countries, of a strongly different degree of firm dynamism 
across countries. At the same time, however, we have seen different contributions of this dynamism to 
industry-wide productivity performance. The additional piece of the puzzle is the analysis of post-entry 
performance, another aspect of firm dynamism.  
Looking at overall survivor rates, almost 60-70 per cent of entering firms survive the first two years in the 
countries for which we have data (Figure 10). Having overcome the initial years, the prospects of firms 
improve further: those that remain in business after the first two years have a 50 to 80 per cent chance of 
surviving for five more years. Nevertheless, in the countries considered, only about 40 to 50 per cent of 
firms entering in a given year survive on average beyond the seventh year.  
                                                
29 . The very high positive dummy for post and telecommunication is likely to be due to two factors: i) the privatisation 
of telecoms in a number of countries that has led to the entry of a number of new private operators; and ii) the rapid increase in 
the number of firms operating in the communication area, related to the spread of Internet and e-commerce activities.   
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Figure 9. Estimated industry1 entry rates relative to the total business sector 
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Figure 10. Firm survivor rates at different lifetime 1, 1990s 
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Failure rates in the early years of activity are highly skewed towards small units, while surviving firms are 
not only larger, but also tend to grow rapidly. Thus, in most countries the size of exiting firms is broadly 
similar to that of entering firms. Moreover, the average size of surviving firms increases rapidly to 
approach that of incumbents in the market in which they operate. On this latter point, there are significant 
differences across countries (Figure 11): in the United States, surviving firms on average double their 
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employment in the first two years, while employment gains amongst surviving firms in Europe are in the 
order of 10 to 20 per cent.30  
Figure 11. Net employment gains among surviving firms at different lifetimes, 1990s 
(  n e t  g a i n s  a s  a  r a t i o  o f  i n i t i a l  e m p l o y m e n t )
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The distinct development of high-technology industries is once again exemplified by the marked 
employment growth amongst surviving firms (Figure 12). In particular, firms in ICT-related industries 
                                                
30. The results for the United States are consistent with the evidence in Audretsch (1995a,b). He found that the four-year 
employment growth rate amongst surviving firms was about 90 per cent.  
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(office accounting and computing machinery and radio, TV and communication equipment) generally 
experience rapid post entry growth in all countries for which data are available. However, even in these 
highly dynamic industries, surviving US firms show a stronger employment expansion, compared with 
those in most of the other countries.   
Figure 12.  Employment gains among surviving firms in high-tech industries 
(  ne t  ga ins  as  a  ra t i o  o f  i n i t i a l  emp loymen t )
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The marked difference in post-entry behaviour of firms in the United States compared with the European 
countries is partially due to the larger gap between the size at entry and the average firm size of 
incumbents, i.e. there is a greater scope for expansion amongst young ventures in the U.S. markets than 
in Europe . In turn, the smaller relative size of entrants can be taken to indicate a greater degree of 
experimentation, with firms starting small and, if successful, expanding rapidly to approach the minimum 
efficient scale. These differences in firms’ performance can only partly be explained by statistical 
technicalities or business cycles conditions, and seem to indicate a greater degree of experimentation 
amongst entering firms in the United States. This greater experimentation of small firms in the US market 
may also contribute to explain the evidence of a lower than average productivity at entry, as discussed 
above.31  
                                                
31. The other additional factors which could contribute to explain the observed differences in post-entry behaviour 
include: a) firms with plants spreading into different US states are recorded as single units, while establishments belonging to the 
same firm, but located in different EU countries are recorded as separate units: available evidence for the United States and 
Finland reveals only marginal differences in the average number of plants per firm in the two countries (1.2 and 1.1 in total 
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2.3 Summing up 
In this chapter we have further explored recent growth patterns by exploiting industry and firm-level data. 
The picture that seems to emerge enhances our understanding of the main driver of economic growth and 
helps to focus our policy-oriented discussion. In particular, we have shown that aggregate productivity 
patterns are largely the result of within-industry and even within-firm performance in most countries. This 
should not hide that some industries (both producers and users of ICT) have had stronger than average 
productivity growth over the past decade and have significantly boosted manufacturing and service 
overall productivity.  
In terms of our international comparison, we have shown that the United States have been notably better 
than most of its trading partners to acquire comparative advantage in rapidly growing ICT market 
segments. The U.S. have also experienced a more widespread productivity acceleration of ICT-user 
industries, while in Europe notable acceleration generally occurred only in the finance sector. So, there 
seems to be evidence to suggest a different pace of development by both ICT producers and ICT users 
across the Atlantic.  
A number of theoretical studies and some anecdotal evidence suggest that new, innovative, firms may 
play a key role in the diffusion of a general-purpose technology as the ICT. We have investigated this 
issue by means of firm-level data. The picture that emerges is one in which, overall, there is a similar 
degree of firm churning in Europe as in the United States. The distinguishing features of firms’ behaviour 
in the US markets, compared with their EU counterparts can be summarised as follows:  
§ In the United States, entrant firms are more heterogeneous in terms of both size and productivity than 
in Europe; 
§ However, selection effects work quickly so that weak recent entrants exit the market and this is 
associated with a stronger contribution of exits to total labour productivity in the US compared to 
Europe; 
§ Moreover, selection and learning effects imply that successful, surviving entrants expand rapidly, 
generating stronger post-entry growth. This is consistent with the evidence of a much stronger 
(employment) expansion of successful entrants in the initial years in the United States compared with 
Europe.  
We have advanced the hypothesis that these differences may indicate a different degree of market 
experimentation in the U.S. as compared with Europe. The more market-based financial system may lead 
to a lower risk aversion to project financing in the United States, with greater financing possibilities for 
entrepreneurs with small or innovative projects, often characterised by limited cash flows and lack of 
collateral. Moreover, low administrative costs of start-ups and not unduly strict regulations on labour 
adjustments in the United States, are likely to stimulate potential entrepreneurs to start on a small scale, 
test the market and, if successful with their business plan, expand rapidly to reach the minimum efficient 
scale. In contrast, higher entry and adjustment costs in Europe may stimulate a pre-market selection of 
business plans with less market experimentation.  
                                                                                                                                                        
business sector; b) business-cycle influences could also possibly explain the distinct growth of surviv ing firms in the United 
States: estimates of post-entry growth in Italy and Portugal in an expansionary period (the second half of the 1980s) are only 
marginally higher than those in the early 1990s. See Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2002) for more details.  
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It is difficult to conclude from our evidence that greater experimentation leads to better aggregate 
performance in all circumstances. However, in a period (like the present) of rapid diffusion of a new 
technology (ICT), it may allow new ideas and forms of production to emerge more rapidly, thereby 
leading to a faster process of innovation and technology adoption. This seems to be confirmed by the 
strong positive contribution made to overall productivity by new firms in ICT-related industries in the 
sample of OECD countries analysed in this chapter. 
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3.  PRODUCTIVITY, INVESTMENT IN ICT, HUMAN CAPITAL AND CHANGES IN THE 
ORGANISATION OF WORK: MICRO EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY AND THE U.S.   
Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between the use of advanced technologies such as ICT and 
related business practices and outcomes such as productivity, employment, the skill mix of the workforce 
and wages using micro data for the U.S. and Germany.   A theme that emerged in the previous chapter is 
that U.S. businesses engage in more market experimentation than do their European counterparts and that 
selection and learning effects are more important in the U.S.  Relative to those in Europe, the typical 
entrant in the U.S. is much smaller and less productive than more mature firms. Selection and learning 
effects yield a substantial contribution from the entry and exit of businesses to growth and productivity.  
In particular, we see a large contribution from the exit of the least productive businesses in the U.S. and 
the rapid post-entry growth of surviving entrants in the U.S. 
Our objective in this chapter is to analyse the microeconomic underpinnings of the findings outlined in 
earlier chapters using establishment-level data from the U.S. and one large European economy, Germany.  
Germany combines European institutions with a large economy, making this comparison both interesting 
and valid.  In particular, we wish to compare the relationships between investments in ICT, market 
experimentation and productivity growth at the micro level for both countries. 
In the course of this analysis, we attempt to explore several questions empirically. We examine the theme 
of potential differences in experimentation between the U.S. and European economies in two distinctive 
ways.  First, experimentation may be present in the entry and exit process as new businesses adopt new 
technologies (broadly defined to include the use of advanced technologies but also organisational 
structure) and concurrently learn whether the technology chosen is suitable and whether the 
ownership/management team is suitable as well.  This form of experimentation is closely linked to the 
ideas in Jovanovic (1982) where new businesses are uncertain of their type (which can be defined in a 
variety of ways including managerial ability and/or the appropriate business practices for a specific 
production unit) and learn about it in the first several periods of operation.  Such experimentation 
suggests that dispersion on a variety of dimensions (productivity, size, wages, skill mix, use of 
technology) is likely to be especially large for entrants and young businesses.  In what follows, we 
explore this hypothesis by examining the nature of such experimentation across the U.S. and Germany.  
Again, the working hypothesis from earlier chapters is that the market and institutional environment in the 
U.S. encourages such experimentation so that we should observe a stronger relationship between 
establishment age and the dispersion of various outcomes in the U.S.  
An alternative but related idea is that each time a business (whether new or mature) adopts a new 
technology the experimentation process begins anew. This idea, that learning is an “active” ongoing 
process as businesses adopt new technologies, is based on the model of Pakes and Ericson (1995).  Under 
this view, it is at businesses that are most actively changing their technology where we should observe the 
greatest dispersion in choices and outcomes reflecting the underlying experimentation.  Here again, we 
are interested in exploring whether the patterns that emerge in the data differ between the U.S. and 
Germany with the working hypothesis that the U.S. will exhibit more evidence of experimentation. 
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We focus on cross-sectional micro data for the years 1999 and 2000 in the U.S., and 2000 and 2001 in 
Germany.  While the data are cross sectional, we know the age of the establishments so that we can 
explore the differences in investment in ITC and outcomes for different cohorts. The micro data permit us 
to examine the relationship between investment in computers, employee Internet access, the skill mix of 
the workforce and outcomes such as productivity and wages.  While there have been studies conducted at 
the micro level on these topics for both the U.S. and European countries, our advantage is that we conduct 
the study for a virtually identical time period using harmonised measurement and methodology. 32 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 1 describes the data. Section 2 presents the results of simple 
regressions relating labour productivity and wages to measures of use of advanced technology in both 
countries.  Section 3 examines the evidence on “experimentation” across countries – first by looking at 
the results by establishment age and then exploring the active learning model by examining the 
differences across businesses depending on how actively they are changing their technology.  Section 4 
concludes with interpretation of the results. 
1. Data Description 
The firm-level analysis presented in the previous chapter (which draws from the OECD firm-level study, 
see Bartelsman et. al. 2002) is somewhat limited in the number of issues that could be addressed with 
internationally comparable micro data.  There is a trade-off between adding additional countries and still 
having harmonised data. In this chapter, we are able to examine a richer set of issues by focusing on 
comparable data from only two countries: Germany and the United States. 
Box 3.1   U.S. Data 
The U.S. data come from two surveys of U.S. manufacturing establishments: the Computer Network Use 
Supplement (CNUS) to the 1999 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and the 2000 ASM.  We also draw 
information on establishment age from the Longitudinal Business Database (see Jarmin and Miranda 2002), a 
research data file maintained by the Center for Economic Studies.  Since both surveys are based on the ASM sample 
frame, we first discuss the general features of the ASM. 
Both the 1999 ASM (from which the 1999 CNUS is drawn) and 2000 ASM are part of the 1999-2003 ASM panel.  
The panel is drawn from the 1997 Economic Census with allowances for new establishment births and replacement 
for sample deaths.  The design for the 1999-2003 panel initially contained approximately 52,000 of the over 380,000 
U.S. manufacturing establishments with paid employees.  Manufacturing companies with more than $1 Billion in 
manufacturing shipments are selected into the ASM with certainty. There are just over 500 these certainty 
enterprises, and all of their over 14,000 establishments are included in the 1999-2003 ASM panel. 
Also selected into the ASM with certainty are any remaining establishments that met at least one of the following 
conditions: have at least 500 paid employees, produce [electronic] computers, or produce in certain "small" 
industries.  This brings the number of certainty cases in the 1999-2003 ASM panel to approximately 16,600.  The 
remaining portion of the sample is chosen randomly, with selection probabilities proportional to size, according to a 
procedure that minimises sample size while satisfying quality constraints within industry and product strata. 
                                                
32  For the U.S. studies using micro data include Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997), Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Troske (2001), Doms, Jarmin and Klimek (2002), and Stolarik (1999a and 1999b). For Germany the only micro study we know 
of, which analyses the impact of ICT on productivity, is Hempell (2002). This study, however, is based on the German service 
sector. 
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For the analysis, we require a number of data items from the ASM and CNUS.  Table 1 lists the data items and their 
source.  We also use establishment identifiers and industry codes from the ASM and CNUS files. The CNUS data on 
e-business processes are available only for reference year 1999.  The computer investment data are available for 
reference years 1992 and 2000.  We examine the 2000 cross section only.  We match the 1999 CNUS to the 2000 
ASM.  Since both surveys are drawn from the 1999-2003 ASM panel, differences in the sample are minimal.  There 
will be some difference due to entry and exit.  However, the largest difference in the establishment composition of 
the two files is due to non-response to the 1999 CNUS.33 The 1999 CNUS contains just fewer than 40,000 
establishment observations.  After matching the 1999 CNUS, the 2000 ASM and the LBD, we are left with 31,265 
establishment observations. 
Table 134 presents the definitions of the key measures used in this study with U.S. data described in panel 
1a and German data in panel 1b.  Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics for the key variables.  It is 
apparent from Table 2 that there are considerable differences across businesses on all measured 
dimensions in both countries.  From Table 3, it is clear that some but far from all of this variation is 
associated with between industry differences.  For example, in the U.S. (Table 3a) computer investment 
per worker is lowest in the non-metallic minerals industry but highest in the computer and office 
equipment industry.  The gap in computer investment between these two industries is about $1600 per 
worker, which is substantial.  However, this gap is relatively small compared to a one standard deviation 
difference in computer investment per worker reported in Table 1 (which is $5100 per worker).  
Table 1a: Primary U.S. Data Items  
Variable Source Notes 
Shipments (tvs) ASM  Total value of shipment.  We adjust for changes in inventories to 
get a concept closer to actual production. 
Value Added (va) ASM  Adjusted shipments minus materials, energy and the costs of 
resales and contract work. 
Employment (te) ASM  Number of full and part time workers at the plant (production 
and non-production). 
Production Workers (pw) ASM  Number of full and part time production workers. 
Payroll (sw) ASM  Total salaries and wages paid. 
Total machinery and 
equipment investment 
(nm) 
ASM  Total investment in new equipment and machinery, including 
vehicles. 
Computer investment 
(nmc) 
ASM  Total investment in computers and peripheral equipment 
(software not included). 
% of employees with 
Internet access 
(emp_access) 
CNUS % of employees at establishment with access of any kind to the 
Internet. 
STAN industry Derived  using SIC codes available on ASM 
Age LBD Categorical age variable taking on values 0 - 10 for plants aged 
0-10 and 11 for plants aged 11+. 
 
 
                                                
33 . More details on the 1999 CNUS are in U.S. Census Bureau (2001), " 1999 E-business Process Use by Manufacturers: 
final Report on Selected Processes", available at www.census.gov/estats.  
34  Note that all the tables in this chapter have two panels labeled “a” and “b” where the “a” panels contain U.S. results 
and the “b” panels contain German results. 
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Table 1a: Primary U.S. Data Items  
Variable Source  Notes 
Shipments  IAB Total value of shipment in the previous business year.  No 
Adjustment for changes in inventories. 
Value Added IAB Total Shipments minus  materials and services received from 
other plants. 
Employment IAB Number of  (production and non-production) employees 
(excluding apprentices) at the plant at  June, 30 th of the current 
year. Adjusted for part time workers. 
Production Workers IAB Number of full and part-time workers (as opposed to salaried 
employees) at  June, 30th of the current year. 
Payroll  IAB Total salaries and wages paid in June of the current year 
(excluding social insurance payments by the employer). 
Total machinery and 
equipment investment  
IAB Total investment in the previous business year (buildings, 
equipment, machinery, vehicles). 
Computer investment  IAB Total investment in information and communication technology 
in the previous business year. 
% of employees with 
Internet access  
IAB % of (office) jobs at establishment with access of 
Internet/Intranet. categorical: 1-all, 2-most, 3 half, 4-a few, 5 
none. Information for 2001 only. 
STAN industry IAB 13 categories 
Age IAB Categorical age variable taking on values 1 - 12  (in 2000: takes 
the value 11 for plants age 11+, in 2001 takes the value 12 for 
plants aged 12+). 
 
Box. 3.2   German Data 
The German data we use are from the IAB Establishment Panel Data Set collected by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt - 
und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany.35 This yearly survey has been conducted since 1993 in West 
Germany and since 1996 in East Germany. Information is obtained by personal questioning carried out by Infratest 
Sozialforschung, Munich, with voluntary participation by plants managers. Altogether, the (unbalanced) IAB panel 
comprises 79000 observations and 26000 plants. Detailed descriptions of the IAB Establishment panel can also be 
found in Kölling (2000). 
The sample is drawn from the emp loyment statistics register of the German Federal Office of Labour, which covers 
all plants with at least one employee (or trainee) subject to social security.36 All plants included in the population 
(i.e. all plants included in the employment statistics register---are stratified into 400 cells, which are defined over 10 
plant sizes, 20 industries and two regions (West vs. East Germany), from each of which the observations of the 
establishment panel are drawn randomly. Large plants are over-represented in the IAB panel. In the first wave 
(1993), for example, the probability of being drawn was on average 91 % for plants employing more than 5,000 
employees, but only 3% for plants employing between 100 and 200 employees and as small as 0.1% for plants with 
less than 5 employees. The over sampling of large plants implies that the survey covers about 0.7% of all plants in 
Germany, but 10% of all employees.37  
                                                
35 . The IAB (in English Institute for employment Research) is the research institute of the Federal Employment Services 
in Germany.  
36 . For 1995, the employment statistics cover about 79of all employed persons in Western Germany and about 86% in 
Eastern Germany, (Bender, Haas and Klose, 2000).  
37 . Population weights, which are the inverse of the sample selection probabilities, are available for empirical analysis. 
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Interviewers ask about 80 questions each year on topics including: detailed information on the decomposition of the 
work-force (gender, skill, blue-collar vs. white-collar, part-time employees, apprentices, civil servants, owners) and 
its development through time; business activities (total sales, input materials, investment, exports, profit situation, 
expectations, whether plant does R&D, product and process innovations, organizational changes, technology of 
machinery, adopted plant policies/strategies); training and further education; wages; lots of information on working 
time (standard working time, overtime, percentage of employees working overtime, percentages of employees 
working on Saturdays, working on Sundays, working on shifts, and working with a flexible working time schedule); 
and general information about the plant (whether plant is subunit of a firm, ownership, birth year, existence of works 
council, whether plant applies bargaining agreement, whether plant has been merged with or split from another plant 
in the last year, three-digit industry affiliation, region).  While most questions are asked yearly (or on a two-year/ 
three-year basis), some topics have been surveyed only once.38 
This study uses observations from the manufacturing sector of the 2000 and 2001 waves of the IAB panel. The 
regression analysis, however, is only carried out with the latter wave, since we do not observe information on 
Internet access in 2000. This leaves approximately 7700 observations for the descriptive statistics and 3500 
observations for the regression analysis.  Altogether, in 1999 there were 336,000 plants (which employed at least 
one employee subject to social security) in the German manufacturing sector covered.39 Our sample accounts for 
approximately 1% of these plants, but for 12% of its workforce and for 11% of its value added. 
As indicated in Table 1, the German data permit the measurement of each concept captured by the U.S. 
data.  For the most part, the measurement methodology has been completely harmonised so that the 
measures are comparable across the countries.  A notable exception is employee access to the Internet.  
Instead of measuring of the percentage of workers that have access to the Internet as in the U.S. data, the 
German data has a categorical variable on the proportion of workers with Internet access (none, some, 
half, most, all). Finally, we have converted German measures into dollars using an aggregate PPP 
measure (OECD, Main Economic Indicators 2002).  
Confirming the finding of the previous chapter, one difference that is immediately apparent in our 
comparison here is that the typical U.S. establishment is much larger than its German counterpart (Table 
2).  We also find that the share of non-production workers (an indirect measure of skill) is larger in 
Germany relative to the U.S. but this level comparison may not warrant much attention given the potential 
differences in how production and non-production workers are defined (e.g., in Germany the distinction is 
based upon hourly wage workers vs. salaried workers while the BLS definition refers more to the type of 
activity). Productivity and payroll per worker are higher in the U.S. but there is greater dispersion in 
productivity and payroll per worker in Germany (but see cautions below about simple comparisons of 
dispersion measures across countries).  Total equipment investment per worker is higher in the U.S. but 
computer investment per worker is higher in Germany.  However, here the U.S. exhibits much greater 
dispersion for both measures of investment relative to Germany. For the most part, the industry rankings 
on the various measures are similar across the countries although there are some notable exceptions 
(Table 3). 
                                                
38 . Information on internet access, for example, is only available for 2001.  
39 . Sourece: IAB-Betriebsdatei, own calculations.  
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Table 2a: U.S. Descriptive Statistics (weighted by sample weights) 
Statistic: Mean Standard Deviation 10th Percentile  90th Percentile  
Age (years) 9.45 3.024 4 11 + 
Employment 140.1 402.50 15 (freq=121) 288 (freq=19) 
Skill (Proportion of non-
production workers) 
0.277 0.191 0.071 0.540 
Employee Internet Access 
(percentage) 
0.210 0.263 0.000 0.600 
Total Equipment Investment 
per Worker ($1000) 
7.927 41.380 0.344 14.938 
Total Comp uter Investment per 
Worker ($1000) 0.455 5.113 0.000 0.925 
Log labour Productivity: VA 
per Worker 
4.325 0.758 3.536 5.173 
Log Payroll per worker 3.480 0.402 2.972 3.973 
 
Table 2b: German Descriptive Statistics (weighted by sample weights) 
Statistic: Mean Standard Deviation 10th Percentile  90th Percentile  
Age (years) 9.7 2.99 5 12 
Employment 28.95 229.75 2 47 
Skill (Proportion of non-
production workers) 
0.32 0.34 0 1 
Employee Internet Access  
(categorical; 1=all, 5=none) 
2.83 1.7 1 5 
Total Equipment Investment 
per Worker 
 ($ 1000) 
7.05 23.6 0 14.61 
Total Computer Investment per 
Worker ($ 1000) 
0.78 2.71 0 1.97 
Log labour Productivity: VA 
per Worker ($ 1000) 
3.63 0.9 2.49 4.59 
Log Payroll per Worker  
($ 1000) 
2.92 0.63 2.05 3.61 
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Table 3a: U.S. Means by STAN Industry (weighted by sample weights) 
Stan Industry Age  Number 
of Estabs. 
Emp. Skill Internet 
Access 
Investment 
Per worker 
Computer 
Investment. 
Per worker 
Labour 
Productivity 
Log Payroll 
per Worker 
Air & Spacecraft  9.8 242 731.7 0.376 0.378 4.954 0.552 4.576 3.753 
Basic Metals 9.4 1282  234.9 0.223 0.183 8.741 0.338 4.395 3.526 
Shipbuilding 8.5 119 353.7 0.153 0.137 1.887 0.251 4.004 3.439 
Chemicals  9.3 2211  135.3 0.384 0.352 23.362 0.782 4.949 3.694 
Petroleum & Oth. Fuels  10.4  163 219.8 0.400 0.450 29.010 0.772 5.570 3.965 
Electrical Machinery 9.6 930 201.9 0.359 0.339 5.626 0.821 4.383 3.545 
Fabricated Metal  9.7 3547  84.5  0.244 0.156 4.712 0.300 4.256 3.503 
Food and Beverages 9.7 2788  192.1 0.292 0.139 9.106 0.289 4.545 3.358 
Machinery & Equipment 
N.E.C. 
9.0 3584  113.4 0.303 0.240 5.642 0.722 4.340 3.623 
MFG. N.E.C. 9.2 2035  90.3  0.277 0.168 3.992 0.239 4.042 3.341 
Medical and optical 
Instruments 
9.3 933 172.8 0.456 0.437 4.505 0.867 4.439 3.605 
Motor Vehicles 9.3 973 368.1 0.230 0.172  6.459 0.302 4.373 3.527 
Computer and Office 
Equip 
8.2 155 350.7 0.551 0.632 7.154 1.995 4.623 3.750 
Non-Metallic Minerals  9.2 2080  73.3  0.228 0.131 16.896 0.236 4.546 3.495 
Pulp, Paper, Publishing 9.7 3028  100.9 0.288 0.275 7.276 0.559 4.296 3.538 
Radio & 
Telecommunications 
Equipment  
8.9 655 240.6 0.338 0.362 10.259 0.750 4.371 
3.545 
Rubber and Plastics 9.3 2251  120.4 0.222 0.163 7.515 0.263 4.218 3.373 
Textiles, Leather, Footwear 9.2 1656  148.0 0.206 0.128 3.816 0.263 3.880 3.125 
Wood Products 9.2 1539  87.1  0.177 0.089 6.773 0.327 4.054 3.281 
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Table 3b: German Means by STAN Industry (weighted by sample weights) 
Stan Industry  Age Number 
of 
Estabs. 
Emp. Skill Internet 
Access 
Investment  Computer 
Investment 
Per worker 
Labour 
Productivity 
Log 
Payroll 
per 
Worker 
Bas Metals  9.6 548 59.7  0.211 2.606 10.072 0.631 3.688 3.044 
Coke, Ref Pet Prod, 
Nuc Fuel, Chemicals, 
Chem Prod 
9.6 497 73.3  0.526 2.319 10.1  1.806 4.288 3.192 
Fab Met Prod 10 965 24 0.208 3.116 9.447 0.478 3.742 3.105 
Food, Beverage, 
Tobacco 
10.2  858 17.4  0.319 3.061 5.572 0.334 3.281 2.645 
Mach & Equip/N.E.C. 8.8 991 42 0.39  2.757 12.389 1.418 3.921 3.155 
Manuf Nec/ 
Receycling 
9.5 454 15.3  0.186 2.704 5.885 0.462 3.311 2.669 
Med, Prec and Opt 
Instr 
9.6 448 13.5  0.444 2.621 2.993 0.594 3.591 2.95  
Mot Veh, Trail and 
Semis  
8.5 362 161.1 0.208 3.099 8.753 0.546 3.725 2.95  
Office, Act , Comp 
Mach; Elec Mach & 
Appar/Nec;  Radio, 
Tele & Comm Equip 
9.1 602 47.1  0.402 2.338 5.174 1.443 3.839 3.135 
Other Non-Metallic 
Min Prod 
9.5 453 20.6  0.354 3.101 9.405 0.958 3.635 2.815 
Other Transport  10.2  169 46 0.21  2.687 8.067 1.064 3.87  2.957 
Pulp, Paper, Printing 
Pub 9.8 470 26.8  0.49  2.468 7.831 1.86  3.801 3.144 
Rubber and Plastics 
Products 9.8 425 48.7  0.192 2.393 6.784 0.721 3.703 3.069 
Textiles, Leather, 
Footwear 
10.2  307 19 0.353 3.56  2.616 0.419 3.504 2.656 
Wood Products 9.9 505 12.6  0.146 2.876 4.33  0.262 3.482 2.773 
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While these summary statistics are useful and the cross-country comparisons of some interest, we base 
our subsequent analysis on a difference in difference approach (i.e., difference between low and high tech 
businesses in U.S. vs. difference between low and high tech in Germany). The level comparisons across 
the countries may be plagued by a variety of measurement problems (e.g., the appropriate price deflator 
conversion across the countries) and thus we have much greater confidence in the results that rely on 
differences in differences.   In this regard, we especially note that the differences in dispersion across the 
countries may reflect differences in the degree of measurement error as well as differences in the size 
distribution or other factors across countries. Thus, we do not put much emphasis on the differences in the 
levels of dispersion, in say, productivity between the U.S. and Germany reported in Table 2.   
In what follows, we seek to relate the use of advanced technology to outcomes like productivity and 
wages at the micro level. Given limitations of available data, the question is how to characterize advanced 
technology. In what follows, we rank establishments on the basis of their equipment investment per 
worker and computer investment per worker. Since both of these measures are not quite what we would 
like (which instead might be a measure of the stock of high tech capital per worker) and are quite noisy 
measures in their own right, we use these measures to create a set of technology groups similar to that 
used in Doms, Jarmin and Klimek (2002). Specifically, for each measure we create 3 groups: (i) zero 
investment; (ii) low investment (below the 75th percentile); and high investment (above the 75th 
percentile).  We choose to classify high investment establishments as those to the right of the 75th 
percentile since the investment distributions are so skewed.  In turn, we interact these 3 groups to consider 
six possible combinations.  As will become clear, we also use the same technology groups for the German 
data.  In addition, these non-parametric measures are likely to be more comparable across countries. 
One point that is worth emphasizing in this context is that the computer investment by itself is likely to be 
an inadequate measure of the use of advanced technology beyond the obvious problem that we have a 
flow rather than a stock measure.  The computer investment measure only captures the direct spending on 
computers but does not include the spending on equipment with imbedded advanced technology (e.g., 
semi-conductors).  Prior research using the Survey of Manufacturing Technology (see, e.g., Dunne, 1994) 
finds that direct spending on computers misses a substantial amount of the investment in high technology 
equipment.  Accordingly, we focus on both total equipment expenditures as well as computer investment 
expenditures.  
With these remarks in mind, it is clear that these measures are imperfect.  As a sensitivity check in what 
follows, we also report results where we use investment in highway vehicles (i.e., cars and trucks - which, 
like computers, are components of equipment investment) to see whether the results we are finding for 
so-called advanced technology also apply to for not so advanced technologies such as cars and trucks. 
This experiment is similar to that performed by DiNardo and Pischke (1997). Obviously, if similar results 
also hold for vehicle s this would raise substantial questions as to whether our measures of IT investment 
are capturing advanced technology.  Unfortunately, due to data limitations we can do this for the U.S. 
only. 
2. The Relationship between productivity, wages and advanced technology 
We begin our micro comparison of the U.S. and Germany by examining the empirical relationship 
between labour productivity and measures of the choice of technology at businesses including the role of 
advanced technology and the skill mix of the workforce.  In a like manner, we examine the relationship 
between payroll per worker and these same factors. 
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Tables 4 and 5 present the results from simple descriptive regressions with labour productivity (log value 
added) as the dependent variable and measures of the use of technology and the skill mix as right hand 
side variables.  Table 4a presents results for the U.S. while Table 4b presents results for Germany.  As 
discussed in the prior section, we define technology groups in a non-parametric fashion us ing the 
equipment investment and computer investment per worker measures.   We also include as RHS variables  
the skill mix (share of non-production workers in the total workforce), a measure of Internet access (as 
noted in the previous section, these measures are not directly comparable across the countries), and the 
interaction of the skill mix and the Internet access variable.  Also, all regressions include controls for size, 
age, multi-unit status (a dummy variable indicating whether or not the establishment is owned by a multi-
location company), a 2-digit STAN industry code and (for Germany) a dummy indicating that plant is 
located in East Germany. 
In the tables, results are presented on un-weighted, sample weighted, and employment weighted 
(including sample weighted) basis. Our primary interest is in the employment-weighted specification 
since these results are the most relevant for the analysis for the other chapters.  That is, the weighted 
results generate aggregate measures of labour productivity comparable to the aggregate industry measures 
analysed in prior chapters.  However, the other specifications are also of interest as it is useful to consider 
the nature of the relationships when all establishments are treated equally regardless of size.  
Interestingly, the results are largely the same across these three specifications so our discussion of the 
employment-weighted results yields a reasonable depiction for all 3 cases. 
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Table 4a: U.S.  Cross Sectional Labour Productivity Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log((TVS-CM)/TE) 
Variable  UNWEIGHTED 
Coefficient Estimate 
 (Std. Error) 
WEIGHT=SAMPLE 
WEIGHT 
Coefficient Estimate 
 (Std. Error) 
WEIGHT=SAMPLE 
WEIGHT*TE 
Coefficient Estimate 
 (Std. Error) 
0 / 0 -0.598  
(0.125) 
-0.636 
(0.083) 
-0.669  
(0.160) 
Low / 0  
-0.445  
(0.019) 
-0.457 
(0.021) 
-0.461  
(0.018) 
High / 0 
-0.116  
(0.023) 
-0.079 
(0.025) 
-0.157  
(0.023) 
Low / Low 
-0.497  
(0.019) 
-0.474 
(0.020) 
-0.513  
(0.017) 
Low / High  
-0.369  
(0.020) 
-0.323 
(0.022) 
-0.414  
(0.019) 
High / Low 
-0.108  
(0.023) 
-0.120 
(0.026) 
-0.074  
(0.021) 
 
 
Investment class: 
Total Equipment / IT 
High/ High Omitted Omitted Omitted 
% of Employment with Internet Access 
0.513 
(0.030) 
0.376 
(0.032) 
0.524 
(0.028) 
% of Non-production Workers (skill) 
0.098 
(0.036) 
0.072 
(0.033) 
0.154 
(0.037) 
Interaction  
-0.440 
(0.076) 
-0.090 
(0.075) 
-0.451  
(0.069) 
Number of Observations 22,704 22,704 22,704 
R2  0.245 0.218 0.259 
Source: Authors calculations from the1999 CNUS and 2000 ASM, Center for Economic Studies.  
Notes:  All regressions also control for size, age, STAN industry and multi-unit status. 
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Table 4b: German Cross Sectional Labour Productivity Regressions 
Dependent Variable: (Log) Value Added, 3261 obs 
Variable   Unweighted. Weight= 
 Sample Weight 
Weight=Sample Weight*TE 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. (Std. Error) 
Investment Class 0/0 -0.296 (0.05) -0.358 (0.112) -0.287 (0.068) 
(High/High omitted) Low/0 -0.433 (0.055) -0.516 (0.117) -0.434 (0.077) 
 High/0 -0.132 (0.062) -0.09 (0.135) -0.176 (0.096) 
 Low/Low -0.33 (0.038) -0.384 (0.101) -0.393 (0.055) 
 Low/High -0.259 (0.043) -0.388 (0.115) -0.31 (0.058) 
 High/Low -0.131 (0.047) -0.335 (0.131) -0.172 (0.062) 
        
Internet Access most -0.082 (0.071) -0.023 (0.128) 0.165 (0.098) 
(all omitted) half -0.137 (0.079) 0.063 (0.159) -0.053 (0.149) 
 a few 0.008 (0.059) -0.023 (0.12) 0.163 (0.076) 
 none -0.062 (0.065) -0.086 (0.121) 0.09 (0.104) 
        
% of non-production workers  0.64 (0.092) 0.534 (0.169) 0.978 (0.133) 
        
Interaction most 0.163 (0.185) 0.288 (0.279) -0.333 (0.229) 
% of non-production /Internet half 0.294 (0.194) -0.39 (0.373) 0.029 (0.322) 
Access a few -0.103 (0.161) -0.016 (0.265) -0.585 (0.201) 
 none -0.573 (0.19) -0.419 (0.302) -0.828 (0.257) 
        
R2   0.245  0.182  0.315  
Source: Authors calculations from the 2001 wave of the IAB Establishment Panel.  
Notes:  All regressions also control for size, age, STAN industry, multi-unit status and East Germany. 
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Table 5a: U.S. Cross Sectional Average Payroll Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log(Payroll/TE) 
Variable  
Un-weighted 
 
Coefficient Estimate 
 (Std. Error) 
Weight=Sample Weight 
 
 
Coefficient Estimate 
 (Std. Error) 
Weight=Sample 
weight*TE 
 
Coefficient Estimate 
 (Std. Error) 
0 / 0 -0.273 
(0.059) 
-0.293 
(0.043) 
-0.288 
(0.077) 
Low / 0  
-0.204 
(0.009) 
-0.233 
(0.010) 
-0.240 
(0.008) 
High / 0 
-0.070 
(0.010) 
-0.095 
(0.013) 
-0.045 
(0.011) 
Low / Low 
-0.228 
(0.009) 
-0.238 
(0.010) 
-0.261 
(0.008) 
Low / High 
-0.127 
(0.010) 
-0.148 
(0.011) 
-0.165 
(0.009) 
High / Low 
-0.068 
(0.011) 
-0.077 
(0.013) 
-0.067 
(0.010) 
 
 
Investment class: 
Total Equipment / IT 
High/ High Omitted Omitted Omitted 
% of Employment with Internet Access 
0.215 
(0.014) 
0.192 
(0.016) 
0.219 
(0.014) 
% of Non-production Workers (skill) 
0.340 
(0.017) 
0.235 
(0.017) 
0.349 
(0.018) 
Interaction 
-0.001 
(0.036) 
0.198 
(0.038) 
-0.006 
(0.033) 
Number of Observations 22,947 22,947 22,947 
R2  0.283 0.257 0 408 
Source: Authors calculations from the1999 CNUS and 2000 ASM, Center for Economic Studies. 
Notes:  All regressions also control for size, age, STAN industry and multi-unit status. 
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Table 5b: German Cross Sectional Average Payroll Regressions  
Dependent Variable: (Log) Payroll per Worker, 3134 obs 
Variable   Un-weighted Weight= 
Sample Weight 
Weight=Sample Weight*TE 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. (Std. Error) 
Investment Class 0/0 -.117 (.025) -.102 (.081) -.111 (.036) 
(High/High o mitted) Low/0 -.081 (.024) -.050 (.080) -.104 (.035) 
 High/0 .012 (.032) .102 (.098) .018 (.042) 
 Low/Low -.079 (.017) -.096 (.073) -.141 (.031) 
 Low/High -.044 (.022) -.197 (.099) -.032 (.024) 
 High/Low -.021 (.020) .080 (.088) -.030 (.027) 
        
Internet Access most .026 (.029) .163 (.082) .124 (.056) 
(all omitted) half .071 (.043) .346 (.103) .068 (.115) 
 a few .060 (.028) .072 (.099) .107 (.061) 
 none .031 (.035) .044 (.084) .055 (.069) 
        
% of non-production workers  .358 (.053) .220 (.121) .582 (.103) 
        
Interaction most .092 (.074) .192 (.173) -.17 (.122) 
% of non-production /Internet half -.124 (.106) -.382 (.210) -.173 (.231) 
Access a few -.037 (.084) .091 (.230) -.183 (.140) 
 none -.615 (.134) -.624 (.228) -.713 (.170) 
        
R2   0.353  0.301  0.342  
Source: Authors calculations from the 2001 wave of the IAB Establishment Panel.  
Notes:  All regressions also control for size, age, STAN industry, multi-unit status and East Germany. 
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In both countries, use of advanced technology (defined using the technology groups described in section II 
with appropriate caveats) and the use of more skilled workers are associated with higher labour 
productivity.  Also, in the U.S., the interaction of Internet access and the skill mix is (somewhat 
surprisingly) negative while the interaction effects in Germany are more difficult to decipher, as the effects 
are not monotonic and often statistically insignificant.40   Still, at first glance, it is striking that the overall 
patterns are so similar across the two countries.  
While the patterns across the countries are broadly similar, the quantitative effects are different in some 
interesting ways.  In particular, our reading of the results is that the use of advanced technology yields a 
greater increase in labour productivity in the U.S. compared to Germany.  We base this inference on the 
difference between the labour productivity of the highest technology group (High/High) and the lowest 
technology group (0/0).  In the U.S., the productivity premium for being “High/High” is 67 log points in 
the U.S. and 29 log points in Germany. In a like manner, the productivity premium for being “High/High” 
relative to “Low/Low” is 51 log points in the U.S. and 39 points in Germany.    
Some of the intermediate comparisons are less clear-cut.  For example, conditional of the level of total 
equipment investment there is an additional productivity premium for U.S. establishments with high 
computer investment per worker of approximately 7 to 10 log points.  These effects are estimated less 
precisely for Germany.  According to the point estimates, a business with high computer investment per 
worker has, conditional on the level of total equipment investment, a productivity premium of between 8 to 
17 log points. Alternatively, conditional on computer investment, there is a bigger productivity premium 
from an increase in total equipment per worker in the U.S. relative to Germany. That is, conditional on 
computer investment per worker, the productivity premium in going from low to high equipment 
investment is between 41 and 44 log points in the U.S. and 14 and 31 log points in Germany.  We think 
these intermediate/conditional comparisons are interesting but place more emphasis on the comparisons 
based upon using the combined impact of total equipment and computer investment spending (e.g., 
High/High vs. 0/0) given the limitations of the measures. 
Internet access has a slightly larger quantitative effect in the U.S. than Germany.  While the differences in 
the measurement of the variables make this a bit difficult to compare, consider that in the U.S. going from 
the 10th percentile plant to the 90th percentile plant (see Table 2a) yields an increase in Internet access from 
0 percent to 60 percent of the workforce. Using the coefficients from Table 4a suggests this is associated 
with an increase in productivity of approximately 24 log points (this calculation takes into account the 
negative interaction effect).  In Germany, an increase from none to half or most (which is roughly 
equivalent in going from 0 to 60 percent) yields according to Table 4b coefficients an increase in 
productivity of between 13 to 23 log points.41   
In terms of other effects of interest, in both countries an increase in the skill mix is associated with an 
increase in productivity and in this case the quantitative effect is much larger in Germany. 42   Also, as 
noted the interaction between Internet access and the skill mix is negative 43 in the U.S. while the effect is 
                                                 
40 The surprising negative interaction effect may in part be related to the fact that the non-production worker mix is a 
poor proxy for the skill mix.  For example, the non-production worker mix includes clerical workers.  Put differently, the 
interaction effect may be picking up composition effects within the two broad categories of workers that we measure.   
41 The interaction effects for Germany are imprecisely estimated so appropriate caution required about this comparison.  
However, we have estimated these specifications without the interaction effects and the quantitative estimated impact is still 
approximately the same. 
42  This measure of skill is quite crude but the only one we have available readily for both countries.  For Germany, there 
are alternative measures of skill and somewhat surprisingly we find that when we include these alternative measures of skill 
instead of this measure that we find less of an impact of a change in skill on productivity.   
43  Interestingly, the negative interaction term fo r the U.S. implies that the marginal impact of increased skill, as measured 
by the share of non-production workers, on productivity is negative for a significant number of establishments with high levels of 
  63 
not monotonic in Germany.  Going from “none” to “all” Internet access does yield a positive interaction 
effect in Germany.   
Tables 5a and 5b present analogous results based on payroll per worker for the two countries. Interestingly, 
the findings suggest that productivity differences are also reflected in wage differences along the same 
dimensions (i.e. the RHS variables in the regressions) especially in U.S.  As is typically the case in these 
types of regressions, appropriate caution needs to be given to the interpretation.  It is likely the case that 
U.S. high tech firms are especially high skill firms and the production/non-production distinction only 
captures part of the skill differences across firms. Existing studies (e.g., Doms, Dunne and Troske, 1997); 
and Abowd, Haltiwanger, Lane and Sandusky, 2001) suggest that this pattern holds in the U.S.  
Alternatively, it may be that there is some rent sharing of “success” from adopting advanced technology.  
In looking at the quantitative patterns, the wage gaps tend to be smaller than productivity gap.  For 
example, the wage gap between 0/0 gap and High/High group is 0.288 for U.S. and only 0.111 for 
Germany. One possible explanation for the apparent greater compression of wages relative to observables 
in Germany is that this is due to the wage setting institutions in Germany (and Europe more generally) that 
reduces the flexibility of relative wages and thus reduces experimentation in Europe.    
As we have noted, appropriate caution needs to be exercised in interpreting these results since measuring 
advanced technology via equipment investment and computer investment per worker groups is imperfect.  
For some sensitivity analysis, for the U.S., we also considered the analysis defining the six groups using 
investment in trucks as opposed to the investment in computers. We estimate the same productivity and 
payroll per worker regressions as in Tables 4a and 5a using the investment category groups defined using 
investment in “low-tech” equipment – highway vehicles (cars and trucks). While the results (not reported 
here) for total equipment investment were more or less unchanged (as expected) we find no productivity of 
wage premium at establishment with high investment in highway vehicles. As such, this gives us more 
confidence that there is information content in the computer investment data we are exploiting in this 
analysis.  Unfortunately, the data do not support a similar exercise for Germany. 
In sum, there are striking similarities in overall patterns but some notable differences in the quantitative 
effects in examining the relationship between outcomes like productivity and payroll per worker and 
measures of the use of advanced technology via equipment expenditures, computer expenditures and 
internet access.  In both the U.S. and Germany, the high productivity workplaces are the high skill and high 
tech workplaces. In the U.S., the differences in technology use account for more variation across 
businesses in productivity and payroll per worker.  In what follows, we treat these results as a backdrop to 
investigate the focus of this chapter – do we observe a greater degree of experimentation in the U.S. 
relative to Germany?   
3. Experimentation?  Differences across Germany and the U.S. 
The Role of Establishment Age 
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter and in earlier chapters, a key theme/hypothesis is that the 
U.S. exhibits greater market experimentation, which might help explain its stronger growth performance in 
a period of rapid diffusion of the a new general purpose technology (ICT). One way to explore this idea is 
to examine the nature of experimentation for entrants and young businesses.  New businesses are 
inherently experimenting as they are beginning to produce goods or services at a new location.  However, 
                                                                                                                                                               
Internet access.  Our prior hypothesis was that Internet access and skill would interact positively.  This may yet be the case and our 
finding may be due to imperfections in our measures – especially for skill as noted above.  An alternative and somewhat whimsical 
interpretation is that the web-surfing by the non-production workers is decreasing productivity.  
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the incentives for experimentation may vary across institutional environments.  In environments that 
especially encourage experimentation, we would expect to see greater dispersion in both choices and 
outcomes for young and new businesses.   
Tables 6 and 7 present means and standard deviations of the key measures by establishment age. Results in 
Table 6 suggest that means do not vary systematically with age with a few notable exceptions. For the 
U.S., we see the result obtained in earlier chapters that new businesses are small relative to their mature 
counterparts.  This finding does not hold for Germany. In addition, it does appear that high-tech investment 
spikes for young businesses and then exhibits mild u-shaped behaviour. 
Table 7 show that productivity dispersion falls systematically with age in U.S. but that this pattern does not 
hold for Germany. 44  The magnitude of the change in dispersion is substantial in U.S.  For the U.S., the 
decrease in dispersion measured by the standard deviation from the youngest to the most mature businesses 
is about 0.22.  A reduction in 22 log points is substantial but small relative to the overall dispersion in 
productivity.  For the U.S., we also see similar patterns for dispersion in payroll per worker.  That is, more 
mature businesses have less between plant dispersion in payroll per worker in U.S.  Again, Table 7(b) 
shows no systematic pattern in dispersion of payroll per worker in Germany.  
While we observe greater dispersion in productivity and payroll per worker for young businesses in the 
U.S., we do not observe striking differences in the dispersion of technology investment and skill mix 
patterns by establishment age in the U.S. There is evidence that equipment investment per worker is more 
dispersed for young businesses relative to mature businesses but there is less of a systematic pattern for 
computer investment. 
                                                 
44  In unreported results, we have calculated the statistics in Table 7 (and Table 6) using industry controls.  That is, before 
calculating the statistics, we deviate each measure from the relevant industry -specific (2-digit STAN mean).  We find the same 
basic patterns in the results.  In particular, even controlling for industry, we find that productivity dispersion falls systematically 
with age in the U.S. but it does not fall in Germany.  For examp le, for the U.S. the standard deviation of log productivity decreases 
from 0.92 for the youngest plants to 0.67 for the most mature plants while the equivalent statistics for Germany are 0.54 (youngest) 
and 0.59 (most mature).  The patterns for other variables are similar as well.  We also repeated the exercise using the employment 
weighted distribution and found similar patterns. 
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Table 6a:U.S.  Means by Establishment Age (weighted by sample weights) 
Age (years) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Number of Establishments  843 1297 751 588 561 547 518 520 629 620 634 23694 
Employment 86.9 80.6 80.5 84.4 89.8 88.3 113.5 99.2 88.8 111.5 102.6 157.2 
Skill (Proportion of non-production workers) 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 
Employee Internet Access (percentage) NA 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.21 
Total Equipment Investment ($1000) 1162.3 845.3 1242.8 890.2 948.0 846.2 952.2 647.2 641.7 819.7 910.0 1400.6 
Total Computer Investment ($1000) 55.4 44.6 48.2 62.9 47.0 63.3 52.9 55.2 45.9 68.5 64.9 85.8 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
36.47 15.38 17.12 11.60 7.19 7.78 9.07 9.70 9.43 6.40 7.03 6.52 
Total Computer Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
0.85 0.61 0.64 1.02 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.58 0.42 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker 4.34 4.29 4.37 4.33 4.35 4.26 4.12 4.27 4.17 4.25 4.30 4.35 
Log Payroll per Worker 3.38 3.32 3.34 3.37 3.38 3.35 3.37 3.45 3.42 3.37 3.38 3.52 
Source: Authors calculations from 1999 CNUS and 2000 ASM, Center for Economic Studies. 
 
Table 6b: German Means by Establishment Age 
Age (years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Number of Establishments  92 197 250 231 250 292 337 447 581 621 2465 2256 
Employment 20.34 22.5 18.35 18.79 15.27 18.45 15.65 15.91 22.02 21.64 32.78 35.65 
Skill (Proportion of non-production 
workers) 
0.23 0.32 0.26 0.38 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.33 
Employee Internet Access (1-5 categories) 2.96 2.85 2.43 2.32 3.16 2.55 2.73 2.54 2.46 2.91 3.12 2.88 
Total Equipment Investment ($1000) 694.18 350.38 394.06 293.31 117.16 309.89 148.39 159.64 190.73 225.97 283.23 375.33 
Total Computer Investment ($1000) 32.23 28.02 93.06 69.79 14.4 20.56 15.96 16.81 17.46 17.94 37.63 35.82 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
17.09 8.23 15.01 6.93 7.07 5.45 10.47 7.27 5.52 13.53 6.21 5.78 
Total Computer Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
1.09 0.65 0.56 0.89 0.46 1.21 1.43 1.27 0.51 0.67 0.84 0.59 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker 
($ 1000) 
3.3 3.36 3.42 3.47 3.77 3.55 3.77 3.77 3.58 3.48 3.66 3.65 
Log Payroll per Worker ($ 1000) 2.82 2.72 2.66 2.62 2.82 2.83 2.95 2.92 2.87 2.74 2.92 3.03 
Source: Authors calculations from the 2000 and 2001 waves of the IAB establishment Panel. 
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Table 7a: U.S. Standard Deviations by Establishment Age (weighted by sample weights) 
Age (years) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Number of Establishments  843 1297 751 588 561 547 518 520 629 620 634 23694 
Employment 277.7 140.4 176.0 140.3 203.7 172.0 400.4 624.8 366.3 304.6 199.7 432.5 
Skill (Proportion of non-production workers) 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.18 
Employee Internet Access (percentage) NA 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.26 
Total Equipment Investment ($1000) 5588.0 4732.8 9679.5 6101.5 9335.6 3961.5 5615.5 3437.5 3129.8 3783.8 4213.9 11588.7
Total Computer Investment ($1000) 469.8 269.2 327.3 448.4 284.5 416.4 346.3 686.7 484.5 656.2 442.2 1054.7 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
151.8 72.80 85.28 26.77 31.89 18.38 49.29 88.11 80.50 15.81 18.70 27.16 
Total Computer Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
4.16 3.18 4.40 3.67 1.31 1.47 2.66 1.16 2.10 1.76 1.97 5.75 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.85 0.73 1.18 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.72 0.72 
Log Payroll per Worker 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.38 
        Source: Authors calculations from 1999 CNUS and 2000 ASM, Center for Economic Studies. 
 
Table 7b: German Standard Deviations by Establishment Age 
Age (years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Number of Establishments  92 197 250 231 250 292 337 447 581 621 2465 2256 
Employment 99.73 148.08 117.03 178.06 71.54 100.07 49.46 46.71 59.25 67.83 237.12 309.48 
Skill (Proportion of non-production 
workers) 
0.25 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.34 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.32 0.34 
Employee Internet Access (1-5 categories) 1.83 1.81 1.68 1.65 1.70 1.66 1.64 1.53 1.65 1.63 1.71 1.70 
Total Equipment Investment ($1000) 21635.97 3438.17 6559.35 8679.07 764.23 13690.35 1024.23 954.70 1600.43 2047.34 3231.78 21851.71 
Total Computer Investment ($1000) 321.10 314.09 5481.75 3320.81 130.09 203.26 129.86 78.15 166.20 144.88 785.03 1017.27 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
33.64 25.94 48.15 14.70 18.72 11.57 34.03 17.65 13.11 54.68 18.64 19.37 
Total Computer Investment per Worker 
($1000) 
3.19 1.39 5.24 3.86 1.75 3.10 4.46 2.57 1.40 1.60 3.05 1.60 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker 
($ 1000) 
0.67 0.83 0.83 1.03 0.98 0.76 0.83 0.97 0.83 0.82 0.91 0.90 
Log  Payroll per Worker ($ 1000) 0.53 0.78 0.70 0.74 0.67 0.65 0.58 0.62 0.57 0.56 0.62 0.59 
Source: Authors calculations from the 2000 and 2001 waves of the IAB establishment Panel. 
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The Role of Active Learning – Differentiating between businesses actively changing their technology 
and others 
Businesses that are actively changing their technology are also inherently experimenting. There is 
uncertainty about the best way to implement a new technology and/or whether the business in question is 
capable of implementing the new technology in a successful manner. However, again the market and 
institutional environment may provide different incentives for experimentation.  If adjustment costs from 
institutional factors limit flexibility then businesses may choose a lower mean, lower risk strategy of 
implementation. 
For this analysis, we use the technology groups that we used in the simple regression analysis in the 
previous section.   For example, businesses that are most actively engaged in changing their technologies 
are the “High/High” group – those businesses that are above the median in both equipment investment per 
worker and computer investment per worker.   
Tables 8 and 9 present differences in means and standard deviations for choices and outcomes by these 
technology groups for the U.S. and Germany.  In terms of means, businesses that are more actively 
changing their technology in both countries have higher productivity, higher payroll per worker, a higher 
skill mix, and have more workers with access to the Internet (an alternative technology measure in its own 
right).  The differences in the means are more pronounced in the U.S.   
The striking differences between the U.S. and Germany are seen in Table 9. In the U.S., the businesses 
most actively changing their technology have greater dispersion in productivity, payroll per worker, the 
skill mix of workers, computer and equipment investment per worker, and the internet access relative to 
those businesses less actively changing their technology (e.g., the “0/0” group or the “Low/Low” group).  
The differences in dispersion are large in magnitude. For example, for productivity the increase in 
dispersion from the “0/0” technology group to the “High/High” technology group is almost 40 log points.  
Strikingly, these patterns do not hold for Germany where there is no systematic relationship between the 
nature of changes in technology and the patterns of dispersion.  
To explore these findings further, we use the results from section III that relate the characteristics of the 
business to the productivity differences. In particular, we use the regression results in Table 4 to examine 
how much of the changes in productivity dispersion across technology groups can be accounted for by 
changes in the dispersion of characteristics across businesses (e.g., skill mix, internet access, computer 
investment and equipment investment per worker) and how much is accounted for by unobservable factors. 
Table 10 presents the results of this exercise. Interestingly, both observable and unobservable factors help 
account for the increasing dispersion with pace of technology change in the U.S.  These results are 
consistent with the view that experimentation occurs over both observable and unobservable dimensions.  
That is, the contribution of observables may reflect the role of experimentation as businesses try different 
ways of conducting business. Alternatively, the role of the unobservables might be interpreted as 
suggesting that those businesses most actively changing their technology face considerable uncertainty 
about how best to change the technology and whether they have the “ability” to change the technology 
successfully. Apparently, both observable and unobservable factors are important in the U.S.  For 
Germany, given that there is not a systematic relationship between the pace of technology changes and 
dispersion, it is harder to interpret the results.  However, we do see some modest role for differences due to 
dispersion in observables but no impact of dispersion in un-observables. 
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Table 8a: U.S. Means by IT and Total Equipment Investment Categories (weighted by sample weights) 
(High Category defined as investment exceeding the 75th Percentile) 
Investment class: 
Equip / IT 
 
0 / 0 
 
Low / 0 
 
High / 0 
 
Low / Low 
 
Low / High 
 
High / Low 
 
High / High 
Number of Establishments  40 9047 2872 10163 4401 2284 2395 
Age 9.54 9.41 8.84 9.71 9.53 9.51 8.78 
Employment 34.4 101.0 136.7 148.7 149.9 209.1 228.0 
Skill: (Proportion of non-production workers) 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.37 0.25 0.33 
Employee Internet Access (Fraction) 0.07 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.34 0.22 0.34 
Total Equipment Investment ($1000) 0 282.6 4332.6 396.1 604.5 4322.6 6586.7 
Total Computer Investment ($1000) 0 0 0 22.29 195.17 38.81 668.30 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 2.47 33.32 2.23 3.44 22.34 36.58 
Total Computer Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 0 0 0.16 1.44 0.20 3.04 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker 3.94 4.19 4.73 4.19 4.42 4.65 4.83 
Log Payroll per Worker 3.33 3.39 3.56 3.43 3.62 3.60 3.73 
Source: Authors calculations from 1999 CNUS and 2000 ASM, Center for Economic Studies. 
 
Table 8b: German Means by IT and Total Equipment Investment Categories 
(High Category defined as investment exceeding the 75th Percentile) 
Investment class: Equip / IT 0 / 0 Low / 0 High / 0 Low / Low Low / High High / Low High / High 
Number of Establishments  1579 793 450 1727 1057 524 1543 
Employment 9.15 14.45 16.54 44.43 34.05 76.33 58.5 
Skill: (Proportion of non-production workers) 0.34 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.4 0.26 0.39 
Employee Internet Access (Fraction) 3.23 2.94 3.03 2.71 2.2 2.2 2.44 
Total Equipment Investment ($1000) 0 36.16 420.16 112.54 119.43 962.77 1467.63 
Total Computer Investment ($1000) 0 0 0 12.27 47.35 25.59 209.36 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 2.69 32.91 2.11 3.1 13.05 25.45 
Total Computer Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 0 0 0.29 1.66 0.35 4.15 
Establishment Age 9.94 9.53 8.49 9.96 9.85 10.23 9.25 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker ($1000) 3.45 3.46 3.73 3.57 3.81 3.75 4.03 
Log Payroll per Worker  ($ 1000) 2.77 2.74 2.93 3.05 3.09 3.13 3.13 
Source: Authors calculations from the 2000 and 2001 waves of the IAB establishment Panel. 
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Table 9a: U.S. Standard Deviations by IT and Total Equipment Investment Categories (weighted by sample weights) 
(High Category defined as investment exceeding the 75th Percentile) 
Investment class: 
Equip / IT 
 
0 / 0 
 
Low / 0 
 
High / 0 
 
Low / Low 
 
Low / High 
 
High / Low 
 
High / High 
Number of Establishments  40 9047 2872 10163 4401 2284 2395 
Establishment Age 2.935 3.023 3.522 2.781 2.933 2.978 3.561 
Employment 33.66 291.45 422.19 396.27 457.50 422.18 669.98 
Skill: (Proportion of non-production workers) 0.109 0.179 0.190 0.178 0.213 0.159 0.213 
Employee Internet Access 
(Fraction) 
0.153 0.223 0.281 0.235 0.313 0.264 0.321 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 2.181 103.60 2.065 2.143 64.612 96.252 
Total Computer Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 0 0 0.117 12.679 0.125 6.656 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker 0.572 0.744 0.922 0.606 0.652 0.891 0.944 
Log Payroll per Worker 0.239 0.405 0.441 0.356 0.380 0.361 0.414 
Source: Authors calculations from 1999 CNUS and 2000 ASM, Center for Economic Studies. 
 
Table 9b: German Standard Deviations by IT and Total Equipment Investment Categories 
(High Category defined as investment exceeding the 75th Percentile) 
Investment class: Equip / IT 0 / 0 Low / 0 High / 0 Low / Low Low / High High / Low High / High 
Number of Establishments  1579 793 450 1727 1057 524 1543 
Employment 28.07 39.56 81.64 169.32 118.44 313.96 409.87 
Skill: (Proportion of non-production workers) 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.34 
Employee Internet Access (Fraction) 1.81 1.72 1.7 1.54 1.44 1.34 1.54 
Total Equipment Investment ($1000) 0 141.99 1963.85 588.83 573.66 4841.08 34957.82 
Total Computer Investment ($1000) 0 0 0 45.41 278.73 101.55 3735.69 
Total Equipment Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 1.7 60.61 1.67 1.6 9.94 37.35 
Total Computer Investment per Worker ($1000) 0 0 0 0.17 1.1 0.14 6.46 
Establishment Age 2.77 3.04 3.71 2.9 2.79 2.7 3.27 
Log labour Productivity: VA per Worker ($1000) 0.93 0.8 0.85 0.84 0.8 0.66 0.94 
Log Payroll per Worker ($ 1000) 0.64 0.66 0.55 0.52 0.65 0.49 0.56 
Source: Authors calculations from the 2000 and 2001 waves of the IAB establishment Panel. 
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Table 10a:U.S.  Means and Standard Deviations of Predicted Values and Residuals by IT and Total Equipment Investment 
Categories (Based on regression in middle column of table 8a) 
(High Category defined as investment exceeding the 75th Percentile) 
Investment class: 
Equip / IT 
 
0 / 0 
 
Low / 0 
 
High / 0 
 
Low / Low 
 
Low / High 
 
High / Low 
 
High / High 
Mean of Predicted Values 3.967 4.196 4.720 4.194 4.419 4.669 4.854 
Standard Deviation of 
Predicted values  
0.210 0.267 0.321 0.250 0.253 0.298 0.325 
Standard Deviation of 
Residuals  
0.448 0.682 0.783 0.555 0.607 0.780 0.750 
Source: Authors calculations from 1999 CNUS and 2000 ASM, Center for Economic Studies. 
 
 
Table 10b: Means and Standard Deviations of Predicted Values and Residuals by IT and Total Equipment Investment 
Categories (Based on regression in middle column of table 8a) 
(High Category defined as investment exceeding the 75th Percentile) 
Investment class: 
Equip / IT 
 
0 / 0 
 
Low / 0 
 
High / 0 
 
Low / Low 
 
Low / High 
 
High / Low 
 
High / High 
Mean of Predicted Values 3.553 3.33 3.81 3.603 3.682 3.703 4.104 
Standard Deviation of 
Predicted Values 
0.285 0.277 0.309 0.325 0.351 0.293 0.341 
Standard Deviation of 
Residuals  
0.856 0.751 0.641 0.804 0.704 0.651 0.818 
Source: Authors calculations from the 2001 wave of the IAB establishment Panel.  
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4. Summary and interpretation 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests U.S. businesses engage in experimentation in a variety of 
ways in a manner that is not matched by their German counterparts. There is greater experimentation 
amongst young businesses and there is greater experimentation among businesses actively changing their 
technology. This experimentation is evidenced in dispersion in productivity and in related dispersion in key 
choices like skill mix and the role of Internet access.  The evidence in this chapter also shows the mean 
impact of adopting new technology greater in U.S. than in Germany. Putting the pieces together suggests 
that U.S. businesses choose a higher mean, higher variance strategy in adopting new technology.    
There are many caveats and cautions that must be noted for interpreting the results in this fashion.  Our 
measures of technology as well as our measures of outcomes like productivity and wages at the micro level 
are imperfect and likely subject to both classical and non-classical measurement error. Moreover, the 
comparison is only for the manufacturing sectors in the U.S. and Germany and largely reflects within 
country cross-sectional differences across businesses in each country for the year 2000. Whether these 
results would hold up in a larger cross-country sample or for other years is an open question. In a related 
matter, the causal link between use of advanced technology and productivity is difficult to determine 
without longitudinal data and as such our results on the relationship between technology and productivity 
(and wages) should be interpreted as characterising correlations between the variables of interest.  Having 
noted these cautions, it is striking to us that systematic differences across the countries in the micro data 
are readily apparent.  The covariance structure between productivity and measures of changing technology 
differ systematically at the micro level across the U.S. and Germany in a manner that is clearly suggestive 
of the U.S. exhibiting a greater degree of experimentation in the adoption of new technologies.     
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4.  ICT AND GROWTH: THE ROLE OF FACTOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS 
Introduction 
The economic theory needed to understand the role of ICT is not unified and different mechanisms are 
needed to explain how growth occurs through different channels (namely, through capital deepening and 
technology shifts, or through growth in the ICT producing sector). Neoclassical investment theory and more 
modern versions incorporating uncertainty are needed to understand capital deepening. The nature of 
demand and tastes for innovation are useful in understanding some of the problems associated with MFP 
growth. Theories of endogenous growth may shed some light on growth within firms in the ICT producing 
sector.  Further, strategic IO theory can help explain how firms use innovation as a competitive weapon, 
and how resources move between competing firms and sectors of the economy. Finally, growth models with 
an evolutionary flavour emphasise that firms grope for the proper configuration of inputs, outputs, and 
technology in an attempt to profitably serve the market.  
While shedding light on the mechanisms underlying the effects of ICT on growth, the models also need to 
be consistent with the stylised facts displayed in the previous chapters. These include the findings that the 
US had higher ICT investment intensity than the EU on average during the 1990s. Further, the EU did not 
enjoy the productivity boom in the late 1990s. At the micro level, entrants are relatively smaller in the US 
but grow much faster, conditional on survival. Also, the dispersion in a range of indicators among firms 
with high ICT intensity is larger in US than in the German manufacturing sector. However, in the 
manufacturing sector, the ICT intensity of US and German firms does not differ much on average. A full 
model that explains all the features cannot be pulled off the shelf, although the different models described 
below in turn, exhibit features that can help explain some of the emerging facts. 
In the following, the notion that economic advances accrue in some automatic fashion to those that purchase 
the advanced ICT, is tossed aside resolutely. As stressed by Baily (2002), the adoption of ICT requires 
explicit innovative actions. Firms producing ICT goods, or making use of ICT both must experiment with 
their production processes and the characteristics of goods and services produced in order to find a 
combination that is successful in the market place. Productivity and profitability differences driven by 
differential efficiencies, costs and customer preferences yield a selection mechanism that sorts out the good 
from the bad implementations of ICT in the ‘research laboratory’ that is the market.  
Table 1 below shows the channels through which growth is expected to occur, along with the theory needed 
to understand the mechanisms, and the institutional or policy environment that impinges on the mechanism.  
In what follows, we first discuss alternative perspectives on the role of ICT – in particular as an investment 
good and as an innovative activity.  Using this discussion, we then describe each of the growth channels in 
turn.  Finally, we discuss the role that market institutions might be playing in impacting these channels of 
growth. 
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Table 1.  Growth Channel, theory, and policy 
Channel Driving force/Theoretical Area of possible policy 
Capital deepening Investment; growth accounting Factor markets 
   
MFP   
   Innovative adoption of ICT   
      Within firms   
         Process/product R&D; strategic IO Product markets 
          Internal organisation, Experimentation; labour Factor markets 
      Resource reallocation General Equilibrium; Strategic Factor and product markets 
   Knowledge creation R&D; Endogenous Growth Science and Tech. Policy 
   
ICT producers   
   Within firm R&D; endogenous growth, Factor and product markets 
   Resource reallocation General Equilibrium; Strategic Factor and product markets 
1. ICT as an investment good 
In Table 4.1, only one channel, that of capital deepening, makes use of investment theory to explain the 
driving forces behind the effects of ICT. The importance of this channel for the total expected growth effect 
of ICT is mostly an empirical issue. Growth accounting quantifies the effect by treating ICT investment 
analogously to other asset purchases and the hiring of other productive inputs. As seen in Chapter 2, the 
contribution of ICT to growth is much smaller in EU countries than in the US. Most of the difference 
derives from a lower stock of ICT assets, and thus a lower expenditure share on this input into production, 
although growth rates of ICT capital services continue to lag somewhat in the EU as well.  
The variables that determine the contribution of ICT capital services to growth in the accounting framework 
include tax rates, asset depreciation, and asset prices, as well as the rate of return on investment. The 
allocation of resources between ICT capital services and other factors of production also depends on asset 
prices for other investment types, as well as the wage rate. For this reason, the conditions in the factor 
markets are important for investment in ICT. In papers by Caballero and Hammour (1998) and Blanchard 
(2001), bargaining power of workers, or stringent labour market (LM) regulations may push firms away 
from labour and towards more capital-intensive technologies. There is enough evidence that LM regulations 
tend to be stricter in most EU countries than in the U.S but there is much less information on how 
regulations affect the relative share of ICT in total capital input.  From the micro-level manufacturing data 
we do see that investment per worker in individual industries is higher in Germany, but that the ratio of ICT 
investment to total equipment investment is about the same. 
Another variable that plays a role in investment is the uncertainty surrounding returns. With small 
modifications to the investment function, the option value of waiting before committing to sunk investment 
can be incorporated into the investment function. In general investment will be lower in a more volatile 
environment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The effect of this type of uncertainty on the relative investments in 
ICT and other equipment is not clear. On the one hand, the general-purpose nature of ICT provides exactly 
the kind of flexibility in future production that options theory calls for. On the other hand, the technological 
uncertainty of ICT-related investment projects likely is higher than tried-and-true equipment, which would 
point towards the value of waiting. Although it is proper to consider technological uncertainty as a cause of 
slow diffusion, this path is not able to explain the differences in ICT intensity across countries, nor the 
differences in firm-level heterogeneity seen in the micro-level manufacturing data. 
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2. ICT adoption as an innovative activity 
Describing ICT investment through use of neoclassical investment theory does not appear to be able to fully 
account for the differences across countries, sectors or firms, and does not explain fully how ICT use may 
affect growth. Seeing ICT adoption by a firm as an innately innovative activity, is an alternative perspective 
that can potentially help in this regard. How do these views of ICT adoption differ, and why does business 
spending on innovative activities, for example R&D, require such different theory from investment in 
buildings or traditional equipment?  
Both types of expenditures have costs and benefits associated with them, with associated factor prices, and 
marginal revenue products. Both types of expenditures are characterised by benefits that occur over time 
and by timing differences in the flow of benefits and costs, thus requiring some method of expectations 
formation and of discounting to determine optimal current expenditures. However, the effects of uncertainty 
may differ between the two types of expenditures. The chance of a successful outcome is related to the 
effort spent on innovation. Further, with innovative activities, the outcome of the search for a better 
mousetrap may be uncertain, but once a successful discovery is made, the result may be used elsewhere by 
the firm at relatively little extra cost. These characteristics are consistent with viewing ICT as a general 
purpose technology (see Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). Also, they underlie the predictions emerging 
from endogenous growth models. 
ICT may be used by firms in many different ways and for many different purposes, but it is unknown a 
priori how best to implement the technology. Unfortunately, the search for improvements through adoption 
of ICT is not yet formalized in the manner that R&D laboratories are. In an R&D lab, trial and error takes 
place in a controlled environment, at an experimental scale. No such laboratory exists in implementing ICT 
to improve business processes or products. Instead, the laboratory for figuring out and developing good 
implementations of ICT must be the market itself.   
The search for a successful implementation of ICT is not restricted to finding ways to substitute away from 
labour or other productive inputs. As will be discussed below, ICT changes transactions costs in many 
interactions between actors within firms, and between firms and their customers and suppliers. As such, 
areas for improvement will involve search over strategies to increase ‘organisational capital’, by 
experimentation with various schemes such as performance pay, flexible job requirements, and workforce 
training (e.g. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002, Black and Lynch, 2001, 2002). Also firms will 
experiment with strategies within the supply chain, such as make-or-buy decisions, strategic alliances and 
customer relation management (examples from management literature, e.g. Hax and Wilde, 1999, or 
Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000). In addit ion, firms may experiment with product characteristics using the 
‘mass customisation’ (increased product variety without increased marginal cost) that is made possible 
through use of ICT. According to most theoretical accounts of innovation, the chance of success depends 
positively on the amount of experimentation. Quite often, firms can replicate a successful ICT 
implementation for not much more than the direct capital and labour input cost and, therefore their 
profitability also increases with scale. Moreover, in a rapidly evolving environment, firm profitability 
increases if the firm can adjust its scale up or down, depending on the apparent success in the market of its 
particular implementation strategy.46 
  
Firms fail because they are unable to match up their system of coordination and control with the available 
technological opportunities, according to Pavitt (1998), rather than because they are unable to understand 
                                                 
46  This effect is well known in the card game of black jack, where a player can make positive profits despite unfair odds 
overall, if he can change the size of the bet as the probability of having a winning hand changes over the course of the game. 
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the technology. By broadening ones view of ‘technology’ to include the implementation through internal 
organization and management of supply chain as well as the  physical ICT assets, the problem of within 
firm innovation may be analysed through more neoclassical models. For example, in models of learning, the 
amount of experimentation increases the learning rate and boosts the present value of profit flows (Wieland, 
2000). While some of the models attempt to characterize the optimal amount of experimentation (e.g. 
Moscarini and Smith, 2001), they do not explicitly state how the experimentation is to take place. In the 
management literature, advice is given on how to infuse a firm with the desire to experiment and innovate 
(e.g. Hamel, 1999), but the exact methodology for experimentation is left to specialized literature. 
In considering the experimentation process, the learning and selection effects emphasized by Jovanovic 
(1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) (and discussed briefly in earlier chapters 2 and 3) are relevant.  Each 
cohort of new entrants will face uncertainty about many facets of the way to do business but in the recent 
era especially how best to adopt and implement ICT.  Existing businesses will also face uncertainty as they 
restructure and retool their production and organization as they implement ICT.  Failure to adopt the new 
technology implies falling behind but failing to adopt the new technology successfully may be just as bad.  
Those entrants and those adopting businesses that have implemented poorly will have lower profits and 
productivity and as such will contract and exit.  Those businesses that implement successfully (and/or 
through learning by doing learn how to implement successfully) will have profitability and productivity 
advantages and expand.  The market selection and learning effects this perspective suggests have obvious 
policy implications that we discuss below.    
Beyond the trial and error aspects of experimentation, another important set of  factors are those that imply 
a possible wedge between social and private returns to innovative activities. Endogenous growth theory (eg 
Jones and Williams 1999), describes the effect at the macro level of the market failures associated with 
R&D. Incomplete appropriability of the benefits leads to under-investment in a decentralised equilibrium. 
On the other hand, ‘stepping on toes’ or a congestion externality occurring between firms competing for a 
prize leads to over-investment, as does the neglect of socials losses owing to ‘business stealing’ away from 
the incumbents using a previous generation of technology.  
It does not seem likely that business firms that purchase existing ICT technology and then experimentally 
arrive at a successful implementation have the same problem in appropriating the benefits as they would 
have, had they acquired truly non-rival knowledge. However, externalities associated with additional users 
in a communications network may hamper adoption at early stages of such networks. Likewise, the 
‘stepping on toes’ externalities may describe problems associated with first-mover advantages inside ICT 
producing sectors, but less in ICT-using sectors. On the other hand, the ‘business stealing’ externality may 
be particularly relevant for ICT adopters, where the quality and variety of products or services made 
possible by successful implementation of ICT may rapidly erode the incumbents’ market share. Differences 
across countries in the facility with which resources (both in factor and product markets) are reallocated 
among competing suppliers may therefore provide a possible cause for differences in ICT adoption.  
It is important to note that the implications of the externalities for welfare are not unambiguous. There is 
always the possibility of excessive dynamics (Reiss 1982 AER; Berry & Waldfogel 1999 Rand; Jones and 
Williams 1998 QJE). Negative externalities of ‘stepping on toes’ and business stealing may outweigh the 
positive externality of knowledge spillovers and create excessive investment in innovative activities. 
Although hard empirical proof is lacking, Jones and Williams gather circumstantial evidence that overall 
R&D investment is sub-optimal in a decentralised economy. 
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3. The growth channels  
With the above views of ICT adoption as an asset investment or as a decision to innovate highlighted, we 
now turn to the channels through which ICT adoption lead to growth. First, labour productivity and output 
grow as a result of capital deepening. Growth accounting in Chapter 1 shows how investment in ICT that 
increases the real flow of services attributable to the stock of ICT assets contributes to output growth.  This 
direct channel of ICT adoption to output is well understood, theoretically and empirically. More interesting 
are the possibilities that adoption of ICT provides efficiency gains over and above the contribution of 
capital deepening.  Even when quality improvements in ICT assets are controlled for (see Chapter 2), the 
measured multifactor  (MFP) residual still shows rates of “technical change” that varies across countries. 
An open question is whether ICT is contributing to this residual “technological” growth.  The following 
sketches out how ICT adoption may end up increasing MFP or MFP growth. 
MFP growth 
ICT potentially contributes by increasing the efficiency of communication and information processing 
throughout parts of the economy where many actors successfully have implemented the technology. The 
improvements in communication and information processing have direct consequences for (at least) two 
aspects of economic processes: (i) transaction cost will go down and (ii) the productivity of knowledge 
workers will increase.47   In a related manner, ICT implementation is associated with changes in the 
organizational capital of firms (as emphasized for example by Bresnahan, Brynjolffson, and Hitt (2002)). 
Economic transactions, whether they take place among human beings, between firms and customers, or 
between firms are accompanied by transaction costs. These include transport costs and search costs, but also 
the costs incurred to check whether contracts are carried out properly (see Milgrom and Roberts [1994] for 
a detailed discussion). The distorting effects of these costs are well known: they place a wedge in the 
match-up of demand and supply. It is indeed possible that economically desirable transactions do not occur 
because of excessive transaction costs. 
The use of ICT could yield more efficient communication between economic parties. For instance, to better 
match demand and supply in the labour market, but also to aid in the logistics of production processes, with 
the purchase of final consumer products (e-commerce) or with the transaction between firms (business-to-
business commerce). Indeed, examples abound of internet-based markets, such as the market for real estate 
or for automotive parts. Unfortunately, factual estimates of the magnitude of the reduction in transactions 
costs due to ICT are scarce.  
Less clear are the quantitative economic consequences of the emergence of new markets and/or the growth 
of existing markets as a result of decreasing transaction costs. In the former situation an entirely new market 
comes into existence with concomitant surplus. In the latter case existing producers’ and consumers’ 
surplus can increase. An example of such a situation is the market for second-hand commodities. On-line 
auctions make it possible that buyers and sellers don’t have to be at the same physical place. Millions of 
transactions can be handled real-time. Indeed, this market has experienced a spectacular growth in recent 
years, leading to a more efficient allocation of the stock of existing goods. 
Another possible implication of the penetration of ICT is that ICT intensity and competition in a market are 
positively correlated. If markets become more transparent firms have to resort to enhancements of their 
                                                 
47  A third effect is that the supply and demand curves can change through increased ICT uptake; supply curves tilt since 
marginal costs fall relative to fixed costs because of the non-rival nature of knowledge as a production factor, while demand curves 
tilt due to the increased frequency and force of (network) externalities (see Shapiro and Varian, 1998). For the story we develop 
here these consequences are of less importance. 
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products and processes in order not to loose market share. Put differently, ICT investments by firms react to 
market structure, and in turn affect market structure. What this means is that the penetration of ICT into 
economic processes is ruled, to some extent, by a snowball effect, where the incentive to adopt ICT 
increases with the penetration rate. 
The second consequence of ICT use throughout the economy is its possible impact on the efficiency of 
knowledge creation and innovation. Knowledge workers conduct Research & Development (R&D) in order 
to come up with new products (product innovations) or enhance the efficiency of existing production 
processes (process innovations). Due to the use of ICT in research it is quite possible that the number of 
successful product and/or process innovations increases for the same R&D efforts. Besides the use of ICT 
to provide useful scientific and technical information for knowledge workers, the effectiveness of R&D 
may increase because ICT allows more rapid feedback on customer desires.  
All of these changes are associated with potential changes in the organizational structure of firms.  The 
manner in which firms interact with each other (through changes in the supply-chain structure and 
management) and the manner in which firms organize and locate their production facilities, capital and 
workforce inputs are all potentially impacted by the implementation of ICT.  The work of Bresnahan, 
Brynjolffson and Hitt (2002), for example, suggests that those businesses that also changed their 
organizational capital exhibited the largest productivity gains from ICT.   Thus, it may be that the  
contributions of ICT to the measured residual technology growth are also (or even mostly) associated with 
the accompanying changes in organizational capital. 
ICT Production  
Improvements in the efficiency and quality of ICT production can also contribute directly to growth.  One 
of the contributing factors here is that one of the largest users of ICT is the ICT producer sector itself.  The 
role of experimentation is presumably important in the ICT producing sector as well as in the ICT using 
sector.  Moreover, the organisational capital of ICT producers has been impacted as well as in the ICT using 
sector.  Thus, much of the discussion above is relevant for ICT producers.  In addition, the structure of 
product and factor markets likely plays an important role for both ICT producers and users.  We turn to this 
issue now. 
4. Market Institutions: The role of product and factor markets  
It is beyond the scope of this effort to provide a comprehensive survey the literature on the role of market 
institutions and policies for promoting growth via the channels discussed above.  Instead, we discuss some 
of the key points that have emerged in the literature that will help guide the empirical analysis of the role of 
policy in Chapter 5.  In many ways, the core hypothesis explored in Chapter 5 is non-controversial.  That is, 
that policy barriers to resources being allocated to their highest valued use may have an adverse impact on 
economic performance in general and productivity growth in particular.  While this core view is not 
controversial, it is an open question as to what specific policies act as such barriers and, of course, it may be 
that market imperfections or externalities call for active policy intervention.  In turn, some of the policies 
designed to combat market imperfections or address externalities may also have adverse impacts in terms of 
barriers to efficient resource allocation. 
Most of our discussion in what follows focuses on the role of product market competition and the product 
and factor market environment necessary to provide the incentives for development, adoption and 
experimentation of new technologies.  While related, in some ways our discussion neglects the role of 
stable macro policies that create a healthy market environment for capital accumulation and thus the 
policies needed to promote the traditional capital deepening channel of ICT.  This neglect is not to suggest 
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this aspect of policy is unimportant but rather that such a perspective is already reasonably well understood 
and agreed upon.  In that regard, it does not seem that the case for U.S. versus European differences in the 
contribution of ICT to growth lies in the differences in macro policies across these countries.     
Product and factor markets and within firm growth 
Starting with the role of product market competition, the theoretical literature has yielded ambiguous results 
about the sign and the magnitude of the impact of competition on innovation. The standard Schumpeterian 
argument is that the relationship between competition and innovation is negative, due to the hypothesised 
negative impact of competition on the appropriability of innovation profits. Post-innovation perfect 
competition makes firms indifferent vis-à-vis the choice of whether to innovate or not. Conversely, the 
expectation of some degree of post-innovation market power pushes firms to engage in innovative effort 
and undertake the required resource investment. In general, the statement that post-innovation rents should 
be high enough to cover the cost of innovation is relatively uncontroversial (see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz, 
1982). The policy implication is that some protection of intellectual property rights is needed (IPRs 
hereafter). 
By contrast, pre-innovation monopoly power may be a requisite for innovation. Nelson and Winter (1982), 
among others, point to the role of retained profits in financing innovation in a world of imperfect capital 
markets. Levin (1978) emphasises the role of pre-innovation barriers to enforce post-innovation monopoly 
power. Others argue that, in certain industries, to the extent that future innovations complement past ones, 
incumbents may have higher returns from innovation than entrants (e.g. Reinganum, 1983).  
In contrast to these views, textbook microeconomic theory suggests that competition brings about allocative 
efficiency gains by forcing price to converge to marginal costs. The role of competition in raising efficiency 
may not, however, be limited to such static gains; additional potential gains -- much larger in 
magnitude -- arise from “dynamic efficiency”. Dynamic efficiency is likely to bring about additional gains 
with respect to those related to static efficiency because firms will continue to improve their performance in 
ways they would not have were competitive pressures weak (Winston, 1993). Moreover, taking a dynamic 
perspective on competition allows to understand better new forms of competition observed in 
“dynamically” competitive industries (Evans and Schmalensee, 2001).  
Models focussing on dynamic efficiency need a premise as to why monopolistic firms do not minimize 
costs or the present value of costs. Much of the literature takes recourse to information asymmetry and the 
associated agency problems. In these models, monopoly rents are captured by managers (and workers) in 
the form of managerial ‘slack’ or reduced work effort, and product market competition disciplines firms 
into efficient operation. At least three different channels can be identified (Nickell et al., 1997). First, 
competition creates greater opportunities for comparing performance, making it easier for the owners or the 
market to monitor managers (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz,1983). Next, since more 
competition is likely to raise the likelihood of bankruptcy at any given level of managerial effort, managers 
may work harder to avoid this outcome (Schmidt, 1997; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Also, if product market 
rents are partly shared with workers in the form of higher wages or reduced effort, then competition 
probably influences workers’ behaviour too (Haskel and Sanchis, 1995).  
It should be stressed that theoretical predictions of the effects of greater competition on managers’ 
incentives are often “subtle and ambiguous” (Vickers, 1995). For example, models using explicit incentives 
under information asymmetry do not lead to clear-cut implications (see e.g. Holmström, 1982), while 
intertemporal models using implicit (i.e. market-based) rewards suggest a positive link between competition 
and managerial effort if productivity shocks are more correlated across competitors than managerial 
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abilities (Meyer and Vickers, 1997). But, competition could also lead to more slack if managers are highly 
responsive to monetary incentives (Scharfstein, 1988). 
Turning to factor markets, factor market regulation and the specific employment contracts resulting from 
the labour bargaining setting, may restrict the domain over which firms may experiment. If changing the 
size of the overall labour force is difficult, firms may not want to experiment too much in make-or-buy 
decisions. If pay scales and job description are written in stone, firms may not be able to play with incentive 
schemes that induce employees to undertake new initiatives.  Overall, with a restricted domain of 
configurations to choose from, theory would predict less within firm productivity growth from the channel 
of organisation and supply chain management. 
Factor and product markets and resource reallocation 
Factor and product market policies also play an important role in determining innovative activity and 
growth though the channel of resource reallocation from less to more productive firms (including 
reallocation through firm entry and exit.)48 The arguments here are different in nature from those that rely 
on asymmetric information. If competitive pressure is lacking, not only are managers able to avoid extra 
effort for the reasons given earlier, but the overall rewards to the firm from innovative effort may be lower 
as well, because the market does not respond by shifting demand to firms with better price or quality.  In a 
more competitive market, buyers will more rapidly shift their expenditures to a firm that has made a 
successful product or process innovation. If factor markets are flexible, firms will be able to adjust factor 
inputs to match the demand for their products and the most efficient producers will expand while the less 
efficient producers will contract and potentially exit.  
The overall effect of competition on incentives to innovate through the resource reallocation channel is not 
unambiguous. Although demand may shift more rapidly to the better firms, overall mark-ups and profit 
margins may decline with heightened competition. Yet, what is important to a firm is the difference 
between expected profit following innovation, versus prof it if it falls behind technologically. Further 
complications in the link between competition and incentives to innovate relate to relative technological 
positions of firms in the market. A firm that is far ahead in its technology may sit back while innovative 
efforts by competitors do not lead to large movements in market share. Overall, recent theoretical work find 
a hump-shaped relationship between competition and innovation, while recent empirical work show a 
positive relationship. 
Modelling the effect of product market competition on resource reallocation is not straightforward. First, 
endogenous growth models with entry, exit, and reallocation of resources between firms are only recently 
being developed (Klette and Kortum, 2002). Next, the literature is still groping towards a generally 
accepted indicator of the degree of product market competition (Boone, 2000). Finally, only recently are the 
various pieces being put together (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt 2002, Bartelsman and 
Hinloopen 2002). Although a full model has not been developed to explain the role of factor and product 
markets in reallocation, we will give a description of the requirements for such a model, by pulling together 
pieces from the existing literature. 
The Klette and Kortum model provides a framework for studying endogenous growth in a setting with 
heterogeneous firms. The model is able to account for many of the stylised facts emerging from firm-level 
empirical studies and yields results at the aggregate level that coincide with quality ladder models 
                                                 
48  It should be noted that the channel called resource reallocation here includes more than what is captured in the 
‘between’ term in productivity decompositions. This channel also includes the incentive effect that resource reallocation has on 
inducing firms to increase their own productivity, which is captured in the ‘within’ term in decompositions. 
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(Grossman and Helpman 1991). In the model, the heterogeneity of innovation intensity across firms is 
imposed by assuming that firm profitability varies across firms.49 Further, the model assumes monopolistic 
competition across differentiation products, but assumes the innovator takes all in the quality ladder for 
each particular differentiated product. Extensions of this model could allow multiple suppliers of each 
product, with the degree indicator of competitiveness determining how the profit shares move with 
technological state of the supplier. A reasonable indicator of the degree of competitiveness of an industry 
has the property that it moves monotonically with the profit share of the efficient firms, as argued by Boone 
(2001).  
Models that capture both the heterogeneity among firms, entry, exit, and reallocation of resources between 
incumbents, innovative activity, and the degree of competition, must take into consideration some of the 
following effects. First, when considering the incentive to innovate, the expenses of the innovative activity 
should not be balanced against the expected profit flows, but against the difference in expected profit flows 
between this case, and the case in which no innovative activities where undertaken. With stronger 
competition, mark-ups may be lower, but the loss of market share and rents for non-innovating firms may 
be larger than under weak competition. Next, the effect of heightened competition on the incentive to 
innovate may depend on how close the competing firms are technologically. Aghion et al. (2001a) argue 
that, for any given level of protection of IPRs, fierce competition between firms with similar technological 
competencies (neck-and-neck competition) may force them to innovate in order to escape competitive 
pressure. Boone 2000 shows how incentives vary depending on state of efficiency relative to competitors, 
and distinguishes the effects of competition on product and process innovation. Based on results in Aghion 
et al. (2002), it is generally thought that the relationship between competition and innovative activity is 
hump-shaped. The intuition is that the expected profit from a risky investment increases with more 
competition, up to a point, because the gains from a higher market share for successful innovator are not 
outweighed by the reductions from the decline in mark-up. 
The above discussion deals primarily with product market competition. Because the costs of resource 
reallocation increase with less flexible factor markets, the incentive for innovation should increase 
monotonically with more flexibility. Further, the ease of reallocation boosts growth through the direct 
arithmetic channel of increasing the share of more productive firms, but also through the incentives it 
creates firms to innovate and boost their own productivity level.  In an environment where innovation and 
experimentation are closely linked, barriers to reallocating capital and labor inputs can have a very adverse 
impact on productivity and growth. 
5. Summary 
In this chapter, we sketched the main links between factor and product market policies, innovation, and 
growth.  In particular, 
 
§ We outlined three possible channels through which ICT can affect growth:  (i) the 'traditional' process 
of capital deepening; (ii) ICT as an instrument for innovative activity; (iii) the contribution of the 
ICT-producing sector to growth.   Since we consider ICT as a general-purpose technology, we have 
placed considerable emphasis on the role of experimentation in the development of new ICT products 
as well as in the implementation of ICT.  For the latter, we stressed that ICT has changed the manner in 
which businesses organise themselves internally and interact externally with other businesses and 
consumers.   
 
                                                 
49  Further research will be needed to extend the model such that experimentation by firms causes heterogeneity in profits 
and innovation intensity. 
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§ The importance of experimentation raises a variety of questions regarding the appropriate market 
institutions for promoting growth via ICT.  Incentives for the development of an ICT-production 
industry seems to be impacted by market structure and externalities in complex ways raising difficult 
questions about the appropriate market policy interventions (if any). In terms of adoption, 
experimentation suggests that market selection and learning effects are likely to be important.  As 
such, product and factor market barriers to the reallocation of capital and labour inputs can adversely 
influence the successful adoption and diffusion of innovative technologies like ICT. 
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5.  DO POLICY AND REGULATORY SETTINGS HELP TO EXPLAIN INDUSTRY 
DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTIVITY AND INNOVATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS OECD 
COUNTRIES? 
Introduction  
In the first three chapters, we described the impact of ICT on productivity and growth, both at the 
aggregate and micro levels, highlighting differences between OECD countries.  One is naturally led to 
conjecture as to what generates these differences, especially given that the capabilities and costs of ICT are 
more or less the same across countries. In Chapter 4, drawing from different theoretical models, we then 
advanced the hypothesis that these differences may be related to the institutional and policy settings 
characterising the OECD countries. Theory, however, does not give clear indications as to the magnitude 
of the effects, or to the specific aspects of the institutional and policy settings that are of foremost 
importance for performance. This final chapter provides some empirical evidence on this issue by relating 
industry-level performance in different countries with a set of OECD indicators of product and labour 
market policy and institutions. 
Ideally, we would like to trace the link between market institutions, the investment in and adoption of ICT, 
and differences in productivity dynamics and innovation activity across countries. However, data 
limitations make this analysis rather difficult, at least on a cross-country basis (i.e. the relevant dimension 
to study policy and institutions). Instead, we take an indirect approach and look at the broader links 
between policy, productivity and innovation, after controlling for a set of other possible influences. The 
implications of the empirical results for our ICT discussion are, however, straightforward. First, we explore 
the links between policy and industry performance during the past two decades, when the IC technology 
shock offered many new opportunities to boost internal efficiency and innovation. In this respect, we are 
looking at a 'natural experiment' in which differences in policy and institutional settings may have been 
particularly important in influencing firms' decisions. Second, the focus on individual industries in 
manufacturing allows taking into account possible differences in their patterns of innovation and adoption 
of new technologies. This enables us to identify ICT-producing industries and industries that are heavy 
users of ICT equipment and check for any difference in performance with respect to other industries. 
The chapter is organised as follows. We first review the empirical literature linking policy and institutions 
with innovation and productivity.  Second, we conduct our own empirical exploration along two separate 
dimensions. First we explore the role of policy and institutions on productivity, while controlling for 
technological catch up across countries and innovation efforts (proxied by R&D). Second, we look at 
whether policy and institutions also affect innovation itself and, via this channel, further contribute to 
shape productivity performance. If one sees the investment and adoption of ICT as a form of innovative 
activity, then these results may provide a direct explanation for the observed differences in the spread of 
ICT across countries.  
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5.1 Existing empirical evidence  
Product market competition, innovation and productivity  
The empirical evidence on the links between product market competition and productivity growth is 
limited and not always conclusive. Some studies focus on trade liberalisation with estimated positive 
effects on both the level and growth rates of productivity (e.g. MacDonald, 1994; Van Wijnbergen and 
Venables, 1993). There have also been attempts to link technical efficiency to competition. For example, 
Caves and Barton (1990), Caves et al. (1982) and Green and Mayes (1991) suggest that, above a certain 
threshold, market concentration leads to a reduction in technical efficiency. Other studies look at specific 
industries across different countries and assess the role of domestic and global competition (e.g. Porter, 
1990; McKinsey Global Institute, 1997; Baily and Gerbach, 1995; and several articles in OECD Economic 
Studies No. 32, 2001). These studies tend to conclude that domestic competition is key for productivity and 
for gaining world market shares, although Baily and Gerbach (1995) also point to the importance of ‘global 
competition’ -- that is, exposure to the best producers wherever they are located -- for productivity growth. 
Finally, there are a number of firm-level studies that report a positive impact of competition (proxied by 
concentration rates, size of rents etc.) on productivity in the United Kingdom (Nickell, 1996; Blanchflower 
and Machin, 1996; Nickell et al., 1997; Disney et al., 2000). In contrast with the empirical studies 
mentioned above, Nickell (1996) uses simultaneously different measures of competition (Lerner index, 
5-firm concentration ratio, and a measure of the number of competitors). Less competition is found to be 
associated with less MFP growth for all variables except the dummy on the number of competitors, which 
is found to have a negative and significant effect only when the Lerner index is not included in the 
equation.  
Evidence on the links between product market competition and innovation is even more scant, although in 
recent years a number of empirical studies have found a positive association using sector- and firm-level 
data for the United Kingdom (see e.g. Geroski, 1990; and Blundell et al., 1995, 1999).50 These studies 
suggest that incumbents are pushed to innovate in order to pre-empt rivals. Conversely, Aghion et al. 
(2001b) find a hump shaped relationship between patents and competition, the latter measured by 
price-cost mark-up in a panel of British firms. Still, for a large portion of the range of variation of the 
mark-up, they find an upward sloped relationship, which becomes downward sloped only in the 
neighbourhood of perfect competition. They also find evidence supporting the hypothesis that ceteris 
paribus neck-and-neck competition, as measured in each industry by the distance between average 
productivity and the international technological frontier, is associa ted with greater innovation performance 
and a more negative relationship between patents and the industry’s mark up. 
Cross-country evidence on competition and innovation or productivity growth is limited and often confined 
to bivariate correlations (e.g. Koedijk and Kremers, 1996), case studies (e.g.Havrylyshin, 1990), or the 
inclusion of a tariff rate or import restriction variable in cross-country growth regressions (e.g. Lee, 1993). 
Some authors also provide indirect evidence on the association of import penetration with innovation and 
growth, although import penetration may also proxy international technological spillovers and not only the 
level of competitive pressure (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995). 
There are a number of reasons why cross-country evidence is scarce. Commonly used indicators of 
competition (such as mark-ups or concentration indexes) are typically endogenous to innovation and, as 
typical in empirical studies of growth, it is often difficult to find suitable instruments. Analysis based on 
panel data with a long time dimension can somewhat alleviate this problem by exploiting the lag structure. 
However long time series are often not available on a cross-country basis. An additional problem, which 
                                                 
50. See also Cohen (1995) for a survey of earlier studies. 
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concerns also studies conducted on panel data, is that measures such as concentration indexes (e.g. n-firm 
concentration ratios and the Herfindahl index) or the Lerner index are likely not to be monotone with 
respect to common notions of competition (see Boone 2000a, 2001). Finally, these indexes fail to provide a 
direct link to policy or regulation. 
Given that the degree of product market competition cannot be easily gauged from direct observation, an 
alternative route consists into focusing into its policy determinants. In particular, we will use a set of cross-
country quantitative indicators of product market regulation and regulatory reform developed by the 
OECD.51 These indicators measure the pro-competitive stance of regulation on the basis of a large set of 
regulatory provisions in OECD countries.52 Letting aside political-economy considerations (see e.g. Duso 
and Röller, 2001), indicators of regulatory stance can be considered exogenous with respect to 
performance variables. Moreover, their relationship with common notions of competition is, in princ iple, 
less ambiguous. Nevertheless, given that these indicators take into account only legal regulatory 
provisions, they might fall short of capturing all relevant factors determining actual competitive pressure. 
Before presenting the econometric analysis, it is instructive to have a graphical look at the cross-country 
aggregate evidence concerning the links between MFP growth, indicators of innovation performance and 
product market regulation. We start with a quick glance at the empirical relationship between innovative 
activity and growth. The evidence is generally supportive of a positive and strong relationship between 
innovation performance and output or productivity growth, especially when the analysis is conducted at the 
sectoral or firm levels.53 In aggregate cross-country regressions, it is somewhat more difficult to establish a 
clear link between an indicator of R&D effort and productivity growth, unless control for other factors 
influencing MFP is included.54 A simple way to control for these other factors is to work with 
first-difference series instead of level series as in Figure 1. It shows a significant correlation between 
changes in business enterprise expenditure in R&D (BERD) intensity and acceleration in MFP growth 
between 1990s and 1980s. 
                                                 
51 . We use different indicators of the stringency of regulations in the product and labour markets. The overall index of the 
stringency of product market regulation (PMR) is a static indicator (referring to conditions in 1998), composed of three elements: 
i) direct state control of economic activities, through state shareholdings or other types of intervention in the decisions of business 
sector enterprises and the use of command and control regulations; ii) barriers to private entrepreneurial activity, through legal 
limitations on access to markets, or administrative burdens and opacities hampering the creation of businesses; and iii) regulatory 
barriers to international trade and investment, through explicit legal and tariff provisions or regulatory and administrative 
obstacles. In order to further characterise the regulatory settings in the R&D equation, this overall indicator is further split into 
outward-oriented regulations (e.g. tariff and non-tariff barriers) and inward-oriented regulations. The latter have also been split 
into economic regulations (state control, legal barriers to entry etc.) and administrative regulations (administrative burdens on start-
ups, features of the licensing and permit system etc.). The indicators  of employment protection legislation (EPL) focus on both 
regular and temporary contracts. They are available for two periods (late 1980s and 1998) and in the econometric analysis the shift 
in regime has been defined on the basis of information about the timing of major EPL reforms (concerning both temporary and 
regular workers) in OECD countries. See Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999) for more details.   
52 . The aim of the OECD indicators is to measure to what extent competition and firm choices are restricted in industries 
and areas where there is no a priori reason to expect the government to interfere or where regulatory goals could be achieved by 
less coercive means. They have no ambition to measure the quality and the effectiveness of existing regulatory environments (See 
Nicoletti et al., 1999). 
53. As summarised by Nadiri (1993), the output elasticities of R&D at the firm level tend to be around 0.1 to 0.3 and the 
rates of return around 20 per cent to 30 per cent.  
54  See among others Cameron, 1998, Frantzen, 2000, Scarpetta and Tressel, 2002 
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Figure 1.  Changes in R&D intensity and MFP acceleration 
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Furthermore, Figure 2 presents evidence of a negative bivariate correlation between patent performance 
(another possible proxy for innovation)55 and the OECD summary indicator of product market regulation 
that includes aspects of inward- and outward- economic and administrative regulation (see Nicoletti et al., 
1999). The correlation is robust to the elimination of single outliers (such as Turkey), although its 
significance depends considerably on a small group of countries with significantly lower patent 
performance (Portugal, Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland and Turkey), whose elimination makes the 
correlation coefficient insignificant at standard statistical level. Similar correlations are found with R&D 
intensity, another proxy for innovation activity. 
                                                 
55. We thank Dominique Guellec for the help provided as regard to these data. 
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Figure 2. Patents per capita and product market regulation 
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Regulation on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs hereafter) is excluded from Figure 3. As stressed above, 
the fact that some degree of protection of IPRs is likely to have positive impact on innovation is relatively 
uncontroversial in the literature, while the policy debate focuses now on the optimal degree of protection 
(see e.g. Scotchmer, 1991, and David, 2001). Figure 2 shows indeed a robust positive correlation between 
innovation performance and an indicator of protection of IPRs developed by Ginarte and Park (1997).56 
                                                 
56. Nonetheless, although indicators based on legal provisions usually have the advantage of being relatively exogenous 
with respect to variables of innovation performance, this does not seem to be the case with the indicator of protection of IPRs that 
is found to be endogenous to R&D expenditure (Ginarte and Park, 1997). Thus, care must be taken in evaluating the impact of IPR 
protection in this type of correlation as well as in the following regression analysis. 
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Figure 3.  Patents per capita and product market regulation 
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Figure 4 shows a negative correlation between the acceleration of MFP, the change in anti-competitive 
product market regulation (Panel A) and the change in regulation concerning IPRs (Panel B) between the 
1980s and the 1990s. Correlations are in both cases significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, in Panel A 
Ireland appears to be a clear outlier, whose elimination from the sample makes the correlation become 
significant at the 1% level. The same occurs upon elimination of Spain in Panel B. 
Pooling together these simple relationships in a simple regression we find that changes in anti-competitive 
product market regulation and IPRs protection explain 37% of the variance of the acceleration of MFP 
growth. As suggested by Figure 5 that plots the acceleration of MFP growth against the predicted values 
from this simple regression, the relatively poor performance of these indicators is again due to Ireland (and 
to a lesser extent Spain) being an outlier. Indeed without Ireland the two regulatory variables becomes 
significant at the 5% level and explain more 55% of total variance (that climbs up to 60% with elimination 
of Spain). 
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Figure 4. Acceleration of MFP, change in PMR and change in protection of IPRs 
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 Figure 5.  Regulatory changes as predictors of the acceleration of MFP growth 
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Labour market institutions, innovation and adoption 
It can be argued that labour market policies and institutions affect both the size of innovation and 
technology adoption rents, through their impact on the cost of pursuing innovation and adoption, and the 
scope for the firm to appropriate these rents rather than sharing them with workers or other firms (see 
notably Boyer, 1988, and Hall and Soskice, 2001). This occurs in spite of the fact that policy-makers 
usually do no set labour market policies to accomplish the goal of enhancing innovation or fostering 
adoption. Three main aspects of policy and institutional settings seem to be more closely related to 
innovation and adoption, although the links are complex (see Box 5.1 for more details): i) the system of 
industrial relations; ii) the costs of hiring and firing (proxied by the stringency of Employment Protection 
Legislation, EPL); and iii) the possible interactions between industry-specific characteristics of the 
technology and EPL which lead to different human resource strategies.  
The industrial relation regime prevailing in a country is likely to influence the human resource strategy of 
an innovating firm. Broadly speaking, in countries where wage negotiations are decentralised and where 
there is little co-ordination amongst employers, firms tend to adjust their workforce while innovating by 
hiring adequately skilled workers on the labour market. Conversely, in centralised or sectoral wage 
bargaining systems, wages are more compressed and firms, despite finding more difficult to attract hig h 
skilled workers on the external market, gain from training their own workers (as there is a greater wedge 
between productivity and wages at high skill levels). In addition, countries that have centralised or sectoral 
wage bargaining systems also tend to have comparatively high hiring and firing costs. The combination of 
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wage compression and high labour adjustment costs tend to favour a process of competence accumulation 
based on firm-supported training and on-the-job learning. Wage compression may not, however, be a 
sufficient condition for firms to rely on the internal labour market to adapt its work force and, ultimately, 
for the decision to innovate and/or adopt a new technology. Another feature of industrial relation system 
plays a crucial role: the degree of co-ordination amongst employers. Co-ordination is implicit in highly 
centralised wage setting systems but also exists in some countries with predominantly sectoral bargaining 
systems (e.g. Germany). In co-ordinated countries, there is only a limited variability of wage offers across 
firms, thereby reducing the scope for poaching. Likewise, co-ordination often leads to close inter-firm 
practices where poaching is considered as unfair behaviour.  
The potential effects of bargaining regimes and EPL on the incentives to innovate and adopt new 
technologies may also depend on the technological characteristics of the sector in which firms operate. 
While in low-tech industries strict EPL is always likely to lead to higher adjustment cots with possible 
negative effects on innovation and adoption, in high-tech industries the effects of EPL may depend on the 
technological trajectory of the sector. When technological progress is cumulative (i.e. further innovations 
along the same trajectory), then investing in the internal labour force may be effective, and firms in these 
industries are likely to have a better innovation performance when labour market institutions enhance a 
thorough exploitation of the internal labour market. This is less so if technological progress leads to 
frequent shifts in the type of physical and human capital required in the production process. In this latter 
case firms have to rely on the external labour market which may be costly when EPL is very strict. 
Empirical evidence indeed suggests countries with co-ordinated industrial relations systems and relatively 
stringent employment protection (e.g. Germany, Austria) have stronger technological comparative 
advantage in industries characterised by cumulative technological progress than countrie s with 
decentralised wage bargaining, no co-ordination and low EPL (e.g. United States, but also United 
Kingdom and New Zealand more recently) (see Bassanini and Ernst, 2002a). 
Box 5.1  Labour market institutions, regulations and performance57 
Labour market institutions can affect firms' performance by influencing innovation rents associated with innovation 
and adoption of new technologies. In decentralised wage-bargaining systems workers can appropriate a large part of 
the rents generated by successful innovations, thereby reducing incentives to innovate in the first place. The risk of 
hold-up can be partly mitigated when bargaining occurs at the national level (or at the industry level but with 
economy -wide co-ordination) and pins down a general frame for the wage schedule. In such a case, the reservation 
wage is fixed for all lower-level bargaining units and is adjusted mainly in response to aggregate shocks. As a 
consequence, the firm’s incentive to undertake innovative investment no longer depends on the bargaining power of 
its own workers (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). 
The industrial relations systems  play also a prominent role on the accumulation of competencies and human capital 
required for developing and implementing innovations. In centralised/co-ordinated industrial relations systems wages 
are typically compressed over the skill dimension.58 Furthermore, in these systems the possibility for the most 
efficient firms to attract more skilled people by offering higher wages is limited.59 Hence it could be argued that 
co-ordinated industrial relations systems, by leading to lower expected earnings for the upper range of skills (with 
respect to unskilled labour), may reduce workers’ willingness to pay for the accumulation of generic human capital, 
                                                 
57. This box draws heavily on joint work of one of us with Ekkehard Ernst (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002a). We are most 
grateful to him for letting us use part of that material here.  
58. An industrial relations system can be said to be co-ordinated when: i) the wage-bargain occurs in a centralised way or 
co-ordination among employers and/or trade unions sets a uniform band of wages; ii) employers and trade unions co-operate as 
regard to decision-making inside the firm; and iii) business associations have an active role in solving free-riding problems across 
firms (Carlin and Soskice, 1990).  
59. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that there are no wage gains to switching jobs in Germany (Zimmermann, 1998) but 
these gains are substantial in the United States (McCue, 1996). 
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thereby leading to lower innovation performance because of lower supply of skilled labour. Nevertheless, firms too 
invest in general training (see Booth and Snower, 1996, and Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a,b, for recent surveys), and 
have greater incentive to pay for training the larger the compression of wages over the skill dimension, because they 
can reap the greater difference between the marginal productivity of skilled workers and their earnings. 
Wage compression is not, however, a sufficient condition to induce a firm to pay for the accumulation of generic 
competencies when there is no economic mechanism at work to prevent other firms from poaching on its pool of 
skilled workers. Co -ordinated industrial relations systems provide at least two such institutional arrangements: 
i) centralised and co-ordinated wage-bargaining settings may extend contracts to cover almost all firms and workers 
and allow only limited variability of wage offers across firms, thereby dampening poaching since workers have no 
incentive to change job if no better wage offer can be made by the poaching firm (Teulings and Hartog, 1998; 
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a); and ii) customary inter-firm practices, typical of co-ordinated industrial relations 
regimes, may enforce an equilibrium wherein poaching is considered as unfair behaviour.60 Furthermore, the cost of 
training is often shared among employers when business associations have a prominent role (Soskice, 1997, Casper et 
al., 1999). As a consequence the only unambiguous effect of the wage compression associated with industrial 
relations regimes is to partially swap the roles of agents as regard to paying for training. Indeed, Lynch (1994), 
Blinder and Krueger (1996), Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and OECD (1993 and 2000) report scattered evidence of 
more firm-sponsored training in more coordinated countries. 
Hiring and firing restrictions may raise the cost of labour adjustment, which is often needed after innovations have 
been introduced (see e.g. Cappelli, 2000). The effects of these restrictions on productivity and innovation are, 
however, likely to be mediated by industrial relation regimes. In co-ordinated countries, firms are less sensitive to the 
adjustment costs imposed by firing restrictions, because they tend to reallocate labour internally. Likewise, in these 
countries, statutory or contractual employment protection may also help solving the moral hazard problem that arise 
when the process of accumulation of firm-specific competencies (as well as the associated worker’s effort) cannot be 
not fully monitored, as is often the case when competencies are acquired on the job. Co-ordination between 
employers and trade unions may favour the achievement of a co-operative equilibrium through the establishment of 
an environment of mutual trust and loyalty. In this case, employment protection complements these arrangements by 
introducing a commitment mechanism that enforces an otherwise time -inconsistent implicit contract, since the 
incentive to increase one’s own generic human capital (at the expense of firm-specific one) is smaller the greater the 
credibility of the career prospects within the same firm. 
Industry-specific characteristics of technological change and associated competence requirements are also likely to 
influence innovation and adoption and their effect may depend on industrial relation regimes. In mature and low-tech 
industries, firms undertake little in-house R&D activity and mostly adopt technology developed elsewhere. The scope 
for expanding production is often limited and innovation frequently leads to downsizing. In these contexts, strict EPL 
may have significant repercussions on productivity and adoption of new technologies, especially if competencies 
required to implement innovations are not available inside the firm. 61 In high tech industries, two regimes can be 
distinguished on the basis of their innovation patterns: Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II (Kamien and 
Schwarz, 1982, Nelson and Winter, 1982, Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995, Breschi et al., 2000). In Schumpeter Mark I 
industries (e.g. precision instruments, standardised software, household appliances), firms often undertake sequences 
of short-lived projects on the basis of the same general knowledge but different specific realisations (e.g. as a 
consequence of short life-cycles of products and rapid capital depreciation). In this process, they rely on a one-shot 
match of human and physical capital requiring (or at least not being impaired by) a quick turnover of workers (or 
even firms themselves). Conversely, in Schumpeter Mark II industries (e.g. electronic components, aircrafts and 
spacecrafts), firms undertake incremental innovations along an existing technological trajectory and competencies for 
this type of innovations are often found inside the firm. This also implies that the loss of few staff members may 
involve significant costs for firms operating in these industries.  
                                                 
60. For instance, Blinder and Krueger (1996) report that inter-firm job mobility is virtually non-existent in Japan due to 
firms’ customary practices of refusing to employ people already working for other firms. Similarly Casper et al. (1999) report 
about legal provisions in Germany that reduce workers’ mobility after tra ining. 
61 . For a discussion about the role of strict regulation on the patterns of technological specialisation of countries, see Saint-
Paul (2002).  
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4.2 The empirical evidence on the links between policy, institutions and performance 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the determinants of productivit y and innovation (proxied by R&D) in 
OECD manufacturing, on the basis of country/industry and time-series data. This sectoral analysis allows 
to consider a set of specific regulatory aspects and to seek possible interactions between them and 
institutional, policy and technological factors characterising each manufacturing industry. At the same 
time, however, given our results in Chapter 2 (i.e. the fact that most of productivity growth in 
manufacturing is explained by within-industry performance) this sectoral analysis may also offer 
economy-wide indications as to the role of policy and institutions for performance. Our empirical approach 
starts with the productivity equation and, insofar as R&D is a driving force of productivity, then moves to 
analyse the determinants of industry R&D intensity. This allows assessment of the direct effect of policy 
and regulations on productivity and the indirect effects via  their impact on innovation activity.    
Policy and institutions and productivity  
The multifactor productivity equation is derived from a production function in which technological 
progress is a function of country/industry specific factors, as well as a catch-up term that measures the 
distance from the technological frontier in each industry (see Scarpetta  and Tressel, 2002 for more details). 
The cross-country, cross-industry analysis of productivity is centred on a catch-up specification of 
productivity, whereby, within each industry, the production possibility set is influenced by technological 
and organisational transfer from the technology-frontier country to other countries. In this context, multi-
factor productivity (MFP) for a given industry j of country i (MFPijt) can be modelled as an autoregressive 
distributed lag ADL(1,1) process in which the level of MFP is co-integrated with the level of MFP of the 
technological frontier country F: Formally,  
ijttji
k
kijtkFjtFjtijtijt dgfVMFPMFPMFPMFP egbbb +++++++= å --- 113211 lnlnlnln    [1] 
where (Vijt)  is a vector of covariates (e.g. product and market labour regulations, human capital, or R&D) 
affecting the level of MFP; fi , gj, and dt are respectively country, industry and year fixed effects. e is an iid 
shock. 
Under the assumption of long-run homogeneity (1-b1=b2+b3) and rearranging equation [1] yields the 
convergence equation: 
( ) ijttji
k
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where RMFPijt=ln(MFPijt)-ln(MFPFjt) is the technological gap between country i and the leading country 
F. Multi-factor productivity, MFPijt, is measured as the Hicks neutral productivity parameter, according to 
a standard neo-classical production technology under constant returns to scale.  
The following (multifactor productivity) index is used as a measure of the MFP level: 
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where a bar denotes a geometric average over all the countries for a given industry j and year t. The index 
has the desirable properties of superlativeness and transitiveness which makes it possible to compare 
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national productivity levels (see Caves, Christensen and Diewert, 1982). We used sectoral PPPs to convert 
underlying data into common currency, while also taking into account differences in purchasing powers 
across countries (as in Griffith et al., 2000). However, as shown by Scarpetta and Tressel (2002), the main 
results are robust to the use of PPPs for total GDP (as in Dollar and Wolff, 1994; and Bernard and Jones, 
1996a). The empirical analysis covers 17 manufacturing industries in 18 OECD countries over the period 
1984-1998 (see Box 5.2 for details on the data).62  
Box 5.2  Data used in the productivity and R&D regressions63 
The main data source is the 2001 OECD STAN database, which provides information on value added, capital stock, 
employment and labour compensation. Data on R&D intensity (R&D expenditure divided by industry value added) is 
from the OECD ANBERD dataset. It measures both public and privately-funded R&D performed by businesses. Data 
on sectoral occupational skills have been assembled from various sources. The classification of countries as regard to 
the degree of centralisation and co-ordination co-ordination of their industrial relations system is based on the OECD 
indicator of the level of co-ordination of the wage-bargaining (see Elmeskov et al., 1998), which classifies countries 
into three groups (low, intermediate, and high co-ordination). In the regression productivity and R&D equations, we 
take countries with an intermediate level of centralisation or co-ordination as a benchmark, and include dummies for 
low and high coordination countries. Indicators of product and labour market regulations are from Nicoletti et al., 
(1999) and those on labour market institutions are from Elmeskov et al. (1998).  
Import penetration is defined as the ratio of total imports to apparent demand. Data on imports are from OECD 
Foreign Trade Statistics. Consistent with the computation of R&D intensity, the data on output used in the 
computation of apparent demand are the result of the harmonisation of different sources (OECD STAN Database 
-- edition 2000, OECD Annual National Accounts Database, OECD Industrial Structure Statistics-ISIS). 
Data on firm size are from the OECD SME Database. The measure used in the R&D regressions is the ratio of total 
employment of firms with 50 or more employees to total employment of all firms in the sample (excluding those with 
fewer than 10 employees).  
Data on trade barriers are from the OECD Indicators of Tariff & Non-tariff Trade Barriers and refer to 1996. Tariffs 
are defined as the simple average of ad valorem tariff rates applied to the most favoured nation. The indicator of non-
tariff barriers is a frequency ratio: it corresponds to the proportion of tariff lines to which anti-competitive non-tariff 
barriers apply. To avoid tariff measures being non-representative, observations in which the frequency ratio of non-ad 
valorem tariffs is greater than 20 per cent (Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel -- ISIC 23 -- in Japan; Other non-
metallic mineral products -- ISIC 26 -- and Telecommunication equipment -- ISIC 32 -- in Norway) are dropped from 
the sample. 
The indicator of protection of IPRs has been developed by Ginarte and Park (1997). It varies between 0 and 5 from 
least to most stringent. The data used in this paper refer to 1995 and have been kindly supplied by Walter Park. All 
other regulatory indicators (administrative regulation, anti-competitive inward-oriented economic regulation) are 
from Nicoletti et al. (1999). They vary between 0 and 6 from least to most restrictive and refer to 1998. 
Two alternative indicators of human capital are used in the R&D regressions: the share of the working-age population 
that completed at least upper-secondary education (from the OECD Education at a Glance database) and the average 
years of education (from Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002).  
Table 1 presents a set of policy and institutional-augmented MFP regressions.64 We start (column 1) with 
the simplest specification in which MFP growth is only a function of the growth in the country leader 
                                                 
62. The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, (western) Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.  
63. This box draws heavily on joint work of one of us with Ekkehard Ernst (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002a). We are most 
grateful to him for letting us use part of that material here.  
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(MFPleader) and the technology gap (RTFP). We then include R&D to the RHS (column 2) and test whether 
its effect also works through the technology gap (column. 3, R&D*RTFP). This would be consistent with 
the idea that R&D is also important for technology transfer and plays a role in developing the 'absorptive 
capacity (see Griffith et al. 2000). In the columns 4-6, we explore whether the estimated impacts vary 
depending on the technological regime characterising each industry. For simplicity we distinguish between 
low-tech industries (LT) and high-tech industries (HT). Moreover, we further split the high-tech group 
(column 10 in the Table) into two components: high-tech industries with different technology trajectories 
(Mark I type industries); and high-tech industries with cumulative technologies (Mark II type industries). 
Equations 7-9 includes our overall indicator of product market regulation (PMR) -- which is assumed to 
have a direct effect on productivity as well as an indirect effect via the adoption process -- and the indicator 
of employment protection legislation (EPL) indicator -- whose coefficient is allowed to vary depending on 
the bargaining regime prevailing in each country.     
 The results clearly point to a differentiated effect of the technology gap on productivity depending on the 
technology regime and market characteristics. Technological convergence seems to take place 
predominantly in low-tech industries, which the coefficient on the technology gap is not significant in 
high-tech industries. These results are consistent with the idea that industries operating in low-tech 
industries tend to share the same technology and thus spillover effects may be significant. In contrast, such 
spillovers are likely to be less marked when technological trajectories stimulate product or process 
diversification and lead to market power, as it is the case in high-tech industries.  
The results on R&D also raise some interesting issues. While there is evidence of a significant positive 
direct effect of R&D on productivity (as would be expected), there is no evidence of R&D also boosting 
productivity indirectly by improving the ability of firms to learn about advances at the leading edge 
("absorptive capacity").65. It has also been argued that the nature of R&D and its impact on productivity 
may vary depending on market conditions under which firms operate. This hypothesis is tested empir ically 
in Table 1 by differentiating the estimated coefficient of R&D by the technology regimes in which firms 
operate. The estimated effect is insignificant in high-tech industries, while it is significant in low-tech 
industries. Moreover, the indirect effect of R&D on productivity via the interaction term is positively 
signed and significant in some specifications, suggesting that technological leaders may actually enjoy 
high productivity returns by investing in R&D than followers. 
                                                                                                                                                               
64 . These are the preferred specifications obtained by a model selection process that is discussed in Scarpetta and Tressel 
(2002). All equations control for the presence of outlier observations in the original sample and for heteroskedasticity. Moreover, 
specifications including product and labour market regulations correct for cluster effects do to the fact that indicators of regulations 
do not vary across industries but only across countries.  
65 . This latter effect is shown by the interaction variable between R&D and the technology catch-up variable, which is not 
statistically significant. Cheung and Garcia Pascual (2001) also found a non-significant effect of R&D expenditure in the diffusion 
of technology. However, the present results are in contrast with those of Griffith et al. (2000). See Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) for 
a discussion of these different results. 
  95 
Table 1. Productivity regressions: the role of R&D, market structure and regulatory 
settings - Manufacturing 
Dependant variable: DTFP ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant _cons-0.030 ** 0.018  0.029 * -0.014  0.035 *** 0.004  0.002  0.016  0.004  0.047  
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.031)
D TFPL e a d e r  j  t Da2ijtBlead-0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.006  0.001  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
D TFPL e a d e r  j  t  (Mark I) FHrdDa2ijt-d 0.096  
(0.062)
D TFPL e a d e r  j  t  (Mark II) SHrdDa2ijt-d -0.014  
(0.011)
RTFP i  j  t -1 cIndexB2diff-0.029 *** -0.029 *** -0.019 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
RTFP i  j  t -1 (LT) LoTechcInd-f -0.039 *** -0.020 *** -0.050 *** -0.060 *** -0.036 *** -0.053 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.016) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012)
RTFP i  j  t -1 (HT) HiTechcInd-f -0.021 *** -0.006  0.007  -0.023  -0.005  -0.019  
(0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017)
RTFP i  j  t -1 (Mark I) FHrdcIndex-f -0.053  
(0.056)
RTFP i  j  t -1 ( Mark II) SHrdcIndex-f 0.052 ***
(0.015)
R&D i  j  t -1  Lnberdvalu-t 0.006 *** 0.009 ***
(0.002) (0.003)
R&D i  j  t -1 (LT) LoTechLnbe-t 0.004 *** 0.004  0.004 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R&D i  j  t -1 (HT) HiTechLnbe-t 0.004 * 0.014 ** 0.007  0.007  0.007  
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
R&D i  j  t -1  (Mark I) FHrdLnberd-t 0.00004  
(0.017)
R&D i  j  t -1 (Mark II) SHrdLnberd-t 0.025 ***
(0.009)
(R&D * RTFP)i  j  t -1  Lnberdvalu-f 0.003  
(0.003)
(R&D * RTFP)i  j  t -1(LT) LoTechLnbe-f -0.002  
(0.003)
(R&D * RTFP)i  j  t -1(HT) HiTechLnbe-f 0.012 * 0.007  0.005  0.006  
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
(R&D * RTFP)i  j  t -1(Mark I) FHrdLnberd-f -0.011  
(0.024)
(R&D * RTFP)i  j  t -1(Mark II) SHrdLnberd-f 0.021 ***
(0.007)
PM regulations (PMR) pmr_a 0.007 * 0.007  
(0.004) (0.006)
PMR * RTFP i  j  t -1 pmr_adiff 0.016 ** 0.011 *
(0.007) (0.007)
High corporatism Hcorp -0.005  -0.004  
(0.004) (0.004)
Low corporatism Lcorp -0.003  -0.002  
(0.005) (0.005)
EPL (medium corporatism) eplMcorp -0.010 *** -0.009 ***
(0.003) (0.003)
EPL (low corporatism) eplLcorp 0.0004  0.0002  
(0.002) (0.003)
EPL (high corporatism) eplHcorp 0.007  0.006  
(0.005) (0.005)
Industry dummies Industry dummiesY e s Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s
Country dummies Country dummiesY e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s N o N o N o Y e s
Year dummies Year dummiesY e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s
RESET1 Reset 0.79  1.57  2.34 * 1.64  0.77  1.74  2.87 ** 3.73 ** 3.21 ** 12.75 ***
Observations Observations2569 2063 2063 2570 2063 2063 2063 2063 2063 932
1  Ramsey's omitted-variable test: F-test on the joint significance of the additional terms in a model augmented by including the second, third and fourth  
  powers of the predicted values of the original model.
All equations include a constant. *, **, ***  denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form and cluster effects on countries in parentheses. The sample is adjusted by excluding influential observations identified by the DFITS cut-off 
combined with the COVRATIO cut-off.  
The absence of any marked effect of R&D in high-tech industries is somewhat puzzling and not very 
comforting in our review of the possible sources of disparities in innovation and adoption and ultimately 
productivity growth. However, on the basis of the discussion above (see Box 5.1), we split the high-tech 
group into a Mark I and a Mark II group, depending on their technological trajectory. To do this, we use a 
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more disaggregated classification of high-tech industries (note that both country and time coverage are 
reduced). In Mark I industries, returns on R&D may not be long lasting and are likely to be driven by the 
need to engage in (perceived) product differentiation to maintain/acquire market shares. By contrast, Mark 
II industries are generally characterised by ‘creative accumulation’, with the prevalence of large, 
established firms and the presence of barriers for new innovators. Returns to R&D in these industries are 
likely to be larger than in Mark I industries, possibly leading to persistent technological leadership. Our 
results broadly adhere to these theoretical considerations. R&D has a strong positive effect in Mark II 
industries but not in Mark I industries. Moreover, there are greater returns from R&D of leading firms 
compared with followers in Mark II industries but not in Mark I industries. Indeed, in these industries there 
are high appropriability conditions and knowledge and technological progress is strongly cumulative, 
which gives the technological leader an advantage in the introduction of innovations. 
Moving to policy and institutions, our results point to a weak direct effect of product market regulation on 
productivity, but a strong indirect effect via the process of adoption of existing technologies (column 7). In 
other words, the further an industry/country is from the frontier, the stronger the cumulative negative effect 
of strict regulations on productivity. These regulations discourage innovation, but also slow down the 
adoption of existing technologies, possibly by creating artificial barriers to the entry (or expansion) of 
‘imitating’ firms and/or by reducing the scope for international spillovers. We also find inconclusive 
results as to the possible impact of industrial relations regimes on productivity, proxied by the dummies on 
the degree of corporatism (the sum of co-ordination and centralisation in wage bargaining).66 However, 
differences in these regimes seem to affect significantly the estimated impact of EPL on multifactor 
productivity. If allowed to vary across the different industrial relations regimes, the negative impact of 
strict EPL on productivity is stronger and statistically significant only in countries with an intermediate 
degree of centralisation/co-ordination -- i.e. where sectoral wage bargaining is predominant without 
co-ordination. As discussed above, innovation and adoption require a continuous process of technological 
change, and the latter is often associated with skill upgrading of the workforce. In this context, strict EPL 
raises the costs of adjusting the workforce, and this may have a particularly detrimental effect on 
innovation and technology adoption if, in addition, the lack of co-ordination does not offer a firm the 
required institutional device to guarantee a high return on internal training, because other firms can poach 
on its skilled workforce by offering higher wages. 
Policy, institutions and innovation 
The above results clearly point to a significant role of R&D activity on productivity, even if the effect 
varies significantly depending on the technological regime in which firms operate. Thus, we explore 
whether policy and institutions also have an impact on R&D activity and, via R&D, on productivity. 
Following a large theoretical and empirical literature,67 the simplest possible model of the determinants of 
innovative effort relates the latter to expected profit differential - that is the expected difference between 
profits that the firm can earn once it has successfully innovated and profits that would be earned otherwise. 
In turn, the expected profit differential depends on the degree of competition (and regulation) in the 
product market and other factors. Taking the ratio of business-performed R&D expenditure to sales (R&D 
intensity hereafter) as the indicator of innovative activity, we can write the following reduced form 
equation (see Bassanini and Ernst, 2002a, for details): 
  ),(& OTHERPMRfDR =  [4] 
                                                 
66 . The Table reports the coefficients of intermediate and highly centralised countries, with decentralised countries are the 
reference group.  
67. See e.g. Aghion et al. (2001a); Boone (2000b); Geroski (1990); Aghion et al. (2001b). 
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where R&D stands for R&D intensity, PMR for a vector of indicators of product market regulation, and 
OTHER for a vector of other controls. 
In the following, equation [4] is implemented empirically on a cross-section of 18 manufacturing industries 
and 18 OECD countries. The choice of a cross-section -- rather than a panel data, as in the case of 
productivity equation -- is justified by the need to include a set of control variables for which time 
dimension is lacking, including detailed aspects of product market regulations. As indicators of product 
market regulation we use measures of inward-oriented economic regulation (state control, legal barriers to 
entry, price controls, etc…), administrative regulation (administrative barriers on start-ups, feature of the 
licensing and permit system, etc…), indicators of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers, plus an indicator of global 
protection of IPRs. Furthermore, we use import penetration as a proxy for competitive pressures not 
captured by the regulatory indicators. Finally, most of the other factors can be controlled for either by 
industry dummies (technological opportunity, returns to scale, dynamics of the industry’s world demand 
etc…) or by country dummies (aggregate demand, supply of human capital etc…). However, other factors 
(such as capital intensity and the dynamics of the industry’s domestic demand), being co-determined in 
equilibrium, are not included in the reduced form, since, in a cross-section, it is impossible to find valid 
instruments for these variables. A control for the average size of firms represents an exception. In fact, this 
control captures the bias in R&D intensity across industries and countries due to different accounting 
practices between large and small firms and has been proved to play an important role in the literature (see 
e.g. Griliches, 1990, Geroski, 1990). 
Choosing a log-linear form for convenience, equation [4] can be therefore re-written as: 
  ijjiijijh
h
ijhij SIZEIMPPMRDR ecmdfga ++++++= å&log  [5] 
where IMP and SIZE denote import penetration and average size, m stands for the country dummy, c stands 
for the industry dummy, e is the standard error term, while h, i and j index product market regulatory 
indicators, countries and industries, respectively.  
With the exception of indicators of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and inward-oriented economic regulation, 
all other regulatory indicators refer to economy-wide regulation and institutions that are by definition 
identical across industries in each country and therefore cannot be identified in the presence of country 
dummies. Moreover, the same applies to the indicator of inward-oriented economic regulation for which 
no sector breakdown is available for manufacturing industries, leading us to proxy it with an economy-
wide indicator. Therefore, to gather some evidence on the absolute impact of economy-wide product 
market regulations on R&D intensity we need to complement equation [5] with a specification of the 
determinants of the country fixed effect, that is: 
  åå ++= m mimh hihi CNTRLdPMRcam  [6] 
where CNTRL stands for a number of other economy-wide control variables that are indexed by m. By 
plugging equation [6] into equation [5] we obtain the general specification of our R&D equation. 68 The 
sample used for the R&D equation includes 2-digits manufacturing industries.69 If not differently specified, 
                                                 
68 . As in the case of the productivity equations, we control for the presence of outliers in the sample and correct standard 
errors fo r the presence of cluster effects.   
69 . The industry manufacturing not elsewhere classified (ISIC 36 and 37), being a residual sector, is excluded, while food, 
beverages and tobacco  (ISIC 15 and 16) and textiles leader and clothing (ISIC 17, 18 and 19) have been aggregated due to lack of 
data availability. Countries considered are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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all variables have been averaged across 1993-1997, excluding years in which observations were missing 
for most of the industries. Data on R&D intensity are the same as those described in Box 2, i.e. the ratio of 
the industry’s Business Expenditure in Research and Development (BERD) to the industry’s total output. 
In a sensitivity analysis we also use the ratio of government-financed BERD to total output.70 As we do not 
always have data on the ratio of government-financed BERD to total BERD for the same years for which 
we have data for R&D intensity, we construct an estimate of government-financed BERD to total output as 
the product of the average ratio of government-financed BERD to total BERD71 by the average ratio of 
BERD to output. We make here an implicit assumption that these two ratios do not vary over time. This 
assumption can be justified on the basis of the limited variation over time (with respect to variation cross-
country and cross-industry) of both ratios. Data on the ratio of government-financed BERD to total BERD 
are from the OECD R&D database. 
The first specification in Table 2 only includes basic controls for R&D intensity, including country specific 
effects.72 The other specifications try to account for these country-specific effects by including different 
aspects of the regulatory and institutional environment, although in a limited number to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity. In particular, we consider the degree of co-ordination of industrial relations systems, in 
order to distinguish between fully decentralised and un-co-ordinated regimes, co-ordinated regimes and 
mixed ones, and the overall level of human capital. Columns 2-5 consider the indicators of inward-oriented 
administrative and economic regulation separately, while a simple average of these indicators is included 
in columns 6-7. In both these two groups of specifications non-significant variables are sequentially 
eliminated. 73 The share of the population that completed at least upper-secondary education seems less 
significant than average years of education (compare column 2 with column 3); therefore the latter is 
retained in all the other specifications (columns 4-7). 
                                                 
70 . The advantage of using R&D intensity data is that they are available for many countries on a comparative basis. 
Nevertheless, these data suffer from important limitations (for a general discussion, see Griliches, 1990). R&D intensity is an 
indicator of input in the innovative process rather than output. Consequently improvements in the efficiency of the innovation 
process (greater output with less input) can be mistakenly interpreted as a reduction of the innovative effort. Moreover, R&D 
intensity conveys only information about formal innovation expenditure. In many industries informal innovation is a sizeable 
component of overall innovation activity. Also, reported data tend to overestimate R&D intensity of large incumbents relative to 
small firms and new entrants.  
71 . As in the case of other variables, the ratio of government-financed BERD to total BERD is an average across 1993-
1997, excluding years in which observations were missing for most of the industries. In the case of the United Kingdom, however, 
the ratio of government-financed BERD to total BERD refers to 1989 (last available year). 
72 . One of the purposes of presenting results from a specification including country dummies (column 1) is that it allows 
assessment of the quality of the estimates obtained with the other specifications. Indeed, if the estimates of those variables that are 
included in all the specifications changed significantly upon substitution of proxies of the country fixed effects, this may indicate a 
serious omitted variable problem. It is reassuring that, across all specifications, the point estimate of the coefficients of industry -
varying variables fall into the boundaries of the 5 per cent confidence intervals and that the RESET test statistics are always 
insignificant at standard statistical levels. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis performed on our preferred specification (corresponding 
to column 5 of Table  2) by eliminating one country at a time suggests that coefficient estimates are relatively robust to variation of 
country coverage.  
73. Estimates from specifications not including tariff barriers are not shown for brevity. In any case, the exclusion of tariff 
barriers do not change estimated coefficients of other variables. 
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Table 2. The R&D equation: main results 
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e :  l ogar i thm o f  R&D in tens i t y
I n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s
Emp loymen t  sha re  o f  l a rge  f i rms 0 .019 * * * 0 .027 ** 0 .023 ** 0 .022 * 0 .022 * 0 .022 * 0 .023 *
(0 .006) (0 .010) (0 .011) (0 .011) (0 .012) (0 .012) (0 .013)
Impor t  pene t ra t ion 0 .004 * 0 .005 ** 0 .004 * 0 .004 ** 0 .004 * 0 .004 * 0 .004 **
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002)
Non- tar i f f  bar r ie rs -0 .014 * * * -0 .018 * * * -0 .023 * * * -0 .023 * * * -0 .023 * * * -0 .023 * * * -0 .023 * * *
(0 .005) (0 .004) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .004) (0 .004)
Tar i f f  barr iers 0 .025 0 .002 -0 .003 -0 .005 -0 .007 -0 .012 -0 .010
(0 .019) (0 .062) (0 .025) (0 .025) (0 .027) (0 .031) (0 .031)
Admin is t ra t i ve  regu la t ion 0 .148 0 .134 0 .125
(0 .131) (0 .147) (0 .130)
I nward -o r i en ted  economic  regu la t i on -0 .438 * * * -0 .446 ** -0 .435 * * * -0 .393 * * *
(0 .135) (0 .162) (0 .134) (0 .122)
Overa l l  i nward-o r ien ted  regu la t ion -0 .430 ** -0 .435 **
(0 .176) (0 .181)
Pro tec t i on  o f  IPRs 0 .708 * * * 0 .674 * * * 0 .660 * * * 0 .758 * * * 0 .824 * * * 0 .856 * * *
(0 .166) (0 .176) (0 .163) (0 .152) (0 .217) (0 .166)
L o w  c o o r d i n a t i o n  d u m m y -0 .599 * * * -0 .559 * * * -0 .596 * * * -0 .730 * * * -0 .913 * * * -0 .863 * * *
(0 .262) (0 .181) (0 .169) (0 .198) (0 .230) (0 .243)
H i g h  c o o r d i n a t i o n  d u m m y 0.216 0 .058 -0 .093
(0 .176) (0 .203) (0 .188)
U p p e r - s e c o n d a r y  e d u c a t i o n  s h a r e 0 .020 *
(0 .011)
Average  years  o f  educa t ion 0 .061 ** 0 .067 ** 0 .066 ** 0 .086 * * * 0 .076 * * *
(0 .024) (0 .027) (0 .026) (0 .026) (0 .026)
I n d u s t r y  d u m m i e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s
C o u n t r y  d u m m i e s Y e s N o N o N o N o N o N o
R E S E T 1 2.45 * 0 .77 1.87 1.92 1.94 2.28 * 2 .00 *
R - s q u a r e d 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
O b s e r v a t i o n s 2 5 4 2 5 4 2 5 4 2 5 4 2 5 4 2 5 4 2 5 4
1 Ramsey 's  omi t ted -var iab le  tes t :  F - tes t  on  the  jo in t  s ign i f i cance  o f  the  add i t i ona l  te rms  in  a  mode l  augmented  by  inc lud ing  the  second ,  th i rd  and  four th   
  powers  o f  t he  p red i c ted  va lues  o f  t he  o r i g ina l  mode l .
A l l  equa t ions  inc lude  a  cons tan t .  * ,  * * ,  * * *   deno te  s ign i f i cance  a t  the  10%,  5%,  1% leve l ,  respec t i ve l y .  S tandard  e r ro rs  ad jus ted  fo r  he te roskedas t i c i t y  o f  
  unknown fo rm and  c lus te r  e f fec ts  on  coun t r ies  in  pa ren theses .  The  samp le  i s  ad jus ted  by  exc lud ing  in f l uen t ia l  observa t ions  iden t i f i ed  by  the  DFITS cu t -o f f  
  comb ined  w i t h  t he  COVRAT IO  cu t - o f f .  Exc l uded  obse rva t i ons  a re :  Food ,  beve rages  and  t obacco  ( IS IC  15 -16 )  i n  No rway ,  Compu te r s  ( IS IC  30 ) ,  
  Te lecommun ica t i on  equ ipmen t  ( IS IC  32 )  and  Wood  ( IS IC  20 )  i n  I r e land ,  O the r  t r anspo r t  ( IS IC  35 )  i n  Greece ,  Coke ,  pe t ro leum and  nuc lea r  f ue l  ( IS IC  23 )  
  i n  t he  Un i t ed  K ingdom,  P r i n t i ng  and  pub l i sh i ng  ( IS IC  22 )  and  Mo to r  veh i c l es  ( IS IC  34 )  i n  Be lg i um,  P r i n t i ng  and  pub l i sh i ng  ( IS IC  22 )  i n  F rance ,  O the r  
  t ranspor t  ( IS IC 35)  in  I ta ly  and E lec t r i ca l  Mach inery  ( IS IC 31)  in  the  Nether lands .
(6) (7)(5)(1) (3) (4)(2)
 
The insignificant coefficient estimate for tariffs might be due to controlling for import penetration (which 
captures some aspects of competitive pressure) and the lack of variability of the indicator resulting from 
the fact that trade barriers are the same across all EU countries (although this statement is true also for non-
tariff barriers). Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 4, there might be good theoretical reasons for a less 
negative impact of tariffs (rather than of non-tariff barriers) on innovation. Under Cournot competition in 
partial equilibrium, conditional to the level of knowledge spillovers, tariffs have a positive impact on 
profits (because they add to foreign competitors’ costs) without changing the incentive to reduce own costs 
via innovation. However, in general equilibrium, tariffs interact negatively with imports and might then 
have a negative overall impact due to their indirect effect on knowledge spillovers. This effect is stronger 
for non-tariff barriers that have a greater impact on the diffusion of products and, eventually, the possibility 
of imitation and reverse engineering by domestic firms. Moreover high non-tariff barriers can be thought to 
affect directly the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestically produced products, thereby 
inducing low incentives to innovate when domestic and foreign firms have simila r levels of 
competitiveness (the case of “neck and neck” competition). 
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The degree of protection of IPRs appears to be positively and significantly associated with R&D intensity 
in all specifications.74 The same applies to inward-oriented economic regulation, while the estimated 
coefficient for administrative regulation is not significantly different from zero. In other words, restrictions 
to competition enforced through administrative barriers to entry do not seem to have a negative effect on 
innovation performance. This might be due to the fact that administrative regulation, by discouraging 
entry, may contribute to increasing ex post innovation rents and improving appropriability conditions, 
reinforcing the effect of IPRs protection. Obviously, this positive effect is stronger for incumbents, and is 
likely to be overestimated in equations using R&D data (see the discussion on R&D data in the previous 
section). Nevertheless, several other explanations are possible: i) by reducing competitive pressures, high 
administrative barriers may also reduce competitive selection and, hence, overall industry efficiency 
(Vickers, 1995; Nickell, 1996), including efficiency in turning R&D into innovation (in this case R&D is 
less productive and the recorded R&D intensity higher, without implying that firms are innovating more); 
ii) tight administrative regulation may generate rents and wage premia, pushing towards more capital-
intensive and higher-technology production processes (see e.g. Chennels and van Reenen, 1998, and 
Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000); and iii) the stringency of administrative regulation may proxy for size, 
compensating for possible errors in the measurement of this variable. The bottom line is that these 
regression results do not authorise us to conclude that the level of administrative regulation is irrelevant for 
innovation. As a partial confirmation of this no-conclusion, the estimated coefficient of overall inward-
oriented regulation in columns 6-7 is strongly significant and virtually identical to that of economic 
regulation in columns 2-5. 
Among the possible covariates for which we could not control for in Table 2 due to the limitation of our 
dataset, public expenditure in R&D is perhaps the most critical for two reasons: i) public expenditure is 
likely to respond to different incentives than private expenditure; and ii) public expenditure in R&D may 
either crowd-out or stimulate private expenditure. Indeed, the literature has found that private expenditure 
in R&D is not neutral with respect to public expenditure (and particularly government-financed 
expenditure in R&D)75. Table 3 presents a sensitivity analysis where our preferred specifications 
(corresponding to columns 4, 5 and 7 of Table 2) have been re-estimated by including the ratio of 
government-funded business-performed R&D to total output. To do so, 66 further observations (including 
three complete countries76) have been excluded in the unadjusted sample due to missing data.77 
                                                 
74. Results concerning protection of IPRs must be taken with care as the coefficient of this variable is likely to be 
overestimated due to the endogeneity of the indicator to the level of R&D expenditure (see Ginarte and Park, 1997). 
75. For instance, Lichtenberg (1988) finds that non-competitive R&D procurement tends to crowd out private R&D 
investment, while competitive procurement stimulates private R&D investment. By contrast, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe 
(1997) support the complementarity hypothesis. See David et al. (1999) for a survey. 
76. Excluded countries are Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands. 
77. This group of specifications however performs much better from the point of view of outlier control. After adjusting 
for influential observations the difference between this sample and the sample of Table 2 amounts to 59 observations. 
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Table 3. The R&D equation: sensitivity analysis: controlling for public expenditure in R&D  
Dependent  var iable: logar i thm of  R&D intensi ty
Independent variables
Employment share of  large f i rms 0.015 0.014 0.015
Import  penetrat ion 0.010 ** 0.010 ** 0.010 **
Non-tariff barriers -0.031 *** -0.031 *** -0.031 ***
Tariff barriers 0.000 -0.001 -0.005
Government-f inanced R&D intensi ty 1 0.216 *** 0.217 *** 0.208 ***
Administrat ive regulat ion 0.040
Inward-or iented economic regulat ion -0.499 *** -0.498 ***
Overal l  inward-or iented regulat ion -0.649 **
Protect ion of IPRs 0.733 *** 0.766 *** 0.916 ***
Low coord inat ion dummy -0.899 *** -0.950 *** -1.111 ***
Average years of educat ion 0.052 ** 0.052 ** 0.071 **
Industry dummies Y e s Y e s Y e s
Count ry  dummies N o N o N o
R E S E T2 2.98 ** 2 .99 ** 2 .45 *
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.88
F-test  on industry dummies 203.43 *** 371.21 *** 126.80 ***
Observations 195 195 195
Industries 1 8 1 8 1 8
Countr ies 1 5 1 5 1 5
1 Logari thm of the rat io of government-f inanced BERD to output.  
2 Ramsey's omit ted-var iable test :  F-test  on the jo int  s igni f icance of  the addi t ional  terms in a model augmented by including the second, th i rd and fourth  
  powers of the predicted values of the original model.
Al l  equations include a constant. *,  **,  ***  denote signif icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level,  respectively. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedastici ty of 
  unknown form and cluster effects on countr ies in parentheses. The sample is adjusted by excluding inf luent ial  observat ions ident i f ied by the DFITS cut-off  
  combined wi th the COVRATIO cut-of f .  Exc luded observat ions are:  Computers ( ISIC 30) ,  Telecommunicat ion equipment  ( ISIC 32)  and Wood ( ISIC 20)
  in Ireland, and Other transport (ISIC 35) in Japan.
(0.011)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.222)
(0.180)
(0.048)
(0.146)
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.055)
(0.298)
(0.026)
(0.145)
(0.248)
(0.024)
(0.175)
(0.208)
(0.025)
(0.003)
(0.048)
(0.140)
(0.149)
(0.010)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(1) (3)(2)
(0.013)
(0.004)
 
Not surprisingly, the elasticity of R&D intensity with respect to government-financed R&D intensity 
appears to be significantly greater than zero (with a point estimate of about 21 per cent). However, the 
effect of this variable on the other coefficient estimates is relatively modest, with most regulatory 
indicators having a stronger and more significant estimated impact except in the case of administrative 
regulation whose t-statistic drops enormously. In brief, this sensitivity analysis qualitatively confirms the 
main results. 
Bassanini and Ernst (2002b) go beyond this point by considering simultaneously the role of product and 
labour market regulations. As regard to the estimates of product market regulation this is important since 
there is a strong correlation between indicators of product and labour market regulation (see Nicoletti et 
al., 1999), therefore equations presented in Table 2 and 3 might suffer from an omitted variable problem. 
Table 4 shows the estimated effects of this extended specification (corresponding to column 2 in Table 3): 
consistent with the productivity equation, the coefficient of EPL is allowed to vary between countries with 
high and low/intermediate levels of co-ordination. While the estimated coefficients for product market 
regulatory variables in these extended specifications are virtually identical to those shown in Table 3, 
complex patterns emerge as regard to the effect of the stringency of labour market regulation.  
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Table  4. Estimated effect of employment protection on R&D intensity 
 L o w - t e c h  i n d u s t r i e s - 0 . 1 6 - 0 . 4 6 * *
( 0 . 2 0 )  ( 0 . 1 9 )  
 M a r k  I  i n d u s r i e s - 0 . 3 8 * - 0 . 1 1
( 0 . 2 1 ) ( 0 . 2 6 )  
 M a r k  I I  i n d u s t r i e s - 0 . 3 7 * 0 . 6 9 * *
( 0 . 2 1 ) ( 0 . 3 0 )
 * ,  * * ,  * * *   d e n o t e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 0 % ,  5 % ,  1 %  l e v e l ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  S t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  a r e  i n
p a r e n t h e s e s .  T h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  
c o l u m n  2  o f  T a b l e  2  a u g m e n t e d  b y  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  r e g u l a t i o n  ( s o u r c e :  B a s s a n i n i  a n d  E r n s t ,  
2 0 0 2 b ) .
I n d u s t r y  t y p e
L o w  /  i n t e r m e d i a t e  
c o o r d i n a t i o n
H i g h  c o o r d i n a t i o n
Dependent variable:  l o g a r i t h m  o f  R & D  i n t e n s i t y
T y p e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  s y s t e m
 
In particular, the effect of employment protection adds to the negative effect of product market regulation 
in unco-ordinated countries,78 with a degree of magnitude equivalent to that of inward-oriented economic 
regulation. 79 Conversely, in co-ordinated countries the stringency of employment protection seems to be 
negatively associated with R&D intensity in low technology industries, but positively associated in Mark II 
industries.80 These results are consistent with the theoretical discussion of the role of the interplay between 
labour market institutions and industry characteristics in shaping incentives for different human resource 
strategies and thereby innovation patterns.81 Indeed, these results seem to reflect the fact that hiring and 
firing restrictions depress the incentive to innovate the greater the need of downsizing and/or reshuffling 
one’s own workforce after having successfully innovated. These negative effects are however smaller the 
larger the scope for internal labour markets. In the context of a cumulative and specific knowledge base, 
stringent employment protection and co-ordinated systems of industrial relations, by aligning workers’ and 
firms’ objectives, enhancing the accumulation of firm-specific competencies and encouraging firm-
sponsored training, may allow firms to fully exploit the potential of the internal labour market.  
5.3 Concluding remarks  
The empirical evidence reported in this Chapter seems to suggests that stringent regulatory settings in the 
product and labour markets may contribute to explain cross-country difference in innovation activity and 
adoption of leading technologies, thus providing an interpretation for the growth patterns discussed in the 
previous Chapters of this study.  
It also appears that the impact on performance of regulations and institutions depends on certain market 
and technology conditions, as well as on specific firm characteristics. In particular, the burden of strict 
product market regulations on productivity seems to be greater the further a given country/industry is from 
                                                 
78. The estimated coefficient of EPL in low-tech industries is not significantly different from zero. However, these 
industries account on average for only 20 per cent of total R&D expenditure in manufacturing. 
79. The standard deviation of the indicator of employment protection is similar to that of the indicator of inward -oriented 
economic regulation in our sample. 
80. The estimated coefficient for Mark I industries is approximately equal to zero. 
81. See, for example, Saint-Paul (2002). 
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the technology frontier. That is, strict regulation hinders the adoption of existing technologies, possibly 
because it reduces competitive pressures or technology spillovers, and restricts the entry of new high-tech 
firms. In addition, strict product market regulations have a negative impact on the process of innovation 
itself. Thus, given the strong impact of R&D on productivity, there is also an indirect channel whereby 
strict product market regulations may reduce the scope for productivity enhancement.  
We have also provided some evidence that high hiring and firing costs weaken productivity performance, 
but this occurs almost exclusively when wages and/or internal training do not offset these higher costs, 
thereby inducing sub-optimal adjustments of the workforce to technology changes. The link between EPL 
and innovation activity is also complex. Our analysis suggests that different joint configurations of EPL 
and bargaining regimes may lead to high innovative activity, though in different sectors of the economy. In 
particular, strict EPL adds to the negative effects on innovation of strict product market regulations in 
un-co-ordinated countries. Conversely, in co-ordinated countries strict EPL tilts the pattern of 
specialisation of innovative activities towards stable and cumulative technological paradigms and away 
from activities characterise by large turnover of technologies. To the extent to which important domains of 
the ICT industry are dominated by the frequent changes in the leading technology (e.g. in software 
industry), these results may help to explain why continental European countries, while enjoying leading 
positions in more industries with cumulative technologies (e.g. motor vehicles) are slow in moving into the 
ICT industry. On the one hand, our results suggests that the combination of strict EPL and intermediate 
bargaining regimes (i.e. lacking co-ordination), as in many continental European countries, is likely to lead 
to lower innovation activity and less incentives to adopt leading technologies. On the other hand, countries 
with a co-ordinated bargaining system but a high level of anti-competitive product market regulation (in 
primis Italy but to some extent also Japan and Germany among G7 countries), while being able to keep up 
with innovations in cumulative industries, have weak incentives in adopting and innovating in ICT 
technologies. Indeed, product market reforms are perhaps the most important item in an ideal policy 
agenda in these countries. 
  104 
REFERENCES 
ABOWD, J. M., J.HALTIWANGER, J.LANE, and K, SANDUSKY (2001). “Within and Between Firm 
Changes in Human Capital, Technology, and Productivity.” Working paper.  
ACEMOGLU, D. and S. PISCHKE (1999a), “The Structure of Wages and Investment in General 
Training”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, pp. 539-572. 
ACEMOGLU, D. and S. PISCHKE (1999b), “Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets”, 
Economic Journal, Vol. 109, pp. F112-142. 
ACEMOGLU, D. and R. SHIMER (2000) “Wage and Technology Dispersion”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 67, 585-607. 
AGHION, P. and P. HOWITT (1992), “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”, Econometrica, 
Vol. 60, pp. 323-51. 
AGHION, P. and P. HOWITT (1998), Endogenous Growth Theory, Cambridge: Mass.: The MIT Press.  
AGHION, P., C. HARRIS, P. HOWITT and J. VICKERS (2001a), “Competition, Imitation and Growth 
with Step-by-Step Innovation”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 68, pp.467-492. 
AGHION, P., M. DEWATRIPONT and P. REY (1999), “Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth”, 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, pp.825-852. 
AGHION, P., N. BLOOM, R. BLUNDELL, R. GRIFFITH and P. HOWITT (2002), “Empirical Estimates 
of Product Market Competition and Innovation”, University College London, mimeo. 
AHN. S.  (2001), "Firm dynamics and productivity growth: A review of micro evidence for the OECD 
countries", OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No. 297.  
ARROW, K. (1962), “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions”, in R. Nelson 
(ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
AUDRETSCH, D.B. (1995a), “Innovation and industry evolution”, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
AUDRETSCH, D.B. (1995b), “Innovation, survival and growth”, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 13, pp. 441-457. 
AW, B.Y., X. CHEN, and M.J. ROBERTS (1997), “Firm-level evidence on productivity differentials, 
turnover, and exports in Taiwanese manufacturing”, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 6235. 
BAILY, M.N. (2002), "The New Economy in Europe and the United States", paper prepared for the 
Conference "Transatlantic Perspectives on the US and European Economies: Convergence, Conflict 
and Cooperation, J.F. Kennedy School of Government, April.    
BAILY, M.N., and H. GERSBACH (1995), “Efficiency in Manufacturing and the Need for Global 
Competition”, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics p.307-308. 
BARNES, M., J. HASKEL and M. MALIRANTA (2002), "The Sources of Productivity Growth: 
Micro-Level Evidence for the OECD", mimeo.   
BARTELSMAN, E.J. and J. HINLOOPEN (2002), “Unleashing animal spirits: Investment in ICT and 
economic growth”, mimeo. 
BARTELSMAN, E.J., S. SCARPETTA, and F. SCHIVARDI (2002), “Comparative analysis of firm 
demographics and survival: Micro-level evidence for the OECD countries”, OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, forthcoming, Paris. 
BASSANINI, A., S. SCARPETTA and I. VISCO (2000), “Knowledge, Technology and Growth: Recent 
Evidence from OECD Countries”, National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 6. 
BASSANINI, A. and S. SCARPETTA (2002), “Does human capital matter for growth in OECD countries? 
A Pooled-Mean-Group approach”, Economics Letters, Vol 74(3), pp. 399-405. 
  105 
BASSANINI, A., and E. ERNST (2002a), “Labour Market Regulation, Industrial Relations, and 
Technological Regimes: A Tale of Comparative Advantage”, Industrial and Corporate Change, 
Vol 11(3), forthcoming. 
BASSANINI, A., and E. ERNST (2002b), “Labour Market Institutions, Product Market Regulation, and 
Innovation: Cross-country Evidence”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No 316. 
BENDER, S., HAAS, A. and KLOSE, C. (2000) IAB Employment Subsample 1975 - 1995. IZA-
Discussion Paper No. 117, Bonn. 
BERNARD, A., and C.I. JONES (1996a), “Comparing Apples to Oranges: Productivity Convergence and 
Measurement across Industries and Countries”, The American Economic Review, vol.86 No.5, pp. 
1216-38. 
 BERNARD, A., and C.I. JONES (1996b), “Productivity Across Industries and Countries: Time-Series 
Theory and Evidence”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp 135-146. 
BERNARD, A., and C.I. JONES (1996c), “Productivity and Convergence across U.S. States and 
Industries”, Empirical Economics, 21, 113-135. 
BLACK, S. E. and L.M. LYNCH (2002), “Measuring Organizational Capital in the New Economy”, 
mimeo. 
BLACK, S. E. and L.M. LYNCH (2001), "How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and 
Information Technology on Productivity", Review of Economics and Statistics, August 2001. 
BLANCHFLOWER, D. and S. MACHIN (1996), “Product market competition, wages and productivity: 
international evidence from establishment-level data”, Centre for Economic Performance, 
Discussion paper No. 286, April. 
BLINDER, A. and A. KRUEGER (1996), “Labor Turnover in the USA and Japan: A Tale of Two 
Countries”, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 1, pp. 27-57. 
BLUNDELL, R., R. GRIFFITH and J. VAN REENEN (1995), “Dynamic Count Data Models of 
Technological Innovation”, Economic Journal, Vol. 105, pp. 333-344. 
BLUNDELL, R., R. GRIFFITH and J. VAN REENEN (1999), “Market Share, Market Value and 
Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, 
pp. 529-554. 
BOONE, J. (2000a), “Competition”, CEnteR Discussion Paper No.2000-104, Tilburg University. 
BOONE, J. (2000b), “Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in Product and Process 
Innovation”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 549-569. 
BOONE, J. (2001a), “Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate”, International Journal of 
Industrial Organisation, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 705-726. 
BOONE, J. (2001b), “Measuring Competition: How Are Cost Differentials Mapped into Profit 
Differentials?”, CPB Working Paper No.131. 
BOOTH, A. and D. SNOWER (1996), (eds.) Acquiring Skills, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
BOYER, R. (1988), “Technical Change and the Theory of Regulation”, in G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, 
G. Silverberg and L. Soete (eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter. 
BRESCHI, S., F. MALERBA and L. ORSENIGO (2000), “Technological Regimes and Schumpeterian 
Patterns of Innovation”, Economic Journal, Vol. 110, pp. 388-410. 
BRESNAHAN, T.F., E. BRYNJOLFSSON, and L.M. HITT (2002), “Information Technology, Workplace 
Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm- Level Evidence,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February, pp. 339-376. 
CABALLERO R.J. and M.L. HAMMOUR (1994), “The cleansing effect of creative destruction”, 
American Economic Review, 84(5), pp. 1350-68. 
CABALLERO R.J. and M.L. HAMMOUR (1996), “On the timing and efficiency of creative destruction”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, pp. 1350-68. 
CAMERON, G. (1998), “Innovation and growth: A survey of the empirical evidence”, mimeo. 
CAPPELLI, P. (2000), “Examining the Incidence of Downsizing and Its Effect on Establishment 
Performance”, in D. Neumark (ed.), On the Job, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
  106 
CARLIN, W., and D. SOSKICE (1990), Macroeconomics and the Wage Bargain, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
CASPER, S. LEHRER, M. and D. SOSKICE (1999), "Can High-Technology Industries Prosper in 
Germany? Institutional Frameworks and the Evolution of the German Software and Biotechnology 
Industries", Industry and Innovation, 6(1), June, pp. 5-24. 
CAVES, R.E. (1998), “Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and Mobility of Firms”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36:4, pp. 1947-82. 
CAVES, R.E., and BARTON (1990), Efficiency in US Manufacturing Industries. MIT Press.  
CAVES, D. L. CHRISTENSEN and E. DIEWERT (1982), “Multilateral comparisons of output, input, and 
productivity using superlative index numbers”, Economic Journal, 92. 
CHENNELS, L., and J. VAN REENEN (1998), “Establishment Level Earnings, Technology and the 
Growth of Inequality, Economics of Innovation and the New Technology, Vol. 5, pp. 139-164. 
CHEUNG, Y.W., and A. GARCIA PASCUAL (2001), “Market Structure, Technology Spillovers, and 
Persistence in Productivity Differentials”, CESifo working paper series No. 517. 
COE, D.T., and E. HELPMAN (1995), “International R&D Spillovers”, European Economic Review, 
Vol. 39, pp. 859-887. 
COHEN, W. (1995), “Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity”in P. Stoneman (ed.), Handbook of the 
Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Oxford: Blackwell. 
COLECCHIA. A. and P. SCHREYER (2001), "ICT Investment and Economic Growth in the 1990s: Is the 
United States A Unique Case? A Comparative Study of Nine OECD Countries", OECd, STI 
Working Papers 2001/7. 
DAVID, P.A. (2001), “The Digital Technology Boomerang:New Intellectual Property Rights Threaten 
Global “Open Science”, mimeo. 
DAVID, P.A., B.H. HALL, and A.A. TOOLE (1999), “Is public R&D a complement or substitute for 
private R&D? A review of the econometric evidence”, Research Policy, Vol. 29(4-5), pp. 497-530. 
DEAN, E.R. (1999), “The Accuracy of the BLS Productivity Measures”, Monthly Labor Review, February, 
pp. 24-34. 
DiNARDO, J. and J. PISCHKE, (1997), "The Returns to Computer Use Revisited: Have Pencils Changed 
the Wage Structure Too?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), pp 291-304.  
DISNEY, R., J. HASKEL and Y. HEDEN (2000), “Restructuring and productivity growth in UK 
manufacturing”, CEPR Discussion paper series, No. 2463, May. 
DOLLAR, D. and E. WOLFF (1994), “Capital intensity and TFP convergence by industry in 
manufacturing, 196385”, in (eds.) Baumol, W. R. Nelson and E. Wolff  “Convergence of 
productivity: cross-national studies and historical evidence”,  Oxford Univ. Press..    
DOMS, M., R. JARMIN and S. KLIMEK, “IT Investment and Firm Performance in U.S. Retail Trade,” 
mimeo, Center for Economic Studies, 2001.  
DOMS, M., T. DUNNE and K. TROSKE, (1997),"Workers, Wages and Technology," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 112(1), pp 253-90.  
DUNNE, T., (1994), "Patterns of Technology Usage in U.S. Manufacturing Plants," RAND Journal of 
Economics, 25(3), pp. 488-99.  
DUNNE, T., L. FOSTER, J. HALTIWANGER and K. TROSKE, (2001), “Wage and productivity 
dispersion in U.S. manufacturing; the role of computer investment,” mimeo. 
DUSO, T., and L.H. RÖLLER (2001), “Towards a Political Economy of Industrial Organization: 
Empirical Regularities from Deregulation”, WZB Discussion Paper, FS IV 01-03. 
DUYSTERS, G. and J. HAGEDOORN (2000), “Learning in dynamic inter-firm networks - the efficacy of 
multiple contacts”, MERIT Research Memoranda 009. 
EATON, B. CURTIS, and RICHARD G. LIPSEY (1989), “Product differentiation”,  in Handbook of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 1, ed. R. Schmalensee and R. Willig (Amsterdam: North-Holland). 
ELMESKOV, J., J. MARTIN and S. SCARPETTA (1998), “Key Lessons for Labour Market Reforms: 
Evidence from OECD Countries’ Experiences”, Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 5, pp. 205-
252. 
  107 
ERICSON, R. And A. PAKES (1995), “Markov perfect industry dynamics: a framework for empirical 
analysis”, Review of Economic Studies, pp. 53-82, Vol. 62, No. 1. 
EUROSTAT (1995), "Recommendation Manual: Business Register", Doc.Eurostat/D3/REP/2rev8.   
EVANS, D., and R. SCHMALENSEE (2001), “Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in 
Dynamically Competitive Industries” NBER Working Paper Series No.8268. 
FISHER, F.M. (1965), “Embodied Technical Change and the Existence of an Aggregate Capital Stock”, 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 32, pp. 263-88. 
FOSTER, L., J.C. HALTIWANGER and C.J. KRIZAN (1998), “Aggregate Productivity Growth: Lessons 
from Microeconomic Evidence”, NBER Working paper, No. 6803. 
FRANTZEN, D. (2000), “Innovation, International Technological Diffusion and the Changing Influence of 
R&D on Productivity”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 193-210. 
GARCIA PASCUAL, A and F. WESTERMANN (2001), "Productivity Convergence in European 
Manufacturing", Review of International Economics.   
GEROSKI, P.A. (1990), “Innovation, Technological Opportunity, and Market Structure”, Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol.. 42, pp. 586-602. 
GEROSKI, P.A. (1991a), “Market dynamics and entry”, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
GEROSKI, P.A. (1991b), “Domestic and foreign entry in the United Kingdom: 1983-1984”, in Geroski 
and Schwalbach 1991. 
GEROSKI, P. (1995), “What do we Know about Entry?”, International Journal Of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. 13, pp. 421-440. 
GEROSKI, P., S. MACHIN and J. VAN REENEN (1993), “The Profitability of Innovating Firms”, RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer. 
GILBERT, R., and D. NEWBERY (1982), “Pre-emptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 72, pp. 514-526. 
GINARTE, J., and W. PARK (1997), “Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-national Study”, Research 
Policy, Vol. 26, pp. 283-301. 
GORDON, R.J. (2000), “Does the “New Economy” Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?",  
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(Fall), pp. 19-65.. 
GORDON, R.J.(2002), "Technology and economic performance in the American economy",  CEPR 
Discussion Paper Series, No. 3213, February.  
GOTTSCHALK, P., and T. SMEEDING (1997), “Cross National Comparisons of Earnings and Income 
Inequality”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, pp. 633-687. 
GREEN, A. and D.G. MAYES (1991), “Technical Efficiency in Manufacturing Industries” Economic 
Journal, 101, 523-538. 
GRIFFITH R., S. REDDING and J. van REENEN (2000), “Mapping the two faces of R&D: Productivity 
growth in a panel of OECD industries”, IFS working paper W00/02. 
GRILICHES, Z. (1990), “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 28, pp. 1661-1797. 
GRILICHES, Z. and H. REGEV (1995), “Firm Productivity in Israeli Industry, 1979-1988”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 65, pp. 175-203. 
GUELLEC, D. and B. VAN POTTELSBERGHE (1997), “Does Government Support Stimulate Private 
R&D?” OECD Economic Studies, No. 29, pp. 95-122. 
GUELLEC, D. and B. VAN POTTELSBERGHE (2001), “R&D and productivity growth: panel data 
analysis of 16 OECD countries”, OECD Economic Studies, No.33(2), pp. 103-126. 
HALL, P., and D. SOSKICE (2001), Varieties of Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
HAMEL, G (1998), “Bringing Silicon Valley Inside”, Harvard Business Review, Sept/Oct. 
HASKEL, J. and A. SANCHIS (1995), “Privatisation and X-inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach”, The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 43, No. 3, September. 
HAVRYLYSHYN, O. (1990), “Trade Policy and Productivity Gains in Developing Countries: A Survey 
of the Literature”, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 5, pp. 1-24. 
  108 
HEMPELL, T. (2002), "Does Experience Matter? Productivity Effects of ICT in the German Service 
Sector, February, ZEW. 
HAX, A.C. and D.L. WILDE (1999), “The Delta Model: Adaptive management for a changing world”, 
Sloan Management Review, Winter. 
HODRICK, R. and E. PRESCOTT (1997), “Post-war US Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation”, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 29, 1-16. 
HOLMSTRÖM, B. (1982), "Moral hazard in teams", Bell Journal of Economics, 13, pp. 324-340. 
JORGENSON, D.W. (1966), “The Embodiment Hypothesis”, Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 74, 
No. 1, pp. 1-17. 
JORGENSON, D.W. and K.J. STIROH (2000), “Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Economic Growth in the 
Information Age”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 125-211. 
JOVANOVIC, B. (1982), “Selection and the Evolution of Industry”, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 3, May, 
pp. 649-70. 
JOVANOVIC, B. and Y. NYARKO (1996), “Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 64, pp.1299-1310. 
KAMIEN, M. and N. SCHWARTZ (1982), Market Structure and Innovation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
KLETTE, T.J., and Z. GRILICHES (2000), “Empirical Patterns of Firm Growth and R&D Investment: A 
Quality Ladder Model Interpretation”, Economic Journal, Vol. 110, pp. 363-387. 
KLETTE, T.J., and S. KORTUM (2002), “Innovating firms and aggregate innovation”, NBER Working 
Paper No. w8819. 
KOEDIJK, K. and J. KREMERS (1996), “Market opening, regulation and growth in Europe”, Economic 
Policy, No. 23, October, pp. 445-467. 
KÖLLING, A. (2000) The IAB-Establishment Panel. Schmollers Jahrbuch, Journal of Applied Social 
Science Studies, 120:2, 291 - 300. 
LAZAER, E.P and S. ROSEND (1981), “Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts”. Journal of 
Political Economy, 89, 841-864.  
LEE, J.W. (1993), “International Trade, Distortions, and Long-Run Economic Growth”, IMF Staff Papers, 
Vol.. 40, pp. 299-328. 
LEVIN, R. (1978), “Technical Change, Barriers to Entry and Market Structure”, Economica, Vol.. 45, 
pp. 347-361. 
LICHTENBERG, F.R. (1988), “The private R&D investment response to federal design and technical 
competitions”, American Economic Review, Vol. 78, pp. 550-559. 
LYNCH, L. (1994) (ed.), Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press for the NBER. 
MACDONALD, J.M., (1994), “Does Import Competition Force Efficient Production?”,  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 76(4), pp.721-727. 
MALERBA, F., and L. ORSENIGO (1995), “Schumpeterian Patterns of Innovation”, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 47-65.  
MALERBA, F., and L. ORSENIGO (1997), “Technological Regimes and Sectoral Patterns of Innovative 
Activities”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 6, pp. 83-117. 
McCUE, K. (1996), “Promotions and Wage Growth”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 175-209. 
McKINSEY Global Institute (1997), Removing Barriers to Growth and Employment in France and 
Germany, McKinsey. 
MEYER , M., and J. VICKERS, (1997), "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," Journal of 
Political Economy , 105, 3, 547-581. 
MILGROM, P. and J. ROBERTS (1995). “Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, structure and 
organizational change in manufacturing.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 19. Pp. 179-
208. 
MOULTON, B.R. (1986), “Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 32, pp. 385-397. 
  109 
NADIRI, M.I. (1993), “Innovations and technological spillovers”, NBER Working Paper No. 4423. 
NALEBUFF, B., and J. STIGLITZ (1983),  “Information, Competition and Markets”, American Economic 
Revue, Papers and Proceedings 73, 278-93. 
NELSON, R. and S. WINTER (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, Mass.: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
NICKELL, S. (1996), “Competition and Corporate Performance”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, 
pp. 724-746. 
NICKELL, S., D. NICOLITSAS and N. DRYDEN (1997), “What makes firms perform well?”, European 
Economic Review, 41. 
NICOLETTI, G., S. SCARPETTA and O. BOYLAUD (1999), “Summary Indicators of Product Market 
Regulation with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation”, OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No 226. 
NICOLETTI, G., R. C. G. HAFFNER, S. NICKELL, S. SCARPETTA and G. ZOEGA (2001a), 
“European Integration, Liberalisation and Labour Market Performance”, in G. Bertola, T. Boeri and 
G. Nicoletti (eds), Welfare and Employment in a United Europe, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
NICOLETTI, G. A. BASSANINI, E. ERNST, S. JEAN, P. SANTIAGO and P. SWAIM (2001b), "Product 
and Labour Market Interactions in OECD Countries", OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No 312. 
OECD (1993), Education at a Glance, Paris, June. 
OECD (1996), Industry Productivity - International Comparison and Measurement Issues, Paris. 
OECD (1997), The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform, Paris. 
OECD (1998a), Technology, Productivity and Job Creation - Best Policy Practices, Paris. 
OECD (1998b), Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 1998, Paris. 
OECD (1999), The OECD Jobs Strategy: Assessing Performance and Policy, Paris. 
OECD (2000a), A New Economy?: The Changing Role of Innovation and Information Technology in 
Growth, Paris. 
OECD (2000b), Education at a Glance, Paris, June. 
OECD (2001a), “The New Economy Beyond the Hype: The OECD Growth Project", Paris.  
OECD (2001b), OECD Economic Studies n.32, Special issue on regulatory reform, Paris. 
OLINER, S.D. and D.E. SICHEL (2000), “The Resurgence of Growth in the late 1990s: Is Information 
Technology the Story?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (4), pp/3 -22. 
PAKES, A. and R. ERICSON (1995), “Markov perfect industry dynamics: a framework for empirical 
work”, Review of Economic Studies, 62(1), p. 53--82.  
PAKES, A. and R. ERICSON (1998), “Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of Firm Dynamics”, 
Journal or Economic Theory, 79(1), p. 1-45. 
PAVITT, K. (1998), “Technologies, Products and Organization in the Innovating Firm: What Adam Smith 
tells Us and Joseph Schumpeter Doesn't”, Industrial and Corporate Change, 7(3), p. 433-52. 
PEREZ, C. and L. SOETE (1988), “Catching up in Technology: Entry Barriers and Windows of 
Opportunity”, in G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete (eds.), Technical 
Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter. 
PILAT, D. and F.C. LEE (2001), "Productivity Growth in ICT-Producing and ICT-Using Industries: A 
Source of Growth Differentials in the OECD?", OECD STI Working Papers, 2001/4.   
PORTER, M., (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: MacMillan Press. 
REINGANUM, J. (1983), “Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly”, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 73, pp. 61-66. 
SAINT-PAUL, J. (2002), "Employment protection, international specialisation and innovation", European 
Economic Review, (46)2 (2002) pp. 375-395. 
 SCARPETTA, S. and T. TRESSEL (2002), “Productivity and Convergence in a Panel of OECD 
industries: Do Regulations and Institutions Matter? ”, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, forthcoming. 
  110 
SCARPETTA, S., A. BASSANINI, D. PILAT and P. SCHREYER (2000), “Economic growth in the 
OECD area: recent trends at the aggregate and sectoral level”, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 248. 
SCHARFSTEIN, D. (1988), "Product Market Competition and Managerial Slack", Rand Journal of 
Economics 19,147-155. 
SCHREYER, P. (2000), “The Impact of Information and Communication Technology on Output Growth”, 
OECD STI Working Paper, 2000/2. 
SCOTCHMER, S. (1991), “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5(1), pp. 29-41. 
SOLOW, R.M. (1957), “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function”, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 39, pp. 312-20. 
SOSKICE, D. (1997), “German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National Institutional Frameworks”, 
Industry and Innovation, Vol. 4, pp. 75-96. 
TEULINGS, C., and J. HARTOG (1998), Corporatism or Competition? Labour Contracts, Institutions 
and Wage Structures in International Comparison, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
THOMKE, S., Von HIPPEL, E., and R. FRANKE (1998), “Modes of Experimentation: An Innovation 
Process--and Competitive—Variable”, Research Policy, 27(3), p. 315-32. 
VAN WINJNBERGEN, S., and A. J. VENABLES (1993). “Trade Liberalization, Productivity, and 
Competition: The Mexican Experience,” mimeo, Centre for Economic Performance, London School 
of Economics. 
VICKERS, J. (1995), “Entry and Competitive Selection”, mimeo. 
WIELAND, V. (2000) “Learning by doing and the value of optimal experimentation”, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 24(4), p. 501-34. 
WINSTON, C. (1993), “Economic deregulation: Days of reckoning for microeconomists”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XXX1, pp. 1263-1289, September. 
WINTER, S. (1971), “Satisficing, Selection and the Innovating Remnant”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 85, pp. 237-261. 
ZIMMERMANN, K. (1998), “German Job Mobility and Wages”, in I. Ohashi and T. Tachibanaki (eds.), 
Internal Labour Markets, Incentives and Employment, London: MacMillan. 
